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The whole universe is in constant flux or perpetual mutation . . . in this
endless progress, the same atom of matter may pass through every
possible Combination, the whole circle of possibilities may be exhausted,
and perhaps the same coincidents & combinations frequently repeated. It
is no less credible that every possible modification of human society and
of individual mind may, at some period or other be called into being.
CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN, in a letter to “Susan Godolphin” (1793)

INTRODUCTION
“VARIETIES OF UNTRIED BEING”
Although the Gothic is a tremendously versatile mode, terror remains central to
its definition.1 Eric Savoy, for example, has argued that any “theory of gothic cultural
production . . . is necessarily invested in a poetics of terror.”2 Scholars often connect
this terror to political fears, particularly when they address the turn of the nineteenth
century, the so-called “age of democratic revolutions.” Angela Wright, for example,
argues that the Gothic shifts at the turn of the century “from reclaiming an
‘immemorial past’ in the 1760s and 1770s to evoking clear and direct connotations of
terror in the 1790s, particularly as the Reign of Terror commenced in revolutionary
France.”3 This line of argument originates at the turn of the nineteenth century, when
figures such as the Marquis de Sade argued that Gothic fiction was “the inevitable
result of the revolutionary shocks which all of Europe had suffered.”4 The political
nature of this revolutionary fear was perhaps best articulated in 1983 by Ronald
Paulson, who argued that “the gothic tended to be the form adopted by those who were
either against or merely intrigued by the Revolution, or by problems of freedom and
compulsion”—even if, like Sade, those figures were considered politically radical
themselves.5 This mode of understanding the Gothic as political fear has continued to
haunt the critical landscape of Gothic studies in the work of scholars such as Fred
Botting, Teresa A. Goddu, and Carol Margaret Davison.6
Departing from such well-established arguments that associate the Gothic
tradition with political fear, my dissertation recovers the Gothic as a literature of
political possibility. I argue that Gothic novels challenge liberal ideas of the bounded
self to produce a sometimes radically egalitarian politics of freedom in the lateeighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Driving narratives of political fear in this
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period was the concern that, in an age of revolution and emergent democracy,
distinctions of rank and class were being challenged by new political systems emerging
in France and the United States. Yet this was also a period of shifting scientific
thought as debates about human variety challenged the biological categories of gender,
race, and species that were just beginning to be established. In this project, I
demonstrate how a transatlantic Gothic literature brought biological and political
indistinction together so that the horrors of one commented on the terror of the other.7
However, this language of indistinction is also what Gothic authors used to describe
the political promise of this period. I read taxonomists and politicians together,
articulating the correlation between emergent biology and revolutionary democracy, to
reconsider what these thinkers imagined as possible in both science and politics—and
how the very imagination of those possibilities seemed both terrifying and liberating.
In arguing for a more liberatory and transatlantic reading of the Gothic, I align
myself with the recently-published Transnational Gothic, in which Monika Elbert and
Bridget M. Marshal claim that “the destabilizing quality of Gothic encounters, while
threatening, have the potential to be quite liberating.”8 Elbert and Marshall argue
compellingly that the “Gothic is a literature of freedom, above all, even it if involves a
painful dialectic between possessed and dispossessed, which finally culminates in a
vision of freedom—or at least of such liberating possibilities.”9 Yet whereas their
utopian visions of the Gothic are tied almost exclusively to a political reading of
freedom, my project also emphasizes a liberatory biology. In the following chapters I
argue that Gothic challenges to the bounded liberal self are both political and
biological in nature. Other critics have acknowledged the dialectic of fear and desire
often present in the Gothic, but few scholars before Elbert and Marshall have teased
out the affirmative politics of a revolutionary Gothic.
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Histories of the Gothic often begin with Edmund Burke, and for good reason. As
Joseph Crawford and others have recognized, Gothic rhetoric is “often articulated in
terms of the Burkean sublime of terror,” and many Gothic chronologies open with
Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful
(1757).10 Paulson notes that “it seems not possible to write about the Revolution and
avoid the aesthetic categories first introduced by Burke in his Reflections,” while
Davison similarly acknowledges the long shadow Burke casts on the aesthetic
categories by which the French Revolution was understood—categories that frequently
included Gothic imagery.11 In the first of his Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796), for
example, Burke writes: “out of the tomb of the murdered monarchy in France has
arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more terrifick guise than any
which ever yet have overpowered the imagination, and subdued the fortitude of
man.”12 Here Burke’s reference to a politically-charged sublime spectre represents a
Gothic terror of revolution that can overpower the human imagination. That terror
manifests itself as a fear of formlessness that surfaces again and again in Burke’s
political writings. In Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), for example, Burke
is forced into choosing monarchy (which by 1796 has been “murdered”) over the
shapeless and arbitrary power of revolutionaries. When faced with the political stakes
of indistinction, Burke argues on behalf of forms, customs, and distinctions.
Indeed, one of Burke’s deepest concerns is that French revolutionaries have
abandoned all historical and political precedents in setting up their government.
Burke wrote explicitly in his Reflections that “the very idea of the fabrication of a new
government, is enough to fill us with disgust and horror.”13 The language of
monstrosity and horror is central to his descriptions throughout the text:
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In viewing this monstrous tragic-comic scene, the most opposite passions
necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind;
alternate contempt and indignation; alternate laughter and tears;
alternate scorn and horror.14
Such language further demonstrates the political fear embedded in the Gothic rhetoric
of this period. In addition, the rhetoric of mixture draws attention to Burke’s fears of
indistinction, as mixture violates the boundaries of social and political taxonomies.15
Burke continues to express a deep anxiety over lack of definitions and categories,
fearing that France has become “a state of unbounded power, for undefined and
undefinable purposes.”16 In Burke’s eyes, this indistinction leads humans to be little
more than animals who “range without limit, and are diversified by infinite
combinations in the wild and unbounded regions of the imagination.”17 This reference
to humans as animals demonstrates that, at least metaphorically, Burke saw
violations of political distinctions as a violation of species boundaries. Being politically
indistinct was comparable to being nonhuman (or less than human): in other words,
being unclassifiable and unknowable—therefore terrifying.
In his earlier Enquiry we gain a better understanding of Burke’s investment in
political distinctions. The same anxieties and tensions that play out in Burke’s
Enquiry—anxieties that Adam Phillips refers to as “the infinite possibilities of human
subjects and a complementary terror of endless confusion and uncertainty”—turn into
a full-fledged obsession with maintaining forms and political distinctions in Burke’s
later political writings.18 Burke’s interest in distinctions has been critically wellestablished by Gothic scholars. Paulson, for example, writes that:
Burke would have agreed that what the Revolution was all about, in its
social dimension at least, was difference. Once it had achieved its first
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aim of ‘liberty,’ its second aim (perhaps a consequence of the first) was to
bring about the ‘equality’ of undifferentiation, which he predicted would
produce uncurbable violence.19
Unlike Paulson, however, who also uses the language of undifferentiation to describe
cycles of retaliation in the revolutionary Gothic, I turn to the language of indistinction
to represent both Burke’s fears of undifferentiation and the Gothic promise of
indistinction as a form of freedom. While Burke certainly sees undifferentiation as
productive of violence, he also struggles with the ways in which it might also be
necessary to build a strong body politic. This leads us back to his aesthetic writings.
Revolutionary writers adopted his language of the sublime for revolutionary discourse,
and—as Furniss has argued—Burke struggled to resist that. He wanted to recast the
French Revolution as a false sublime, or a paralyzing spectacle of terror. Yet in his
own aesthetic writings, Burke also describes fear as having a productive function; it is
not merely disabling. Moments of weakness or terror are like the exercising of muscles,
according to Burke—they are conducive to both health and strength.20 As such,
survival is somewhat dependent on fears produced by the sublime. So, while his
Reflections seek to paint the Gothic terror of revolution, his own aesthetic categories
allow for a functional capacity to the sublime that is perhaps even enabling.
I begin with Burke because it is this tension between boundlessness and order
presented in his aesthetic writings that provides a language of gothic sensibility for the
authors I discuss—even as most of them at least partially reject his politics. This is
most evident in Wollstonecraft (and, to some extent, Ann Radcliffe), who offers both a
political and an aesthetic critique of Burke’s understanding of the sublime and its
relationship to revolutionary politics.21 In the Reflections, for example, Burke not only
refers to “masculine women” (which upsets formal gender categories) but to “furies of
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hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women.”22 As Furniss notes: “It is not just
that men may have assumed the garb of women, or even that women have taken on
the attributes of men, but that it becomes no longer possible to tell the difference—no
longer possible to assign a fixed gender to either of the revolutionary sexes.”23 For
Burke, gender indistinction is one marker of disruption of hierarchies and social
systems—a marker Wollstonecraft attacks in her response.24 This disrupts the social
and cultural distinctions he sees as essential to maintaining political order, and also
disrupts Burke’s own categories of the sublime and the beautiful (which are clearly
gendered in his aesthetic writings). Here Burke’s aesthetic categories become clearly
political. As Furniss writes, “Burke takes for granted the analogy between the human
body and political state.”25 This analogy matters, because Wollstonecraft uses biology
to make political arguments about gender and indistinction—a move crafted
specifically as a response to Burke’s writings.
Burke fears social and political indistinction, and it is important to recognize
that he is writing in a period in which Europeans also expressed biological fears of
indistinction—particularly in terms of the instability of species distinctions in America.
Burke’s invocation of Cato in the aftermath of the French Revolution is a striking
moment of this overlap between biological and political discourse in Europe and
America. In a 1789 letter to Charles-Jean-Francois Depont, Burke writes, “the French
may be yet to go through more transmigrations. They may pass, as one of our poets
says, ‘through many varieties of untried being,’ before their state obtains its final
form.”26 The poet is Joseph Addison and the quoted phrase is from his play Cato
(1712). Yet while Cato used the phrase “varieties of untried being” to think about
metaphysics and the afterlife, Burke uses it to describe shifting political forms and
systems following the French Revolution.27 Burke sees these “transmigrations” as
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chaotic, warning his friend to “fix rules” and establish a semblance of stability until
the state reaches its final form. Formlessness and the lack of fixed distinctions in a
period of revolutionary activity unsettle Burke, which explains the fierce advocacy of
social and political distinctions in the Reflections and his later work.
Yet the passage Burke cites from Addison’s final act also invokes a language of
biological indistinction: “Through what variety of untried being, / Through what new
scenes and changes must we pass! / The wide, the unbounded prospect, lies before
me.”28 The language of variety in Addison’s “variety of untried being” offers a
vocabulary for interrogating human exceptionalism in an early republic that looked
out over its own “unbounded prospect” with concerns about mixture and hybridity. By
the late eighteenth century, “variety” had become a politically and culturally charged
term in debates over human diversity, with polygenists often using the word
interchangeably with “species” and monogenists primarily using “variety” to indicate
differences in degree rather than kind. In the second edition to Systema Naturae (1740),
for example, Carolus Linnaeus divided the human species into six varieties, fueling a
debate over race and human origins that continued into the nineteenth century and
played a significant role in the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin.29
Thomas Jefferson’s participation in this debate is notable; his response to
Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon’s work in Notes on the State of Virginia (1785)
and his often-contradictory stance towards blacks demonstrate the centrality of such
questions.30 In the late-eighteenth century, a number of American writers—including
both Jefferson and Brown—felt it necessary to respond to claims about American
species made by natural historians such as Buffon and C. F. Volney.31 Beginning with
Jefferson, and even earlier with Crèvecœur’s Letters from an American Farmer (1782), I
argue that American Gothic fiction is often a critique of European claims that
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Americans are mixed, prolific, and degenerate. It is in the context of these debates that
theologians and natural philosophers explored human difference through science,
politics, and religion. Such writings took on new significance in the aftermath of the
French and Haitian revolutions as they became intertwined with increasingly heated
debates about human diversity and human origins.
The crossroads of biology and politics becomes a nexus of the authors in this
dissertation as they engage with broader questions about human life. Their politics are
not framed strictly in the Burkean sense of a contract between the living and the dead
(a source of debate between Burke and Thomas Paine), but also in terms of what
counts as political life in an age of democratic revolutions. For example, if democratic
man is a creature with rights inherent in him or her solely by the fact of being human
and being alive, in the 1790s this endowment of life also makes him or her a matter of
government. By imagining a reduction of man to mere animal life through leveling, the
authors in this project seem to be questioning whether human life itself—life subject
to biological and political indistinction—might be too weak a category to shape
governments or social orders. If the human is as fluid and changeable as Stanhope
Smith posits, how can it be expected to constitute stable political forms? Yet unlike
Burke, the authors in this project attempt to view this instability as promising—an
opportunity to look beyond the human toward new forms of freedom.
While the primary authors highlighted in this dissertation—Mary Wollstonecraft,
Charles Brockden Brown, Mary Shelley, and Robert Montgomery Bird—are not the
first to grapple with species difference and human indistinction, the utopian potential
of mixture and transformation takes on a new political resonance in their texts. These
authors were versed in the scientific writings of figures like Samuel Stanhope Smith,
Erasmus Darwin, and Samuel Morton, as well as the political writings circulating
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across the Atlantic. They responded by crafting a Gothic fiction that explored the
potential consequences of radical leveling and responded to a Burkean politics of
distinction by instead exploring the liberatory promise of indistinction in their
writings—often drawing on Burke’s own aesthetics of the sublime to shape an
emergent transatlantic Gothic sensibility.32 Drawing on this work, I demonstrate how
questions about the stability of the human as a political category became questions
about the stability of the human as a biological category as these authors imagined a
world that was already effectively posthuman. Gothic literature thus represents an
important arena for constructing a politics of indistinction, and I selected those Gothic
narratives of indistinction that most clearly examine the biological (sleepwalking,
plague, species, reanimation, and psychology) to think about the political (democracy,
revolution, boundlessness, and equality) and vice versa. These texts reveal an intense
engagement with early nineteenth-century constructions of the human and the self,
and serve as laboratory for experimenting with the fears and hopes of indistinction.
No writer more explicitly responds to Burke, nor engages with the promise of
indistinction as optimistically as Mary Wollstonecraft. Through the lens of Samuel
Stanhope Smith’s An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in
the Human Species (1788), which I discuss at length in Chapter 1, Wollstonecraft’s
political treatises and engagement with Burke suggest how pervasive the intertwined
questions of human distinction and political history became in an age of democratic
revolutions. Whereas figures such as Burke and John Adams (among others)
attempted to theorize a politics of distinction amidst democratic revolutions by arguing
for human distinctions as political and historical necessities, Wollstonecraft turns to
biology and the natural sciences to theorize a politics of indistinction that, while still
commenting on the political conflicts and controversies of this period, is rooted in a
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parallel debate in the sciences over human plasticity and variation. This matters
because both of these debates have too long been rooted in the narratives of political
or biological degeneracy, and have for too long been treated themselves as distinct.
Wollstonecraft—and other authors in this project—upend those narratives by thinking
about indistinction as productive. Wollstonecraft argues that Burke’s affections for
heredity, nobility, customs make nobility into nothing more than “monsters in human
shape,” and asks: “How can he discover that he is a man, when all his wants are
instantly supplied, and invention is never sharpened by necessity?”33 In Rights of
Woman (1798), Wollstonecraft dedicates an entire chapter to the “pernicious effects
which arise from the unnatural distinctions established in society,” building upon
these claims.34 Wollstonecraft inverts the Gothic rhetoric of Burke, making
distinctions themselves unnatural and monstrous. Hearkening back to a tradition of
Longinus where the sublime is tied to political liberty, Wollstonecraft sees indistinction
(and particularly gender indistinction) as natural and politically liberatory.
As an interdisciplinary project interested in boundlessness, it should come as
no surprise that my dissertation has its own boundary issues. Yet these issues have
profound methodological and literary-historical implications. Stretching from the
1780s to the 1840s, my project is situated along a historical fault line in American
literary studies (early American vs. nineteenth-century American) while also crossing
the geographical and national boundaries between American and British literature.35 I
have framed my dissertation as a transatlantic project because revolutionary
discourse is transatlantic, and because the Gothic is a transatlantic genre.36 Like
them, I also resist the ways in which scholarship on the Gothic has been limited by
national borders—although the scope of my project still limits me to a study of British
and American fiction. This scope, however, allows me to produce a more coherent
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transatlantic literary history than scholars of the Gothic have acknowledged.37 To do
this effectively, I also work across disciplinary boundaries. In this project, I engage
with literature and history, political theory, science studies, and philosophy. The
result of these boundary crossings is a project that rethinks a Gothic literary tradition
following the “age of democratic revolutions” in order to accommodate convergent
political and scientific narratives centered on the contested figure of the human.
By tracing a transatlantic literary history that begins with Mary Wollstonecraft,
I purposefully deemphasize the influence of William Godwin on these authors—many
of whom are often labeled Godwinian—to better understand Wollstonecraft’s influence
on the Gothic sensibility of this period.38 I similarly dislocate traditional narratives of
an “American” Gothic that often jump straight from Brown to Edgar Allan Poe. The
landscape of existing scholarship on Wollstonecraft, Brown, Shelley, and Bird rarely
engages with their transatlantic literary-historical influences. Both Brown and Shelley,
for example, were influenced by Wollstonecraft. Brown’s first novel, Alcuin: A Dialogue
(1798), was an attempt to write an American version of Wollstonecraft’s Rights of
Woman. Shelley read Brown’s novels and admired them (even referencing Brown in her
1826 novel, The Last Man); Bird, on the other hand, despised Brown’s work—even as
he modeled his own writings on Brown and even repurposed some of Brown’s material
outright. All of these authors read and responded (directly or indirectly) to Burke. Yet
few scholars have examined them together, and those who work on them individually
often mistakenly diagnose a conservative postrevolutionary turn in their politics. In
this dissertation, I look to remedy that by articulating a more radical politics of
indistinction and proposing an alternative literary trajectory for understanding the
historical and political continuities of the transatlantic Gothic in this period.
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It is the transatlantic dimension of my project that allowed me to discover the
Gothic as a politics of possibility. The translation of British Gothic into American
Gothic and Brown’s revision of European suspicions of American species are what
open up indistinction as a politically liberatory concept, just as the confluence of
political and biological narratives also make the Gothic a genre of utopian promise. In
Edgar Huntly (1799), for example, Brown embeds a European Gothic narrative within
his American tale, allowing us to think carefully about the Gothic as a transatlantic
mode—one that travels with Clithero from England to America. By depicting Clithero
as a shapeshifter when he arrives in America, Brown represents the move from a
European Gothic to an American Gothic not merely as a geographical shift that marks
a move from castles to frontier fiction, but as a shift from the Gothic as a breakdown
of distinctions of rank and class (Clithero’s narrative) to the Gothic as an enabling
space of ontological indistinction (Edgar’s narrative) that redeems America from
European suspicions of degeneracy. Edgar’s narrative produces an ontological
framework that opens up fluid human-animal possibilities that aren’t strictly
incorporated within a dominant cultural mode or a monstrous otherness, as I argue
more fully in in Chapter 2. Instead, my reading of these narratives highlights how
indistinction always has been central to Gothic writing, and how these fictions
produce not only a dialectic of fear and desire, but a landscape of political possibility.
It is for this reason that I turn to posthumanist methodologies as a way of reading
monstrosity as something more than a terrifying otherness—what Judith Halberstam
refers to as a deviant status—but rather the utopian promise of posthumanity.
Posthumanism, animal studies, and biopolitics have become important modes
of inquiry in contemporary Americanist scholarship, and a similar turn to the
intersection of life sciences and politics in the early Atlantic world is necessary in
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order to understand how the Gothic engages with and challenges liberal ideas of the
human self.39 Novelists and scientists throughout the Atlantic world sought to
construct narratives that could address questions of natural variety, human diversity,
dynamic change, community, and the self—questions that are also deeply political.40
This project examines how these writers organized their reality around figures of
ambiguity and paradox (particularly as they explored what it meant to be human),
while seeking more complex and less anthropocentric narratives that resisted binary
systems of understanding the human and the natural world.41 For this project, the
work of Donna Haraway has been particularly important. While Haraway’s greatest
impact on literary and culture studies has been her feminist writings—most popularly
“A Cyborg Manifesto” (1985)—in this project I have been drawn to her other work on
reclaiming monsters as regenerative figures and the idea of companion species.42 I see
Haraway as a natural successor to Mary Wollstonecraft; she is an intellectual who
draws on biological arguments to produce feminist challenges to hierarchies and the
politics of distinction I have laid out in this introduction. Reading Haraway today, it
seems clear that her work represents an ongoing response to Burke—her insistence on
a politics for “inappropriate/d others” who are “not to be originally fixed by difference”
is itself a politics of indistinction.43 More importantly, perhaps, she offers an
affirmative model for thinking through what a politics of indistinction might look like,
and how such a politics opens up new possibilities for reading the Gothic as a
literature of possibility. Her work makes it possible to reexamine how scholars read
the postcolonial “other” (what she calls a reification based on difference), and to build
a less anthropocentric method for thinking about literary and culture studies. The
work of Haraway in producing a more liberatory and affirmative politics of
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posthumanism maps nicely onto my view of the revolutionary Gothic as an affirmative
political genre tied to—but not strictly defined by—a poetics of terror.
By articulating a politics of indistinction I highlight what early Americanists
(and those working more broadly in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Atlantic
world) can contribute to conversations about posthumanism and what posthumanist
theory adds to existing early Americanist scholarship.44 I see these as mutually
supportive conversations that do not often meet. Just as Matthew Taylor does the
important work of rethinking posthumanism as something that predates the twentieth
century (beginning with Poe), my project carves out a space for the posthuman in the
transatlantic Gothic fiction of the late-eighteenth century leading up to Poe. Yet even
as his work rethinks the place of the human and the self alongside the cosmologies of
late-nineteenth century (importantly recognizing the role of African-American
literature in this process), my project recognizes a different set of challenges to the
human that exist in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary Atlantic, where emergent
democracies and proto-evolutionary thought force a recalibration of the political and
biological distinctions that previously defined bodies and bodies politic. Cary Wolfe has
noted that posthumanism is both before and after humanism, so this longer trajectory
should seem obvious.45 Still, with the bulk of posthumanist work taking place in the
twentieth century, the work of my dissertation to recognize posthumanity as a much
earlier concern helps us understand that these are not strictly modern questions.
With that in mind, my dissertation opens with Wollstonecraft’s review of Smith’s
An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species
(1788) as evidence of the overlap between biological and political discourse and as an
entry point for thinking more carefully about the critical role Wollstonecraft plays in
shaping a transatlantic Gothic sensibility. I use Smith’s Essay to establish the politics
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of indistinction as a transatlantic concern and to show how America becomes a crucial
space for negotiating the political and biological consequences of equality. I also invoke
his writings as evidence of Wollstonecraft’s engagement with science as foundational
to her political theories—particularly her investment in biological justifications for
gender indistinction. Wollstonecraft’s turn to biology also shapes her response to
Burke’s depictions of the sublime and the beautiful, an act that itself is deeply political.
I argue that Wollstonecraft ultimately harkens back to an earlier version of the
sublime—one that begins with Longinus—as something that can only flourish in
places where equality is valued. Wollstonecraft’s engagement with the intersections of
the biological and the political shape her Gothic sensibility and set up my later
chapters on Brown, Shelley, and Bird, whose Gothic narratives further establish the
sublime as something that does more than threateningly erode boundaries. Instead,
these authors envision the sublime as something more promising, something that
enables the type of boundary-crossings capable of producing radical equality.
The remaining chapters examine the political evolution of this Gothic sensibility
as it plays out into the nineteenth century. My second chapter, on Brown, uses three
of his major novels—Arthur Mervyn (1799-1800), Ormond (1799), and Edgar Huntly
(1799)—to trace the move from gender indistinction in Wollstonecraft’s writing to race
and species indistinction in an emergent American Gothic fiction. I specifically
examine how Brown challenges the idea of human exceptionalism by exploring the
leveling effect of epidemics and the breakdown of human-animal distinctions in the
American wilderness. By recoding immunity as a state of political exception and
sleepwalking as a process of species mixture, Brown interrogates both the
sustainability of political life in a democratic society and the utopian potential of
human indistinction. This chapter offers an expanded reading of Brown’s novels in
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which lycanthropic transformations and imagined immunities allow him to craft a
transatlantic Gothic fiction invested in ontological indistinction.
Locating Brown within a larger transatlantic discourse motivates the move to
Shelley in my third chapter. In The Last Man (1826), Shelley presents a new narrative
of indistinction that moves beyond liberatory human-animal transformations to
explore the posthuman prospects of human extinction. Whereas Brown destabilizes
the category of the human through tropes of somnambulism, lycanthropy, and
narratives of immunity, with Shelley one gets the sense that all political systems are
ultimately rendered indistinct against the leveling power of disease.46 Scholars have
primarily read The Last Man as Shelley’s claim for racial unity and domestic intimacy,
yet in this chapter I argue that such readings miss underlying political claims about
human indistinction. Shelley challenges not only the boundaries of human
communities, but the boundaries of the human as both a biological and a historical
category. By opening up a historical boundlessness and entertaining the possibility of
human reanimation (a trope also present in her 1818 novel, Frankenstein), Shelley
challenges the sustainability of political distinctions over time. In this chapter, I argue
that this speculative historical imagination makes indistinction central to Shelley’s
vision of the potentially utopian ends of human history.
In my fourth chapter I turn to Bird, whose Sheppard Lee (1836) shifts us away
from Shelley’s narratives of reanimation to a narratives of metempsychosis that raises
the possibility of an indistinct self. Bird was familiar with contemporary scientific and
historical debates about racial origins, and while he takes up similar issues as Shelley,
he uses them instead to examine the psychological state of nineteenth-century
American politics. The permeable boundaries between persons—and even between
persons and things—raise questions about how the indistinct self points to the
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mutability of political categories, including the slave/master distinction so actively
debated in antebellum America. The transmigration of soul from body to body in
Sheppard Lee complicates social, political, and biological distinctions and leads to a
politics of indistinction in which the bounded self becomes permeable and leads
(potentially) to madness. Yet this madness is liberatory for Sheppard Lee, allowing him
to engage in radical cross-racial and cross-species sympathies that will continue to
influence political, scientific, and literary inquiries into the nineteenth century.
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Posthumanism has emerged—often in conjunction with animal studies—as a new framework for
understanding both the humanities and the human, although it has not emerged without skepticism and
it has received scant attention outside of twentieth and twenty-first century scholarship. Posthumanist
thinkers, such as Donna Haraway, Isabelle Stengers, and Cary Wolfe, have called for undoing humananimal dichotomies and breaking apart the notion that humans are, or ever were, human. Yet other
scholars, such as Priscilla Wald and David Eng, have been resistant to the use of the term “posthuman”
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Wolfe argues compellingly that “[posthumanism] comes both before and after humanism: before in the
sense that it names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being . . . [but] it comes after in
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Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xv-xvi.
45

That all of the Gothic authors in this project engage on some level with illness highlights a particular
Gothic mode that emerges out of the politics of indistinction seen here in the writings of Smith and
Wollstonecraft. The Gothic horror of these narratives lies in the exigencies of the unknown, the
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construct—one that is tied to emergent democratic revolutions. The physical and metaphorical power of
disease opens up the possibility of human mutability and political leveling. There is a countenancing of
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such, the authors all become uncertain diagnosticians of the cultural and political future of radical
equality in the Atlantic world.
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CHAPTER 1
“HUMAN PLASTICITY”
Mary Wollstonecraft, known for her critical reviews, began her foray into
reviewing scientific texts for the Analytical Review with a rare moment of effusive
praise. In 1788, she reviewed An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and
Figure in the Human Species (1788) by Samuel Stanhope Smith: a Pennsylvania-born
clergyman and president of the College of New Jersey, as well as a prominent
American acolyte of Scottish “Common Sense” philosophy. This marked
Wollstonecraft’s first known review of a scientific text, and remained one of the longest
reviews she would write for Joseph Johnson’s publication.1 What sets this review
apart from others by Wollstonecraft, however, is not merely its subject and length, but
its tone; her review of Smith’s Essay is remarkably positive.2 It opens with a lengthy
meditation on the unity of the human species by Wollstonecraft, followed by claims
that this is “an ingenious essay” and that Stanhope Smith provides “a masterly and
philosophic answer” to the views of Lord Kames, who contended that different races of
men were suited to different climates, an argument that placed him perilously close to
theories of polygenism.3 Wollstonecraft highlights her key interest in Smith’s text by
noting, “Dr. S. rationally concludes that natural causes are sufficiently powerful to
effect the changes observable in the human species.” She then offers an unreserved
recommendation: “Our succinct account will only, we imagine, excite curiosity and
induce the thinker to peruse the whole performance.”4 She quotes liberally from the
Essay, referring to it as “just,” “interesting,” full of “common-sense,” and having “great
force”—then concludes by “expressing the pleasure the perusal has afforded us.”5
Wollstonecraft’s review demonstrates her conversance with Enlightenment discourses
of race and her investment in the political implications of monogenetic narratives, as
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well as her fascination with such questions.6 This “interesting subject,” she claims, is
“of the utmost importance to our happiness.”7
The “interesting subject” of Smith’s Essay is nothing less than the question of
human variety. Smith frames his essay as a response to what he calls the “arbitrary
hypothesis, that men are originally sprung from different stocks, and are therefore
divided by nature into different species,” arguing instead that human variation is the
result of two primary natural causes: the climate and the state of society.8 The
publication date of Smith’s essay places him at the center of scientific debates on race
and theological debates about human origins, and situates him firmly on the side of
monogenism.9 Although he primarily viewed his essay as a scientific and theological
argument against polygenism, by the time he revised it in 1810 he was more keenly
aware of its political implications.10 As I argue later in the chapter, this is one reason
why Wollstonecraft matters: she draws out the political stakes of what Smith primarily
sees as a scientific and theological argument.11
Smith was no minor figure in the United States; he was a respected
Presbyterian clergyman and member of the American Philosophical Society. One year
after being published in Philadelphia, Smith’s Essay was revised and published in
Edinburgh. The first edition was also republished in London in 1789.12 As Winthrop D.
Jordan notes in his introduction to the 1812 edition of Smith’s Essay, while “[his]
book scarcely took England by storm . . . it was accepted as an outstanding
presentation of the argument that human variations were caused by the environment.”
More importantly, “anyone wishing to argue otherwise would have to contend against
Smith.”13 By situating his text within a transatlantic discourse about equality, I
emphasize the biological underpinnings of democratic thought in this period. While it
would be a mistake to read his essay as a manifesto for human equality (Smith
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publicly opposed radical democracy of the Jeffersonian variety), we shouldn’t ignore
how this discourse of equality subtends his work. Smith’s Essay was written in
postrevolutionary America, where the experiment with democracy highlights important
tensions between essentializing narratives of human distinction (slavery and the
Atlantic slave trade) and human likeness (“all men are created equal”).
What motivated Wollstonecraft, known primarily for her contributions to
political and literary writing, to compose such a lengthy and complimentary review of a
scientific essay on human variation?14 In this chapter, I address that question by
examining the ways in which Wollstonecraft’s engagement with Smith and the debates
over human distinction shape the way politics and biology align in her best-known
political writings.15 Her penchant for using the language of biology to make political
and historical claims—particularly when these claims draw upon a Galenic model of
medical practice—exemplifies an emergent dynamic of this period that led many
intellectuals to either defend or reject radical equality on scientific grounds. Although
Wollstonecraft’s interest in scientific texts has been noted by other scholars, scant
work has been done on her extrapolation of scientific discourse into social and
political realms.16 In what follows, I demonstrate how the biological underpinnings of
her belief in mutability allowed Wollstonecraft to transform a transatlantic discourse
about radical equality—which, as I discuss in my introduction, is often defined in
response to Edmund Burke—into a politics of human plasticity.
The outcomes of this investigation will be threefold. First, scholars interested in
race, politics, science, and religion do not always realize how much these topics
impinged on one another. Even when we do understand that they all informed each
other, it is difficult to examine these separate topics as mutually constitutive. Smith’s
Essay gives us a way into seeing these relations. This chapter draws together these
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disparate topics by first establishing the politics of indistinction as a transatlantic
discourse involved in race, politics, science, and religion. Moreover, Smith’s influence
and standing—along with the tensions he engaged over the period he spent revising
and re-issuing his Essay—help situate America as a crucial space for negotiating both
the political and biological consequences of equality and plasticity. Second, having
established how a transatlantic discourse of human variety draws together these
sometimes separated topics, this chapter establishes Wollstonecraft’s engagement with
science as foundational to her political theories—particularly her responses to Burke
and his conceptualization of the French Revolution. Finally, this chapter will examine
how Wollstonecraft’s turn to biology as an argument for gender indistinction shapes
her response to Burke’s theory of the sublime and the beautiful, a move that itself is
deeply political. By dissociating the sublime from masculinity, Wollstonecraft harkens
back to an earlier version of the sublime—beginning with Longinus—as something
that can only flourish in places where equality is valued. In this way, Wollstonecraft’s
engagement with the intersections of the biological and the political shape her Gothic
sensibility and set up my later chapters on Charles Brockden Brown, Mary Shelley,
and Robert Montgomery Bird, whose Gothic narratives similarly establish the sublime
as something that does more than threateningly erode boundaries. Instead, these
narratives envision the sublime as something that enables political and biological
indistinctions capable of producing radical equality.

SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH AND THE SCIENCE OF UNIVERSAL HUMANITY
Smith was an influential thinker in his own right. He was such a distinguished
student at the College of New Jersey, for example, that James Madison once told his
father Smith was “the greatest Scholar” of his class.17 Although his father at one point
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worried about his growing interest in immaterialism and the work of Bishop Berkeley
during his studies, Smith was thoroughly converted to the Scottish philosophy of
“Common Sense” by his mentor and predecessor as president of the College of New
Jersey, John Witherspoon. Key to this Enlightenment philosophy and Smith’s personal
beliefs was the idea of a universal moral sense. His correspondence with these figures
and his faith in “Common Sense” reveals him as a disciple of the Enlightenment—a
man committed to human improvement through scientific inquiry and reason.
Like many of his colleagues at the College of New Jersey, Smith himself spoke
widely on behalf of American independence. He also actively rejected dogmatic
intolerance, at one point petitioning the Virginia assembly for the same religious
liberties at home that the colony sought from Great Britain prior to the war. Smith
advocated for more religiously catholic government and educational systems,
particularly early in his life. He felt that names, labels, and sectarian arguments were
limiting and narrow-minded; such proclivities already hint at an interest in
indistinction. This anti-sectarian resistance to names and labels demonstrate a
predisposition in Smith—an attitude that is interested in leveling and skeptical of fixed
taxonomies. In his private correspondence, Smith believed in universal salvation,
something he only acknowledged to friends such as Benjamin Rush via private
correspondence. As such, he was theologically more radical than his peers, even as he
clung to more moderate political positions later in life. He was a staunch Federalist,
and—far from being considered theologically radical—he was sometimes accused of
orthodoxy in his religious practice. This latter claim, however, was hard to reconcile
with his tumultuous tenure as president of the College of New Jersey.18
While Smith was primarily regarded as a theologian prior to publishing his
Essay, he was also an established educator (having helped found what we know today
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as Washington and Lee University and Hampden-Sydney College) and natural
philosopher. Smith conversed with many of the major American political figures of the
period, including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, with whom he discussed
such issues as education, religious liberty, free will, sectarianism, and determinism.
As Mark Noll notes, when Smith returned to the College of New Jersey as Professor of
Moral Philosophy, he “became a leader . . . in the effort to defend the harmonies of
physical science (or natural philosophy), mental science (or moral philosophy),
theological science (systematic reflection on Christianity), and political science (the
lineaments of republicanism.”19 His frequent correspondence with Rush and other
members of the American Philosophical Society kept him abreast of developments (at
home and abroad) in medicine, natural history, politics, education, and other fields. In
all his work, Smith emphasized the harmony of subjects and, in various ways, sought
to break down distinctions—distinctions which, it should be noted, often continue to
guide our scholarship today. Scholars of early American literature, for instance, might
specialize in the study of early American religion or early American science or early
American politics. For Smith, however, these were all of a piece.
Despite spending a life trying to harmonize subjects and break down
distinctions, Smith—unlike Wollstonecraft—did not seek radical equality in politics.
Instead, he felt that the framers of the Articles had been deceived “by that elevated
and sublime virtue which was displayed at that time by the whole mass of the people
and so created a government unduly influenced by principles of pure democracy.”20
Although Smith advocated for liberty, he saw pure democracy as paralyzing. He was
politically opposed to Jefferson, yet in many ways shared Jefferson’s confidence that
science would lead to moral and political improvement. That being said, Smith also
shared the same disgruntled view of the world in the 1790s as his colleagues at the
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College of New Jersey. He was alarmed by what he deemed a “democratic frenzy”
during the French Revolution, and, in what was a rare entry into national politics,
Smith even served as a presidential elector for John Adams in 1801. When Joseph
Priestley visited America, Smith openly criticized both his methods and his eloquence,
tying Priestley’s materialist beliefs to the political radicalism in France. Despite the
radical egalitarianism that undergirds the science of his Essay, Smith’s political
stances were representative of conservative Federalist positions throughout the 1790s.
While remembered at home for the tensions that led him to resign from the
College of New Jersey in 1812, Smith is perhaps best-known abroad for the
publication of his Essay, a text that enjoyed transatlantic circulation from 1787-1790,
and was then expanded and reprinted in 1812. On why Smith undertook this essay,
Noll speculates that “[his] interest may have been stimulated by his acquaintance with
the Indian missions sponsored by the New Side Presbyterians in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, his associations with early opponents of slavery like Samuel Miller, or
his contact with blacks in Virginia and to a lesser extent in New Jersey.”21 The
immediate impetus behind organizing his thoughts on this matter, however, was David
Ramsey, who appears to have shared a coach with Smith and Witherspoon one night,
in which Smith and his companions discussed racial diversity. Following this
encounter, Ramsey helped get Smith an honorary membership in the American
Philosophical Society, and then invited him to deliver the society’s oration in 1787.
The oration was published later that year, and as Noll points out, “the essay
was significant as a pioneering American effort in physical anthropology and for its
consideration of the place of blacks in a white society.”22 Its immediate republication
in both Edinburgh and London demonstrates its transatlantic appeal, and speaks to
the essay’s relevance as part of growing conversations about race and the debates over
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human origins. In the essay, Smith outright rejected Lord Kames’ claim that there are
different species of men, noting instead that “the goodness of the Creator appears in
forming the whole world for man, and not confining him, like the inferior animals, to a
bounded range. . . . The divine wisdom is seen in mingling in the human frame such
principles as always tend to counteract the hazards of a new situation.”23 Here Smith
opens up the possibility of an adaptable and unbounded human form (opposing it in
this quote with the boundedness of inferior animals), articulating a Lamarckian
understanding of environmental adaptation before Lamarck—although he was
operating within a theological framework. Smith sought to demonstrate that science
supported divine revelation, and that the unity of humanity was essential for a
“Common Sense” moral philosophy.
While Smith appears more interested in method and science in his Essay, his
scientific proof of revelation—which was leveled directly against Kames’ Sketches of the
History of Man (1774)—made him a champion of Christianity in the eyes of many of his
contemporaries. His work was widely admired in the press and in the church,
although he is familiar primarily to historians of science and critical race theorists
today. As Noll argues, “compared with Kames, who wrestled seriously with the biblical
record, Smith rested his case on the exclusive use of natural philosophy and was
much less indebted to revelation.”24 Smith intended his Essay to be read primarily as
a scientific and philosophical work, although he was aware of its theological value.
Near the end of his life, Smith expressed his pleasure at knowing that Dugald Stewart,
successor to Thomas Reid as leader of the Scottish “Common Sense” philosophers,
and Georges Cuvier, France’s greatest naturalist, had approved his essay.
Part of the international appeal of Smith’s Essay was the way Smith
demonstrated how, America becomes the site of new questions about human variety.
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In addition to being at the center of ongoing debates about new species, taxonomies,
and the possibility of degeneration, America was an important space for interrogating
natural history in the context of slavery or as part of ongoing conversations about the
adaptability of the “savage” natives. Smith uses slavery to support his claims about
human plasticity, noting that the strongest physical distinctions are seen in the
southern states of the U.S. between slaves and masters because of systemic inequality.
Similarly, he describes frontiersmen living in nature and starting to resemble the
natives, bolstering his argument that the primary distinctions between Indians and
Anglo-Americans are the state of society. In her review, Wollstonecraft paraphrases
one particular footnote from Smith’s Essay treating the issue of human variety among
slaves. It offers a strong, biological case for emancipation: “the great difference
between the domestic and field slaves, gives reason to believe that, if they were
perfectly free, enjoyed property, and were admitted to a liberal participation of the
society, rank, and privileges of their masters, they would change their African
peculiarities much faster.”25 That Wollstonecraft would gravitate toward this note in
her review speaks to her awareness of the politically radical potential of Smith’s work.
She not only recognizes his most explicit claim for the possibility of physical
indistinction, but also hints at the idea that intellectual distinctions are the result of
society rather than nature.
Mobility and mixture play important roles in his theory of human variety, and
Smith is fascinated by how “unmixed” China and Arabia are, in contrast to England or
America. Smith’s emphasis on the superiority of middle climates shows his Galenic
leanings toward temperance and balance. Smith claims that “the temperate zone” is
where the shape and function of eyes should “be esteemed a perfection.” 26 The middle
zones are not only temperate zones, but also spaces of mixture. As the most desirable
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climates, they attract a mixture of different peoples. Smith goes on to write: “All the
principles of the human constitution unfolding themselves freely in such a region, and
nature acting without constraint will be there seen most nearly in that perfection
which was the original design and idea of the creator.”27 Smith privileges America and
England as beautiful because they are equal and mixed, placing them above unmixed
and more restricted climates and societies. Of African slaves, he writes at great length
about their ability to become more refined; he describes “Negroes” in America losing
their scent and growing straighter hair as they are exposed to the new climate.28 Smith
also insists that manners, cultivation, and civilized habits affect complexion, in
addition to climate. One of his most interesting references is to second and third
generation Americans as second and third “races.”29 Changes in climate and society,
according to Smith, are capable of producing new races. This is his core claim.
Smith makes two additional claims about the influence of the state of society on
human variation: “In the first place, that the effect of climate is augmented by a
savage state, and corrected by a state of civilization,” and that “by the state of society
many varieties in the human person are intirely formed.”30 Smith argues elsewhere
that savagery is not the natural state of man, but the result of inhabiting certain
climates and states of society. Instead of imagining an initial state of nature in which
man progresses out of savagery toward civilization, Smith sees civilization itself as the
original state of man—a state that can degenerate under particular circumstances of
climate and society. Here we see some overlap with Burke, who refused to
acknowledge, even theoretically, the existence of a non-civil state of nature. Both men
see the law of nature culminating in—if not always progressing toward—a state of
civilization. Their views, however, seem to diverge when it comes to imagining what
that civilized state looks like. For Smith, with the proper climate and the proper
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education, one could theoretically imagine a race of men indistinct from one another.
For political philosophers like Burke, on the other hand, all men have a station, and
that distinction is necessary for the ordering of society.
The radical possibilities of Smith’s work can be seen as he more closely
examines the mutability of “savages” in his Essay. The hardships of their lives, the
lack of nutrition, and a lack of personal hygiene “all have a prodigious effect to darken
the complexion, to relax and emaciate the constitution, and to render the features
coarse and deformed.”31 For Smith, a state of civilization corrects this, and can even
correct the effects of climate to some degree. This leads to beautifying the human form.
As he writes, “all the features of the human countenance are modified, and its intire
expression radically formed, by the state of society.”32 Smith’s claim that even savages
can become perfected by society is a firm argument for human plasticity, and one that
has political implications in an age of slavery and ongoing conflict with indigenous
Americans. Wollstonecraft clearly saw the radical potential of these claims,
highlighting Smith’s reflections on African bodies and minds in her review. While
Smith is primarily interested in how humankind produces infinite variety,
indistinction becomes a theoretical and political possibility recognized by figures such
as Wollstonecraft in his work—although he may not see it himself. By emphasizing the
natural causes of infinite variety among men, Smith opens up the possibility that men
could be also become infinitely indistinct. Human plasticity opens up both the
possibility of sameness and difference, particularly as we move from individual
distinctions to conceptualizing indistinction across (and between) species.
Smith continues to highlight the boundlessness of human variety alongside the
infinite varieties of governance, an idea whose revolutionary potential would not have
been lost on thinkers like Wollstonecraft: “As the degrees of civilization, as the ideas,
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passions, and objects of society in different countries, and under different forms of
government are infinitely various, they open a boundless field for variety in the human
countenance.”33 Smith continues by noting that these varieties become more deeply
ingrained over time, particularly under a system where “families have held for ages the
same stations in society. They are most conspicuous in those countries in which the
laws have made the most complete and permanent division of ranks.”34 In an
argument that would be politically compelling for Wollstonecraft, he makes it clear
that distinctions are conspicuous in countries where the laws—not nature—have
created permanent divisions of ranks. Smith goes on to write:
If, in England there exists less difference between the figure and
appearance of persons in the higher and lower classes of society than is
seen in many other countries of Europe, it is because a more general
diffusion of liberty and wealth has reduced the different ranks more
nearly to a level. . . . Such distinctions are, as yet, less obvious in
America; because the people enjoy a greater equality.35
Ironically, Smith is providing a rather Burkean argument, although many of Burke’s
detractors would not have recognized it as such. Smith clearly outlines the ways in
which equality reduces not only political and social distinctions, but physical
distinctions as well. Carried to its logical end, Smith’s Essay makes the case that
radical political equality could lead to human indistinction. Indeed, Smith appears to
be making a scientific case for the relationship between indistinction and equality by
highlighting a reduction of distinctions in more democratic countries. If Smith sees
equality as the natural and God-given state of existence, readers such as
Wollstonecraft might argue for indistinction as a natural outcome.
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The radical possibilities of indistinction, however, are not limited to politics.
Smith’s claims about the natural causes of indistinction open up the possibility of
biological adaptation as well. In an early explanation of how climate affects complexion
and figure, Smith describes how animals adapt to climate as justification for how
humans adapt and compares his theories of changing complexions with the ways
change occurs in animals. “We continually see the effect of this principle on the
inferior animals,” he writes, and “human nature, much more pliant, and affected by a
greater variety of causes from food, from clothing, from lodging, and from manners, is
still more easily susceptible of change, according to any general standard, or idea of
the human form.”36 Smith sees humans as even more pliant than animals, and this
extreme plasticity makes it difficult to erect any general standard of the human form.
Not content with this comparison, he later proceeds to make a similar comparison
between human transformation and that of vegetables: “The intense heat, which, in
this region [Africa], makes such a prodigious change on the human constitution,
equally transforms the whole race of beasts and of vegetables.”37 That the mutability of
humans might lead them to be bred as animals or raised as produce becomes explicit
in the essay as Smith writes: “If men in the affair of marriage were as much under
management as some other animals, an absolute ruler might accomplish in his
dominions almost any idea of the human form.”38 Smith goes on to note how this
mutability of the human form enables the upper ranks greater access to perpetual
improvement, demonstrating that their station isn’t necessarily inherent in them, but
in the conditions of their birth and generations of adaptation.
Smith turns to literary examples to further this point, arguing that “tales of
romances that describe the superlative beauty of captive princesses, and the fictions of
poets, who characterise their kings and nobles, by uncommon dignity of carriage and
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elegance of person, and by an elevated turn of thinking, are not to be ascribed solely to
the venality of writers prone to flatter the great, but have a real foundation in
nature.”39 Smith clearly recognizes the ways in which variety can be manipulated,
demonstrating how susceptible the human countenance and human mind are to
human systems (manners, wealth, and political institutions)—a susceptibility
represented in romances. He continues by emphasizing that societal causes may have
an even more potent effect on the human constitution than climate. He writes:
The state of manners and society in those republics [Bæotian and Attic]
produced this difference more than the Bæotian air, to which it has been
so often attributed. By the alteration of a few political, or civil, or
commercial institutions . . . the establishment of which depended on a
thousand accidental causes, Thebes might have become Athens, and
Athens Thebes.40
Smith’s emphasis on accidental causes here demonstrates his own discomfort with the
notion of inherent distinctions, an idea Wollstonecraft later attacks in her political
writings. In this passage, by linking climate and society, Smith brings science and
politics together to argue instead that “a thousand accidental causes” can lead to
infinite human variety. In his words, “the transmission of climatical or national
differences ought not to appear surprising—the same law will account for both.”41 Here
he explicitly links the biological and the cultural through shared laws.
While Smith argues that such changes are gradual, it is clear from the example
above that he can imagine entire nations changing based on climate and societal
factors. Later in the Essay, he discusses how this leads to infinite variety:
A nation which migrates to a different climate will, in time, be impressed
with the characters of its new state. If this nation should afterwards
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return to its original seats, it would not perfectly recover its primitive
features and complexion, but would receive the impressions of the first
climate, on the ground of those created in the second. . . . This exhibits a
new cause of endless variety in the human countenance.42
Smith thus acknowledges the imprint of habits, custom, and history on the human
figure, and points out that shared climate and shared systems will not perfectly
recover a given constitution. For Smith, human variety is constantly adapting; the
human constitution may degenerate, but it never returns to the exact state it was in
before. He goes on to write: “It is more easy to preserve acquired features or
complexion, than to regain them after they have been lost.”43 The political implications
of this are rather conservative; while humans are adaptable, the difficultly of regaining
lost features reifies existing cultural hierarchies.
Still, that distinctions are not inherent—but rather acquired over time and often
accidental—remains important to Smith. As he notes, “the pliant nature of man is
susceptible of change from the minutest causes, and these changes, habitually
repeated, create at length conspicuous distinctions.”44 They only solidify over time, in
part due to heredity: “We see that figure, stature, complexion, features, diseases, and
even powers of the mind, become hereditary.”45 Ultimately, this leads Smith back to
his original claim that humans are not inherently different; their varieties stem from
natural and societal causes. He writes, “such differences prove, at least, that the
human condition is susceptible of all the changes that are seen among men. It is not
more astonishing that nations, than that individuals, should differ.”46 More
importantly, Smith argues at the end of his essay, that “The doctrine of one race
removes this uncertainty, renders human nature susceptible of system, illustrates the
powers of physical causes, and opens a rich and extensive field for moral science.”47
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This is perhaps the most important thing to recognize in Smith’s writings: his abiding
interest in the extent to which human nature is susceptible to systems.
Opening with a rejection of the idea that men are different species and ending
with the claim that human nature is “infinitely various” and “infinitely mixed,” Smith’s
Essay establishes a scientific foundation for this plasticity.48 His examples establish
the theoretical possibility of human indistinction, at least under the proper conditions
of climate, government, and education. Moreover, his reliance on Galenic models of
medicine to establish a climatist justification for human variety sets up a vision of
disease as a natural and necessary agent of change, one which could possibly lead to
radical equality—even if Smith’s own politics feared unrestrained democracy. While
Smith’s Essay wasn’t intended to be political, his case for plasticity as a marker of
universal humanity opened up the radical possibility of human indistinction. He saw
the unity of human nature as essential to a universal moral philosophy founded on
“Common Sense,” a need Wollstonecraft shared as she made the case for both
democracy and the rights of women. Her arguments similarly rest on human plasticity
(she is particularly interested in the role of education in shaping humans) and a
Galenic model of understanding the body politic. In the following section, I examine
more directly the ideas shared by Smith’s Essay and Wollstonecraft’s political theories,
and the important roles that human plasticity and Galenic medicine play in her
responses to Burke and her reaction to the aftermath of the French Revolution. Smith
certainly was not politically radical in the mold of figures such as Thomas Paine,
William Godwin, and Wollstonecraft. Yet this is precisely why he matters: his scientific
ideas led to political ramifications that he himself would not endorse, and his writings
provide an entry into the conversations that would continue to motivate Wollstonecraft
as she interrogates the effects of both biological and political systems on human
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nature. As we’ll see in the next section, she takes scientific arguments like those made
by Smith and extrapolates them into a more explicitly political context.

MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND THE POLITICS OF INDISTINCTION
While Smith’s Essay broadened the discourse of race by emphasizing biological
and political environments as causes of human plasticity and human variance, it also
provided a foundation for Wollstonecraft to make larger claims about political equality
as a realizable human state (and one enjoyed by men and women). Contemplated
through the lens of Smith’s Essay, Wollstonecraft’s political treatises and engagement
with Burke suggest how pervasive the intertwined questions of religion, science, and
politics became during the so-called “age of democratic revolutions.” In The BurkeWollstonecraft Debate, Daniel O’Neil makes “the assumption that political theory
emerges most poignantly and powerfully from great political controversy and
conflict.”49 Yet political theory does not merely emerge from political controversy; it is
the confluence of multiple conflicts in a number of fields. Whereas figures such as
Burke and John Adams (among others) attempted to theorize a politics of distinction
amidst democratic revolutions by arguing for human distinctions as political and
historical necessities, Wollstonecraft turns to biology and the natural sciences to
theorize a politics of indistinction that, while still commenting on the political conflicts
and controversies of this period, is rooted in a parallel debate in the sciences over
human plasticity and variation. That debates over monogenism and polygenism ramp
up alongside debates about political distinction and radical equality is no coincidence;
just as the reemergence of evolutionary thought (and its opponents in the racial
sciences) happens in the aftermath of various experiments with democracy.
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Wollstonecraft’s review of Smith’s Essay represents an important (and transatlantic)
point of intersection between these otherwise parallel narratives of biology and politics.
Thinking about what Smith’s Essay means in the context of Wollstonecraft’s
political writings is not merely important for literary-historical reasons; it also
establishes Wollstonecraft as a unique voice in the revolutionary debates of the 1790s.
Mitzi Myers argues persuasively that Wollstonecraft’s response is not merely a critique
of Burke’s political theory, but a moral argument that exposes “the cruel inequities
which those theories presuppose.”50 I would take this argument further to recognize
the ways in which Wollstonecraft’s argument is not simply moral, but also biological.
Wollstonecraft, like Smith, prefers to rely on scientific justifications for her moral and
political arguments and uses science to undercut Burke’s historical claims for a
politics of custom and distinction.
In attacking Burke, Wollstonecraft often falls back on medical and biological
rhetoric to make her case. In her critique of the vices of those distinguished by rank,
for example, she writes: “A surgeon would tell you that by skinning over a wound you
spread disease through the whole frame; and, surely, they indirectly aim at destroying
all purity of morals, who poison the very source of virtue, by smearing a sentimental
varnish over vice, to hide its natural deformity.”51 She describes Burkean
sentimentality as merely skinning over a wound to hide the natural deformities of his
politics (which, for Wollstonecraft, are the vices attributed to rank). Wollstonecraft—
like other authors in this project—repeatedly returns to the language of disease as a
rhetorical strategy for exploring the relationship between political systems and human
life. Like Smith, she saw disease as an agent of change and a precursor to radical
equality—a possibility she clearly valued more than he did.
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Similarly, Wollstonecraft latches onto Smith’s language of “habits” in his Essay,
a word that would become politically charged for her as she attacked Burke for his
deference to habits and customs. In her review, she cites Smith’s argument that:
When the climate constantly repeats the one of the other of these effects
in any degree, then, in proportion, an habitual colour begins to be
formed. Colour and figure may be styled habits of the body. Like other
habits, they are created, not by great and sudden impressions, but by
continual and almost imperceptible touches. Of habits both of mind and
body, nations are susceptible as well as individuals.52
Wollstonecraft gravitates toward claims with political resonance, here quoting Smith
as he makes the leap from the susceptibility of individuals to habits to the
susceptibility of nations. She highlights his arguments about color and form being like
“habits of the body,” and in her political writings, she argues that non-racial
categories—most notably gender—are habits as well. Smith is clearly not the only
influence on Wollstonecraft’s political writings, yet her selection of this passage
suggests that she sees human plasticity as essential to human variety, a claim that
subtends future arguments about political equality.
Wollstonecraft goes on to cite Smith, who argues that “we find [humans] in all
climates not only able to endure the change, but so assimilated by time, that we
cannot say with certainty whose ancestor was the native of the clime, and whose the
intruding foreigner.”53 She quotes Smith’s claim here that human plasticity is such
that distinctions between the native and the foreign become impossible to determine
over time. These distinctions become even more difficult to maintain in nations that
value equality. Wollstonecraft highlights the following passage from Smith’s Essay:
“Equality of rank and fortune in the citizens of the United States, similarity of
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occupations, and of society, have produced such uniformity of character, that hitherto
they are not strongly marked by such differences of feature as arise solely from social
distinctions.”54 As I noted in the previous section, Smith makes the case for why
America is such an important space for examining human plasticity; it is a relatively
equal society, and one that has thrown off the trappings of artificial distinctions.
Smith argues that, without a unity of the human species, “the science of morals
would be absurd; the law of nature and nations would be annihilated; no general
principles of human conduct, of religion, or of policy, could be framed; for human
nature, originally infinitely various, and, by the changes of the world, infinitely mixed,
could not be comprehended in any system.”55 Like Smith, Wollstonecraft would later
argue for a comprehensive system that could account for infinite variety, although she
also sought a justification for radical equality. Human plasticity was certainly at the
core of her arguments for education. Quoting again from Smith’s Essay, she writes,
“The body and mind have such mutual influence, that whatever contributes to change
the human condition in its form or aspect, has an equal influence on its powers of
reason and genius. And these have again a reciprocal effect in forming the
countenance.”56 This is one of the most important passages for Wollstonecraft, who
argues in her own writings that women need education, and are stifled by the lack of
reason and genius as a result of societal forces. She believes that reason can be gained.
Citing Smith again in her review, she writes, “the impressions of education, which
singly taken are scarcely discernible, ultimately produce the greatest differences
between men in society.”57 Wollstonecraft’s inclusion of these sections on education
preface the claims she will later make in Rights of Woman.
While theologians praised Smith’s Essay for its scientific defense of scriptural
revelation, Wollstonecraft and others—more than Smith himself—recognized that the
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Essay had larger political implications. Throughout her review, Wollstonecraft
highlights the most politically-charged passages in Smith’s Essay, particularly those
observations that could be easily translated into commentaries on the body politic. For
example, Wollstonecraft cites the following passage in her review: “Every permanent
and characteristical variety in human nature, is effected by slow and almost
imperceptible gradations. Great and sudden changes are too violent for the delicate
constitution of man, and always tend to destroy the system.”58 Like Smith,
Wollstonecraft is interested in the susceptibility of the human body to the environment,
and she later uses similar language to explore the body’s susceptibility to violent
changes in political systems as well. Whereas Smith is talking specifically about
changes occurring in human bodies, for Wollstonecraft a passage like this also offers a
biological platform for explaining changes in the body politic.59
Wollstonecraft’s own interest in human plasticity explains why she wrote such
a glowing review of Smith’s Essay, while later rejecting the claims of figures such as
Lavater, who posited a more rigid and bounded notion of the human. For example, she
refers to the following “common-sense” argument by Smith in her review: “all features
of the human countenance are modified, and its entire expression radically formed, by
the state of society.”60 This claim becomes essential to Wollstonecraft’s later writings,
as she argues that human distinctions are not innate, but formed by habits and
societies. It is imperative to Wollstonecraft that all humans—men and women alike—
are mutable, and able to be shaped (however gradually) by the climates and habits
around them. Her vindications in Rights of Men and Rights of Woman are grounded in
a biological argument for equality. Notably, she ends Rights of Woman with the
following: “Let there be then no coercion established in society, and the common law of
gravity prevailing, the sexes will fall into their proper places.”61 This invocation of
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gravity allows Wollstonecraft an analogy that applies the idea of a natural, universal
law to an argument for the equality among sexes. As I will demonstrate, Wollstonecraft
sought a biological justification for equality in Rights of Man, one that armed her
against Burke’s claims that Dr. Price, like the French, harbored only an abstract,
metaphysical notion of liberty. If equality, not distinction, is the biological default,
equality is not an abstract, metaphysical concept—instead, it is deeply rooted in the
physical (or natural) world. Wollstonecraft’s review of Smith’s Essay highlights the
ways in which she participates in a similar discourse as she develops her own theories
about mutability and natural causes; Smith’s writings provide one framework for
imagining a radical equality that is biologically justified.
While the passages Wollstonecraft selects for her review hint at the political
implications of Smith’s work, in the rest of the Essay Smith more carefully outlines his
thoughts on human plasticity and demonstrates his own reliance on climatist Galenic
models for understanding human variety. As a defense of the unity of humanity,
Smith’s essay opens by exploring the varieties of complexion in the human species. He
pays particular attention to the principle of color, and one of his earliest examples
makes a clear argument for the variety of complexion as a natural (and healthy) bodily
reaction to changes in climate. Here Smith is drawing on an ancient theory of Galenic
(humoral) medicine, although he—like other figures in the eighteenth century—argues
that civilization is as capable of producing human variety as climate. Interestingly, he
uses disease as an agent of this change, describing a southern disorder that sounds
similar to the yellow fever:
Men […] are usually attacked by dangerous disorders that leave the
blood impoverished, and shed a yellow appearance over the skin. These
disorders are perhaps the efforts of nature in breaking down and
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changing the constitution, in order to accommodate it to the climate; or
to give it that degree of relaxation, and to mingle with it that proportion
of bile, which is necessary for its new situation.62
A comparable view of disease will subtend Wollstonecraft’s political arguments about
revolution later in this chapter, and will have similar implications in the following
chapters on Brown, Shelley, and Bird.63 Smith’s claims are both proto-evolutionary
and draw on old-fashioned Galenic models; he sees natural causes as instruments of
adaptation to new climates (and later to new societies). By making disease a natural
(and necessary) agent of change, he sets up a framework for thinking about how
disease not only affects the human constitution, but also human political systems and
societies. Although it undercuts his own political views, this system opens up the
possibility that leveling forces such as disease might be necessary agents of
adaptation—agents that could lead to radical equality.64 Smith’s turn to disease as an
agent of adaptation rather than degeneration also offers an important counterexample
to Burke’s later use of disease as metaphor for foreign invasion. Whereas Burke relies
on a contagionist view of disease to figure the French Revolution as degenerate,
Wollstonecraft—like Smith—draws on Galenic models of medicine to justify revolution
when she argues that you must sometimes force a crisis to counter imbalance in the
system. Wollstonecraft hints at the political and racial implications of these models in
the selections of Smith’s Essay she chose for her review.65
Even though Wollstonecraft’s review of Smith is a marker of the transatlantic
dimension of the debate over human plasticity, I purposefully avoid arguing for a
direct line of influence from Smith to Wollstonecraft. Rather, I want to emphasize how
both authors participate in a similar move from the biological to the political in this
period. In what follows, I demonstrate how this politics of indistinction develops
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throughout her major political writings, beginning with her attack on hereditary
distinctions in Rights of Men and ending with her use of Galenic language to justify the
violence of the French Revolution. What begins as an argument that hereditary
distinctions are unmanly and restrictive in Rights of Men sets up a more radical claim
for gender indistinction in Rights of Woman—a claim that establishes equality as a
necessary condition for human plasticity and improvement. By unmooring the sublime
from the gendered categories established by Burke in his Enquiry, Wollstonecraft also
establishes equality as a necessary condition for sublimity, setting up later authors to
embrace the Gothic as an important genre for exploring indistinction.
In her earliest tract, Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft sets out to respond directly to
Burke by asserting that the “birthright of man . . . is such a degree of liberty, civil and
religious, as is compatible with the liberty of every other individual with whom he is
united in a social compact.”66 Establishing liberty as a right universal to all men, she
argues that it “has never yet received a form in the various governments that have
been established on our beauteous globe.”67 She attributes this failure of liberty to
several causes: most notably hereditary property and the tendency for men like Burke
to “reverence the rust of antiquity, and term the unnatural customs, which ignorance
and mistaken self-interest have consolidated, the sage fruit of experience.”68 Indeed,
Wollstonecraft refers to Burke as having a “bigoted veneration for antiquity.”69 and
refers to his ambition as “irrational.”70 She proposes in its place a virtuous ambition
by opening up education and reason for women, the poor, and others—not just those
who inherit it. Here belief that societal and educational changes can shape people
echoes the claims made earlier by Smith. In sharp contrast to Burke’s fears of a
mobile, “swinish multitude,” Wollstonecraft argues against what she describes as a
Burkean worldview: that “we ought cautiously to remain for ever in frozen inactivity,
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because a thaw, whilst it nourishes the soil, spreads a temporary inundation.”71 Her
argument against inactivity (an inactivity that denies human plasticity) is one she will
return to in her Rights of Woman and French Revolution, and one her daughter, Mary
Shelley, will interrogate in The Last Man.
Much of the emotional impetus behind Rights of Men comes from Burke’s attack
on Dr. Price, a close friend to Wollstonecraft. Yet she does concede that “Price’s
political opinions are Utopian reveries, and that the world is not yet sufficiently
civilized to adopt such a sublime system of morality.”72 Wollstonecraft shares Price’s
optimism, if not the entirety of his proposed systems: “I reverence the rights of men.—
Sacred rights! for which I acquire a more profound respect, the more I look into my
own mind; and, professing these heterodox opinions, I still preserve my bowels; my
heart is human, beats quick with human sympathies.”73 Valuing equality is akin to
being human, or—attacking Burke in his own language—being manly. Distinctions
which produce inequality are unmanly; they are the product of artificial sympathies.
She writes, “among unequals there can be no society;—giving a manly meaning to the
term; from such intimacies friendship can never grow; if the basis of friendship is
mutual respect, and not a commercial treaty.”74 Referring to the National Assembly,
she writes more explicitly: “Time may shew, that this obscure throng knew more of the
human heart and of legislation than the profligates of rank, emasculated by hereditary
effeminacy.”75 Here effeminacy is used both as unmanly, but also as a subtle critique
of the ways in which females are shut out from improvement and reason by artificial
distinctions made between the sexes. Wollstonecraft thus attacks Burke and his
colleagues as effeminate, while also attacking the term itself.
For Wollstonecraft, this effeminacy is a direct result of the influence of society
on the human constitution. Like Smith, she believes that society can mold and shape
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men and she argues that hereditary property and honors have stifled man’s growth.76
Critiquing Burke, she writes that “man has been changed into an artificial monster by
the station in which he was born,” when “true happiness [arises] from the friendship
and intimacy which can only be enjoyed by equals.”77 By imposing artificial
distinctions upon men, hereditary property and social distinctions violate natural
rights. “It is necessary emphatically to repeat,” she writes, “that there are rights which
men inherit at their birth, as rational creatures, who were raised above the brute
creation by their improvable faculties. . . . prescription can never undermine natural
rights.”78 For Wollstonecraft, equality is essential to human improvement (plasticity); it
is the right of all men—all members of the human species—and it is a right that is
violated when men are kept from improving by limiting distinctions upheld only by
artificial customs. Wollstonecraft argues that Burke’s affections for heredity, nobility,
customs make nobility into nothing more than “monsters in human shape,” and asks:
“How can he discover that he is a man, when all his wants are instantly supplied, and
invention is never sharpened by necessity?”79 In Rights of Women, Wollstonecraft
dedicates an entire chapter to the “pernicious effects which arise from the unnatural
distinctions established in society,” building upon these claims. In that text, she notes,
“what but habitual idleness can hereditary wealth and titles produce?”80 She similarly
argues that “the character of every man is, in some degree, formed by his
profession.”81 Wollstonecraft believes a lack of experience (and certain professions—or
a lack of—as well) can have a degenerative effect on the human condition, here
offering a critique of British masculinity where nobility becomes a degenerate state
incapable of adaptation and improvement.82
Wollstonecraft’s mode of argument here is that habits such as heredity and
professions—in addition to what Smith calls the habits of body—create distinctions

— 49 —

between rich and poor, or the nobility and the peasant class. Yet whereas Smith used
this to indicate why the nobility might be prone to beauty, Wollstonecraft argues that
their station deprives them of the necessary experiences and habits to cultivate reason.
She makes a similar claim about women, who are deprived of education and
expectations, but then argues that a change in society can remedy this situation and
remove these distinctions (and the necessary evils brought about by them). In Rights of
Woman she writes: “Riches and honours prevent a man from enlarging his
understanding, and enervate all his powers by reversing the order of nature, which
has ever made true pleasure the reward of labour.”83 This description is fitting, as
elsewhere Wollstonecraft mentions Washington as an exemplar of this mode, pulling
from the American Revolution models of equality and indistinction.
That Wollstonecraft is familiar with Smith is important because of the
significant place America plays in his treatise. She explicitly draws attention to this in
her review, acknowledging that “his residence in America facilitated his researches
and gives weight to his conclusions.”84 Clearly, the political implications of Smith’s
residence and experiences in America are part of what led Wollstonecraft to praise his
work. In crafting her response in Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft was responding not
just to Burke, but also to figures such as John Adams, who supported the American
experiment with democracy while advocating for distinctions of rank and gender. By
the time she wrote An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution in 1794,
Wollstonecraft began to take a proto-evolutionary view of political progress. She cites
the American republic as a model of evolutionary progress rather than degeneracy
(which she admittedly saw in aspects of the French Revolution), noting that “the
anglo-americans appeared to be another race of beings.”85 In this regard she echoes
the claims of Burke and Adams. Yet she ultimately sees the French Revolution as
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unnatural not because equality is unnatural, but because the conditions under which
equality was pursued were unnatural. Her comparisons between the political
environments in America and France help her argue for radical equality even as she
became disenchanted with the violence of the French Revolution.
Wollstonecraft continues to attack Burke in Rights of Men by questioning his
support for the American revolution—continuing to make America an important space
of contestation—since the “whole tenour of his plausible arguments settles slavery on
an everlasting foundation.” This is due, in her words, to his “servile reverence for
antiquity.”86 In making this argument, she writes, “For who shall dare to complain of
the venerable vestige of the law that rendered the life of a deer more sacred than that
of a man?”87 While this is most immediately a commentary on the game laws in Britain,
by comparing human life with the life of a deer (which was considered property under
said laws), Wollstonecraft also invokes the ongoing justifications for slavery in the
Atlantic world: namely, that some humans are brutes, or a different species. This is
exactly the premise she argues against, claiming that men are distinct by reason and
thus worthy of equality and the right to improve themselves. She continues by
accusing Burke of treating other humans as both property and animals (as livestock),
writing: “You have shewn, Sir, by your silence on these subjects, that your respect for
rank has swallowed up the common feelings of humanity; you seem to consider the
poor as only the live stock of an estate, the feather of hereditary nobility.”88 By fixing
political and social distinctions and making them hereditary, Wollstonecraft argues
that Burke equates blacks, those of the lower classes, and women to animals. “Brutes
hope and fear, love and hate; but, without a capacity to improve, a power of turning
these passions to good or evil, they neither acquire virtue nor wisdom—Why? Because
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the Creator has not given them reason.”89 She argues against rank and also against
the sentimentality of Burke’s historical arguments.
Inequality similarly stifles reason for Wollstonecraft, because it limits one’s
ability to exercise the understanding; as she notes, “the power of exercising our
understanding raises us above the brutes.”90 Even in this early treatise, Wollstonecraft
begins to make important gendered arguments as she critiques the masculine nature
of the sublime (as Burke describes it). She pushes back against the idea that women
are inherently less rational than men: “you have clearly proved that one half of the
human species, at least, have not souls; and that Nature, by making women little,
smooth, delicate, fair creatures, never designed that they should exercise their
reason.”91 This leads to a comparison of women with animals:
If beautiful weakness be interwoven in a woman’s frame, if the chief
business of her life be (as you insinuate) to inspire love, and Nature had
made an eternal distinction between the qualities that dignify a rational
being and this animal perfection, her duty and happiness in this life
must clash with any preparation for a more exalted state.92
Here we see the coupling of Wollstonecraft’s arguments for gender equality with a
theological argument about the “exalted state” of men and women. She also counters
the notion of women as mere companions to rational men with the fairly obvious
argument that such reasoning dehumanizes women and puts them on par with
nonhuman animals. By resisting “beautiful weakness” as a defining feature of women,
Wollstonecraft makes a subtle attack on the gendered descriptions of the sublime and
the beautiful as outlined by Burke in his Enquiry.
Wollstonecraft makes it clear that the only distinction that matters is that
between humans and nonhuman animals: humans have the capacity for both reason
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and virtue. She argues that all men and women should be given the chance to obtain
virtue, but “such a glorious change can only be produced by liberty. Inequality of rank
must ever impede the growth of virtue.”93 She then takes Burke to task for his
dismissive criticisms of the lower classes and their role in the revolution:
If this grand example be set by an assembly of unlettered clowns, if they
can produce a crisis that may involve the fate of Europe, and ‘more than
Europe,’ you must allow us to respect unsophisticated reason, and
reverence the active exertions that were not relaxed by a fastidious
respect for the beauty of rank, or a dread of the deformity produced by
any void in social structure.94
If we remember that rank is still a description used for the animal kingdom and that
void alludes to the natural void, we see that Wollstonecraft is speaking to both
biological and political concerns. Her reference to a “dread of deformity” speaks to
eighteenth-century concerns about radical equality and species indistinction as
formless voids. In an attempt to avoid formless spaces, naturalists in the eighteenth
century obsessively identified new species (including hybrid species) in order to fill
perceived “gaps” in the great chain of being. A gap in nature equates to a gap in
hierarchy or station, and Wollstonecraft’s response to Burke challenges both a
biological and a political distinction of ranks.95 She regrets this change could not be
brought about by those of rank: “I am afraid that human nature is still in such a weak
state, that the abolition of titles, the corner-stone of despotism, could only have been
the work of men who had no titles to sacrifice.”96 This lack of activity (or “active
exertions”) is what Wollstonecraft sees as one of the primarily limitations on the
nobility’s ability to enact change.97 Burke’s “dread of deformity” only strengthens his
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commitment to distinction and rank, whereas Wollstonecraft turns to formlessness
and indistinction in order to imagine radical equality.
Wollstonecraft closes out Rights of Men by claiming, “the manners of man may
change without end; but, wherever reason receives the least cultivation—wherever
men rise above brutes, morality must rest on the same base.” She goes on to write,
“the more man discovers of the nature of his mind and body, the more clearly he is
convinced, that to act according to the dictates of reason is to conform to the law of
God.”98 The coupling of reason and morality here is important, as it echoes Smith’s
coupling of science and theology.99 Both authors remain convinced that the truths
about human nature must be founded on a belief in human unity and scientific
principles. Wollstonecraft takes the next step by explicitly arguing that “virtue can
only flourish amongst equals.”100 She concludes Rights of Men with a somewhat
qualified endorsement of the French Revolution; an endorsement that recognizes the
revolution as an experiment with radical equality. The question she asks is whether or
not it can be implemented and exist more than theoretically: “Whether the one the
French have adopted will answer the purpose better, and be more than a shadow of
representation, time can only shew. In theory it appears more promising.”101
Wollstonecraft’s interest in the susceptibility of humanity to systems leads her to
imagine the French Revolution as an important experiment, one that “in theory”
promises a radical equality enabling by social and political indistinction.
While Wollstonecraft seems to operate within a shared discourse with Smith in
Rights of Men, her familiarity with such arguments becomes more apparent as she
argues for gender indistinction in Rights of Woman. There, she opens with a similar
argument that women have not been treated as humans, and breaks down the gender
distinctions in order to claim more fully humanity for women. She opens by noting
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“that either nature has made a great difference between man and man, or that the
civilization which has hitherto taken place in the world has been very partial.”102 She
blasts men as guilty of “considering females rather as women than human creatures,”
and argues that “[women] are treated as a kind of subordinate beings, and not as a
part of the human species.”103 Wollstonecraft lays out her argument: “I shall first
consider women in the grand light of human creatures, who, in common with men, are
placed on this earth to unfold their faculties.”104 She seeks a universal humanity that
specifically articulates the equality of women and justifies their inclusion among the
ranks of men. She argues that, in their current state, women are treated like domestic
animals: “the sexual weakness that makes woman depend on man for a subsistence,
produces a kind of cattish affection which leads a wife to purr about her husband as
she would about any man who fed and caressed her.”105 The domestication of women
limits their ability to progress, and restricted access to society inhibits their ability to
develop that which makes them human: reason and virtue.
As Wollstonecraft notes in Rights of Men, she believes men are distinct from
brutes due to their capacity for reason. It is clear, however, that immediate
respondents to her work saw these calls for indistinction as potentially threatening to
even this human-animal distinction.106 Perhaps that best example of this is Vindication
of the Rights of Brutes (1792), a satirical pamphlet by Thomas Taylor published in
response to Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Women, and—to a lesser extent—Thomas Paine’s
Rights of Man. The final paragraph of Taylor’s pamphlet is worth quoting at length:
And thus much may suffice, for an historical proof, that brutes are equal
to men. It only now remains (and this must be the province of some abler
hand) to demonstrate the same great truth in a similar manner,
of vegetables, minerals, and even the most apparently contemptible clod
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of earth; that thus this sublime theory being copiously and accurately
discussed, and its truth established by an indisputable series of
facts, government may be entirely subverted, subordination abolished,
and all things every where, and in every respect, be common to all.107
Written as a satirical attack, Taylor’s “vindication” is not entirely unfounded. Smith,
for example, in his Essay, make comparisons between human plasticity and that of
vegetables in different climates. Similarly, Wollstonecraft’s repeated comparisons
between men, women, and animals highlights a slippery boundary between the
human and the nonhuman. Taylor’s final line is telling: these claims for biological
indistinction lead to a vision of radical political indistinction in which “all things every
where” become “common to all”—including property, wives, and bodies. Taylor refers
to this radical indistinction as a “sublime theory” that is expressly subversive.
Wollstonecraft’s animal comparisons are more explicit in Rights of Woman than
in her other treatises. She argues that women need to be “[raised] in the scale of
animal being, when they are comprehensively termed mankind,” and notes with some
frequency the similar treatment of both women and animals.108 And, in what likely
disturbed figures like Taylor, she argues that “humanity to animals” should be part of
national education. She makes comparisons between treatment of the poor and
treatment of animals, and refers to animals as part of family. Her basis for these
claims is not strictly moral; it is also biological. Here we see a shift in the way
Wollstonecraft engages with indistinction as she moves from a conversation about
human equality to challenging the distinctions between humans and animals. This
shift to human-animal indistinction marks the radical possibilities of Wollstonecraft’s
writings. At one point, she uses contemporary anatomy to argue against Rousseau
regarding the state of nature and man’s status as a carnivorous animal.109
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Wollstonecraft also uses naturalists to discuss the age of maturity among men and
women. “It is proper to observe, that animals who arrive more slowly at maturity, are
the longest lived, and of the noblest species. Men cannot, however, claim any natural
superiority from the grandeur of longevity; for in this respect nature has not
distinguished the male.”110 Wollstonecraft’s claims that gender indistinction is natural
are rooted in biological claims in a manner that echoes the ways in which Smith draws
upon naturalist comparisons between human and nonhuman animals to make claims
about human adaptability in his Essay.111
Wollstonecraft makes her most radical and explicit statement about gender
indistinction when she writes, “I do earnestly wish to see the distinction of sex
confounded in society.”112 At no other moment is she so blunt about her intentions
with this essay, making it clear that she not only sees these distinctions as artificial,
but that they should be confounded. She goes on to ask, “Can she believe that she
was only made to submit to man, her equal, a being, who, like her, was sent into the
world to acquire virtue?”113 And then, “Is one half of the human species, like the poor
African slaves, to be subject to prejudices that brutalize them?”114 Here we see gender
distinctions placed alongside racial distinctions—distinctions which, as Wollstonecraft
validated in her review of Smith, were the result of climate and society. What’s more,
here she uses this argument to push more actively for political change. She argues, for
example, that women should be represented in government, an explicit example of
such change. She then argues for education reform on a national level, calling for
mixed classes of boys and girls educated on the same model. She specifically calls for
an elementary day school, “where boys and girls, the rich and poor, should meet
together. And to prevent any of the distinctions of vanity, they should be dressed alike,
and all obliged to submit to the same discipline.”115 Wollstonecraft summarizes her
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claims by writing, “I principally wish to enforce the necessity of educating the sexes
together to perfect both . . . they should be sent to school to mix with a number of
equals, for only by the jostlings of equality can we form a just opinion of ourselves.”116
Wollstonecraft privileges an educational space that is mixed and equal, much like
Smith privileged similar spaces as he discussed the best adaptations of the human
constitution in his Essay.117
Even as late as her account of the French Revolution (1794), Wollstonecraft
continued to echo the work of Smith in her writings. This account, in particular,
seems rooted in a similarly Galenic mode of understanding the body and the body
politic. Where her two vindications grappled primarily with the intersections of biology
and politics in terms of human plasticity, this account more explicitly attempts to
reconcile her optimism for the revolution and a disheartened view of its violence
through the rhetoric of medicine—and, more specifically, a climatist view of medicine
that directly opposes a Burkean view of revolution and revolutionary ideals as
contagion. Wollstonecraft writes in her account, “it is the uncontaminated mass of the
[French] nation, whose minds begin to grasp the sentiments of freedom, that has
secured the equilibrium of the state.”118 Referring to the need for political equilibrium
calls to mind a Galenic model of health that equates equality and balance with
wellness. Attempting to reconcile her revolutionary ideals with the accusations of
violence and failure from all sides, she goes on to argue:
The revolution was neither produced by the abilities or intrigues of a few
individuals; nor was the effect of sudden and short-lived enthusiasm; but
the natural consequence of intellectual improvement, gradually
proceeding to perfection in the advancement of communities, from a
state of barbarism to that of polished society.119
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Working against the foreign body model of disease that Burke used as a metaphor for
the French Revolution, in which revolution is seen as a contagion brought about by a
select few, Wollstonecraft argues that the revolution was a natural effect of a
community seeking to improve by bringing equality and balance to the system.
One of the more striking observations Wollstonecraft makes as she attempts to
contextualize the French Revolution comes in the form of a commentary on the French
diet. Struggling to reconcile her French sympathies with the violence of the revolution,
Wollstonecraft speaks at length about how the French were “not properly qualified” for
the revolution, drawing comparisons with the American Revolution.120 As part of this,
she explains how the French diet affects their constitutions and characters:
Besides, the very manner of living in France gives a lively turn to the
character of the people; for by the destruction of animal juices, in
dressing their food, they are subject to none of the dullness, the effect of
more nutritive diet in other countries; and this gaiety is increased by the
moderate quantity of weak wine, which they drink at their meals, bidding
defiance to phlegm.121
Along with descriptions of French customs, climate, and political tendencies, this view
of the French as a passionate and lively people (which led, in Wollstonecraft’s eyes, to
a somewhat overzealous and violent revolution) echoes Smith’s descriptions of how
diet, climate, and the state of society produce variety in humans—demonstrating again
a discourse of human plasticity circulating in the Atlantic world at this time.
Wollstonecraft uses natural causes to reconcile what she sees as important French
ideals with the violence of their political upheaval, and to also reconcile the different
outcomes sin which democratic revolutions played out in American and France.
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That being said, Wollstonecraft ultimately believes the revolution will have
salubrious effects on France. She compares the political progress of France, for
example, to the progress of medical science. She writes, “though thousands have
perished the victims of empirics, and of despots, yet the improvements made both in
medicine and moral philosophy have kept a sure, though gradual pace.”122 Her belief
in a steady forward progress leads her to argue that “if men have not clearly
discovered a specific remedy for every evil, physical, moral, and political, it is to be
presumed, that the accumulation of experimental facts will greatly tend to lessen them
in the future.”123 This passage reveals that, like Smith, Wollstonecraft sees harmony
between the physical, moral, political sciences.124 It also reveals her faith in
experimental philosophy; she values experiments as a necessary part of scientific and
political processes. Wollstonecraft shares this in common with Smith and others who
argued that “experiment in morals as well as in phisics [sic ] is the only proper source
of truth, & guide of reasoning.”125 As Noll writes, Smith “believed in [science’s] power
to ferret out the secrets of the world—human nature, politics, history, religious and
ethical experience, as well as chemistry, astronomy, and applied mathematics,” a
widely held view at the turn of the century.126 Just as Smith relies on scientific
evidence to make theological claims about human origins (and vice versa),
Wollstonecraft borrows from the language of science to undergird her political theories.
Wollstonecraft ends her account of the French Revolution with an image of the
diseased political state as a necessary precursor to political health, claiming that,
while “a change of character cannot be so sudden as some sanguine calculators
expect,” leveling is necessary for progress.127 She argues that revolution is the natural
result of enlightened progress toward equality. Although she would not have known it,
Smith made a similar remark in 1784, noting that while revolutions were certainly
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disruptive, “when we consider that human society can only advance to a certain period
before it becomes corrupted, and begins to decline, and that letters always decline
with virtue, revolutions are perhaps the necessary scaffolding by which science and
human nature must gradually arrive at their summit.”128 Revolutions, while
sometimes painful, are necessary. Again, both authors draw on a Galenic
understanding of crisis as a necessary part of the restorative process for the body (and,
for Wollstonecraft, the body politic). In her final words, Wollstonecraft writes:
Thus had France grown up, and sickened on the corruption of a state
diseased. But, as in medicine there is a species of complaint in the
bowels which works it’s own cure, and, leaving the body healthy, gives an
invigorated tone to the system, so there is in politics: and whilst the
agitation of it’s [sic] regeneration continues, the excrementitious
humours exuding from the contaminated body will excite a general
dislike and contempt for the nation; and it is only the philosophical eye,
which looks into the nature and weighs the consequences of human
actions, that will be able to discern the cause.129
Wollstonecraft, like Burke, thinks about democracy here as a disease. Yet for her, it is
not a plague that leads to decay; instead, it is a purging force whose leveling sets the
stage for future growth. That Wollstonecraft ends her preface to French Revolution by
dismissing the old society as a “tremendous empire of superstition and hypocrisy,
erected upon the ruins of Gothic brutality and ignorance” seems important in this
regard.130 Wollstonecraft imagines a new society purged of these trappings, a society
where equality paves the way for a new Gothic sensibility that appeals to an earlier
tradition in British literature in which the Gothic is instead tied to political liberty.
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While Smith’s attack on polygenism and Wollstonecraft’s attack on Burke may
not seem immediately to be part of the same conversation, both demonstrate an
emergent transatlantic interest in the political and biological consequences of equality
and human plasticity. While Smith was perhaps less aware (or less interested) in the
political consequences of human plasticity, for Wollstonecraft an engagement with the
science of human variety became foundational to her political theories, her response to
Burke’s politics of distinction, and her justifications of radical equality and the French
Revolution. Wollstonecraft’s turn to biology shapes not only her response to Burke’s
Reflections, but to his theory of the sublime and the beautiful. In addition, her use of
disease as the metaphorical agent that brings about the fall of this old society provides
an important preface to the work of Brown, Shelley, and Bird. Indeed, all three of
these authors literalize that metaphor in their own works in an attempt to imagine
what a new Gothic might look like—and what that new mode says about democracy
and the boundaries of the human. Wollstonecraft’s rejection of the “superstitions” of
an older Gothic mode sets up a clear foundation for Brown’s preface to Edgar Huntly,
in which he outlines a new, distinctly American Gothic mode. That Brown was not
only familiar with Wollstonecraft, but actually drew from her aesthetic, is clear in his
attempt to write an American version of her Rights of Woman in his first published
work: Alcuin: A Dialogue (1798). In the following chapter, I explore in more depth the
ways in which Brown’s American Gothic mode draws heavily on Wollstonecraft’s
insistence on indistinction as a biological foundation for radical equality.
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NOTES
Almost two years would pass before Wollstonecraft again tackled natural history and science by
reviewing the work of figures such as Johann Kaspar Lavater, William Smellie, and Georges-Louis Leclerc,
Comte de Buffon. Her reviews primarily focused on educational works, travelogues, and fiction.
1

Janet Todd has described Wollstonecraft the reviewer as “a new literary partisan[;] she vigorously
attacked the rival, more established journals: the Critical Review was ‘timid, mean’, she declared, and the
Monthly Review tame and sycophantic.” Janet Todd, Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2000), 139. Yet, whereas Todd argues that “no one could accuse her of these
faults,” Wollstonecraft’s review of Smith was perhaps recklessly congratulatory; it certainly stood out
against the more critical tone she used when reviewing other texts, 139. The length of this review alone
puts Smith in the same company as Samuel Johnson, Frances Burney, Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Catharine Macaulay, and Charlotte Smith—all reviewed by Wollstonecraft for the Analytical Review.
2

Kames later backed away from these arguments, but his Sketches of the History of Man (1774) provided
Smith with a convenient starting point for making his own claims about the unity of the human species.
4 Mary Wollstonecraft, The Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (London:
Pickering & Chatto, 1989), 7:50-51.
3

Compare this language with the opening to another one of Wollstonecraft’s reviews from this period: “It
is almost insufficient to say of this insipid production, that its preposterous incidents, and absurd
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CHAPTER 2
“IMMUNITY AND TRANSFORMATION”
Although much has been said about the similarities between Charles Brockden
Brown and William Godwin—Brown himself acknowledged his literary debt to
Godwin—we often forget that his first published work, Alcuin: A Dialogue (1798), has
more in common with Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman than the Gothic fictions of her
husband. Indeed, when a version of Alcuin appeared in in the Weekly Magazine it was
titled “Rights of Women,” a shortened version of the title to Wollstonecraft’s treatise.
Alcuin’s dialogue addresses many of the same issues discussed in my first chapter,
including the unequal access to education for women and the ways in which women
are treated much like animals in a patriarchal society. In Alcuin, Brown even imagines
a utopian woman’s paradise—a society in which men and women are treated and
educated equally—that demonstrates his awareness of the political potential of gender
indistinction. Although Mrs. Carter ultimately backs away from Alcuin’s suggestion
that marriage be abolished by the end of the text, it is clear that Brown, like
Wollstonecraft, is interested in the possibilities of radical equality.
Brown also draws on similar arguments to make his appeal, demonstrating his
own familiarity with the discourses on human plasticity put forth by thinkers such as
Samuel Stanhope Smith. Early in the text, Mrs. Carter asks Alcuin if he believes “that
the sexes are essentially equal.”1 To that, Alcuin responds: “It appears to me, that
human beings are moulded by the circumstances in which they are placed. In this
they are all alike. The differences that flow from the sexual distinction, are as nothing
in the balance.”2 These arguments echo the claims put forth by both Smith and
Wollstonecraft in their writings, that education and the state of society is capable of
shaping humans and their abilities. Like Wollstonecraft, Brown turns this into an
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argument for female education and attacks the “habits” of men that, as Mrs. Carter
notes, for making “the circumstance of sex a reason for excluding one half of mankind
from all those paths which lead to usefulness and honour.”3 Alcuin, then, becomes an
American echo of Wollstonecraft’s arguments for gender indistinction.
Yet just as Wollstonecraft took the work of Smith beyond what he could imagine,
I argue that Brown does similar things with Wollstonecraft’s politics of indistinction.
Whereas Alcuin itself serves as an interesting text for examining gender indistinction,
as Brown moves from Alcuin to his Gothic fiction, he explores more radical equalities
that Wollstonecraft, perhaps, could not imagine. Building on the language of disease
used by Burke and Wollstonecraft in Chapter 1, Brown examines what happens to
human distinctions—especially race distinctions—when disease gets literalized
(something we will also see in Chapter 3 with Mary Shelley). The first half of this
chapter explores how the democratizing and leveling power of disease in Brown’s
yellow fever novels contributes to a politics of distinction. In this section, Brown
remains attentive to concerns about questions about social and political status, yet
quickly moves beyond that standard Gothic narrative to further examine the politics of
racial indistinction in the wake of the Haitian Revolution. The second half of this
chapter looks at how Edgar Huntly takes this a step further to examine the possibility
of species indistinction. By examining the possibility of indistinction between humans
and animals, Edgar Huntly more explicitly frames this transition from a European
Gothic to an American (and transatlantic) Gothic fiction.

ESTABLISHING A POLITICS OF IMMUNITY
In the fall of 1798, having noted that a “fatal pest has encompassed us and
entered our own doors,” the aspiring novelist Brown lost his close friend—the poet and
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physician Elihu Hubbard Smith—to a growing yellow fever epidemic in New York. A
similar outbreak had plagued the city only three years prior, and the most devastating
of these epidemics had driven Brown from his Philadelphia home in 1793. Having
arranged for the burial of his friend, he departed from this “pestilential, desolate, and
sultry city” and took up residence with the playwright William Dunlap in New Jersey;
a month later he began writing Ormond; or, The Secret Witness.4 A sprawling narrative
of conspiracy and contagion, Ormond was the first of Brown’s published novels to
revisit the Philadelphia he knew in 1793: a community threatened not only by disease,
but by the perceived collapse of established social, political, and racial hierarchies.5 By
this time, Brown had spent three years working on Arthur Mervyn; or, Memoirs of the
Year 1793, and he published both novels in 1798 as violent democratic revolutions in
France and Saint Domingue made it seem necessary to contemplate how societies
were bound together. As pestilent disease, uncontrolled immigration, and
revolutionary energies threatened the capital of the young republic, the perceived
immunities and increased mobility of foreign agents in Philadelphia led to fears of a
nation susceptible to physical and ideational contagion.
Whereas literary scholars and historians have often dismissed Ormond for
Brown’s better-known Arthur Mervyn, this “brilliantly bungled book” offers a striking
commentary on the power of contagionist discourse to construct alternative codes of
belonging in the early republic.6 Some critics have demonstrated a growing interest in
the formative yellow fever chapters of Ormond, yet few scholars have succeeded in
bringing the text into a larger conversation with Arthur Mervyn. In the following
sections, I do just that, underscoring what philosopher Roberto Esposito has called
“the immunitary semantics at the center of modern self-representation” by examining
how discourses of immunity alter the biopolitical landscape of Philadelphia in the
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1790s.7 With an increased focus on the intersection of literature and medicine,
contagion has become something of a scholarly buzzword in early American studies: it
serves metaphorically to demarcate the postcolonial other, demonstrates the
transmissibility of revolutionary rhetoric, highlights the instability of republican
government, and embodies fears of racial mixture. As such, I want to shift the
emphasis from a discourse of contagion (often associated with a fear of the foreign) to
a discourse of immunity (a fear associated with foreign immunities) in order to
demonstrate a more affirmative politics in Brown’s Gothic that can emerge only after
deconstructing the intersection of biology and politics in this period.
Brown complicates early American medical narratives by positioning
contagion—in the words of Priscilla Wald—as “more than an epidemiological fact.”8
Wald argues instead that contagion is “a foundational concept in the study of religion
and society, with a long history of explaining how beliefs circulate in social
interactions” and notes, “the interactions that make us sick also constitute us as a
community.”9 She recognizes that narratives have social consequences; as authors
imagine (and reimagine) the threat of an outbreak, they disseminate information and
shape how communities respond to and experience disease. Esposito offers a variation
of Wald’s argument by arguing that immunities also constitute us as a community.
Esposito claims, “immunitas is inscribed in the reverse logic of communitas: immune is
the ‘non-being’ or the ‘not-having’ anything in common,” and notes, “it is precisely
such a negative implication with its contrary that indicates that the concept of
immunization presupposes that which it also negates.”10 For Brown, the yellow fever
epidemic exposes pockets of non-being within the community as non-citizens gain
mobility and access to society through a perceived resistance to disease.
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Although Wald and Esposito are primarily interested in twentieth-century
biopolitical questions, their writings also provide a rewarding approach to reading the
outbreak narratives of the 1790s. For Wald, outbreak narratives offer a striking
commentary on the transmission of bodies and ideas in society:
[Contagion] means literally “to touch together,” and one of its earliest
usages in the fourteenth century referred to the circulation of ideas and
attitudes. Revolutionary ideas were contagious, as were heretical beliefs
and practices. The circulation of disease and the circulation of ideas were
material and experiential, even if not visible. Both . . . demonstrated the
simultaneous fragility and tenacity of social bonds.11
This etymological reading is well suited to Brown’s novels, particularly Ormond. As
Brown’s narratives of conspiracy (literally “to breathe together”) are subtended by an
emergent discourse of contagion (literally “to touch together”), they produce a complex
language capable of responding to the material and social experiences of a politically
charged and epidemical community. Yet I find Wald most provocative not for her
reading of contagion, but for her exploration of socially constructed immunities—or
“epidemiologies of belonging”—that are shaped by real and perceived resistance to
disease. In order to articulate how Brown’s outbreak narratives help construct a
politics of indistinction, I borrow Wald’s “imagined immunities” (with all the weight of
her gesture to Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities) to push against the critical
tendency to merely pathologize contagion. Instead, I argue that perceived immunities
to both disease and republican thought in Brown’s novels open up the liberatory
possibility of an immunological citizenship defined by exemption from disease.12
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SYMPTOMS OF TERROR IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
Ormond opens with the narrative of Mr. Dudley, a wealthy merchant deceived
by his young business partner. Brown introduces a rhetoric of contagion early in the
text, noting that Dudley’s wife “caught the infection” of melancholy from her husband
and “there was no remedy” for Dudley’s initial suspicions toward his partner. The fall
of Dudley intertwines disease and social circumstances: his frame is no longer
“exempt from infirmity” and his moral character displays similar “symptoms of this
depravity.” Newly impoverished, Dudley’s injured pride leads him to move his family
from Baltimore to Philadelphia where poverty and an outbreak of yellow fever make it
impossible to leave.13 He loses his wife and his vision, and becomes completely
dependent upon his daughter Constantia: an industrious, chaste, and educated
republican woman [American version of classic Gothic narrative of lost status?].
Constantia refuses to marry impetuously in order to improve her situation, relying
instead on the language of illness to describe ill-placed love as a malady that is only
“curable” with time and reason. To Constantia, love is a disease that must be treated
and overcome alongside the “infirmities of sex and age” that challenge her efforts to
care for her father.14 Physically and economically confined, Constantia’s story becomes
one of perpetual contact and contagion. She is a figure constantly threatened by
transgressive persons and their dangerous narratives.
Rooted in the political rhetoric of the 1790s, the historical backdrop to
Constantia’s narrative is one of intense political debates. As Catherine O’Donnell
Kaplan notes, this was a period in American history when “political responsibilities
seemed to subsume all other duties, political speech to drown out all other
communication,” and fears of widespread political unrest emerged even before the first
case of yellow fever was reported in 1793.15 American support for France was of

— 75 —

particular consequence, as the French found themselves simultaneously at war with
Britain, Holland, Spain, and Austria. Although French support had made it possible
for Washington to force a British surrender at Yorktown, the new president proclaimed
neutrality on behalf of the United States, sparking a series of public and private
debates. Tensions increased in April with the arrival of the French republic’s new
minister, Edmond Charles Genêt, who demanded war with England and garnered
public support as he traveled from Charleston to Philadelphia. French sympathies
heightened again as thousands of refugees fled slave rebellions in Saint Domingue in
July. Political intensities led John Adams to proclaim a “French madness.” Years later
he would argue that only the yellow fever had saved the nation from political disaster:
You certainly never felt the terrorism excited by Genet in 1793, when ten
thousand people in the streets of Philadelphia . . . threatened to drag
Washington out of his house and effect a revolution in the government,
or compel it to declare war in favor of the French Revolution and against
England. The coolest and the firmest minds . . . have given their opinions
to me that nothing but the yellow fever . . . could have saved the United
States from a total revolution of government.16
Yet as Brown wrote Ormond in 1798, the political landscape hadn’t much improved.
John Robinson’s Proofs of a Conspiracy was published amidst fears of secret societies,
revolutionary violence escalated across the Atlantic, and Adams signed the Alien and
Sedition Acts to protect the republic from malicious writings and alien enemies.
Such fears, however, were no longer limited to politics. The gathering of the
College of Physicians by Mayor Clarkson in 1793 marked the first time in American
history that the government had appealed to an organized medical society for
assistance and by 1797 the nation’s first medical journal was being published by
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Elihu Hubbard Smith in New York. Fierce medical debates emerged in 1793 as
physicians divided themselves into two camps: climatists claimed that yellow fever was
the result of miasmic vapors rising from the filth of the city, while contagionists argued
it was an infectious disease imported from the West Indies. So prevalent were these
debates that by 1795 Brown’s friend Elihu Hubbard Smith found it impossible to avoid
the incessant “fever talk” around him: “Fever is the invariable and unceasing topic of
conversation. When two persons meet, the Fever is the subject of the first inquiries.
People collect in groups to talk it over and to frighten each other into fever, or flight.”17
Despite Kaplan’s claim that all speech in this period was subsumed in political debate,
Smith’s concerns and a sharp increase in publications on the fever spoke to the rising
importance of medical discourse in the 1790s. Climatist and contagionist positions
often played to the major ideological camps of the early republic, making it difficult to
distinguish between medical and political discourse—especially as contagionists
sought to restrict the influx of immigrants from Saint Domingue.18
Brown did not share these medical convictions, and instead viewed the yellow
fever as a disease whose origin and transmission would remain mysterious. In a
footnote to his translation of C. F. Volney’s View of the Soil, Brown outright rejects
both camps: “Why, exclaims one, did not the equal or greater filth and impurity of our
towns generate the fever before 1790? And why, may another exclaim, did not our
intercourse with the West Indies import that disease sooner?”19 Brown was
unconvinced that science could speak with certainty on the transmission and
treatment of yellow fever, and instead turned to literature in order to explore the social
consequences of disease in a time of heightened political anxiety. In his preface to
Arthur Mervyn, Brown reflects on the singularity of this period by noting that “the evils
of pestilence by which this city has lately been afflicted will probably form an æra in
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its history,” yet also recognizes the futility of consigning this shared experience to
scientific and historical scrutiny. Distancing his work from that of the “physician and
political economist,” Brown instead fashions himself a “moral observer” whose
authorial gaze rests not on the physical effects of disease, but on the “new displays of
the influence of human passions and motives” which result from a “change in
manners and population.”20 As such, Brown finds himself crossing disciplinary
boundaries much like Smith and Wollstonecraft did as they worked to bring together
science, religion, race, and politics. Brown would later reflect on how texts both
construct and reflect meaning within a society by arguing, “the narration of public
events, with a certain license of invention, was the most efficacious of moral
instruments.”21 As increasingly diverse and shifting populations challenged the
nation’s social structures, Brown sought a cultural diagnosis through Gothic fiction.
Brown’s disinterest in a purely medical account can be seen in his earliest
descriptions of the fever in Ormond, which are devoid of physical details and instead
explore the social consequences of the disease. As Constantia walks the streets of
Philadelphia upon the death of a friend, she observes in those around her “the
symptoms of terror with which all ranks appeared to be seized . . . there were few
passengers whose countenances did not betray alarm.”22 Written at a distance of only
five years, Brown’s reference to “terror” evokes images of “the Terror” that erupted in
France weeks after the first yellow fever outbreak in Philadelphia. Brown more
explicitly references “the Terror” later in the text as Martinette—an exiled French
revolutionary—narrates her escape from the “sanguinary tyranny of Robespierre” to a
shuddering Constantia.23 As “moral observer,” Brown becomes diagnostician of the
social and cultural symptoms of the epidemic. Through Constantia he speaks to a
growing national fear of political insurrection and unstable communities.24
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Constantia’s early recognition of these “symptoms of terror” foreshadows her later
meetings with Martinette and reveals a fragmented American political consciousness
that celebrated an ideology of freedom yet feared the potential consequences: an
American “Terror” like that in France or a violent pursuit of citizenship as seen in
Saint Domingue. Brown remained publicly skeptical of these anxieties, yet he was
unable—or perhaps unwilling—to transcend such fears in his fiction.

CONSTRUCTING IMAGINED IMMUNITIES
Even as he affirms the danger of foreign influence on Constantia, Brown uses
Martinette’s commentary on Robespierre as an indictment of fearing the foreign.
Despite his published support of black resistance in Saint Domingue, Brown betrays
his own republican uncertainties as he imagines a free republic in which non-citizens
(or “non-beings”) gain rights through violence and immunity. Brown’s interest in the
epidemic is perhaps best understood by looking at the Greek roots of the term
epidemios. Whereas nosos was the term for the disease, epidemios was initially used to
reference to a country, a people, or a home: all which describe human beings socially
bound together. Before Hippocrates used the term to describe diseases themselves,
epidemios referred to persons who chose to reside in a given country. Brown’s novels
imagine epidemics as more than the physical presence of fever; epidemics also mark
the arrival and ongoing presence of non-citizens whose perceived immunities permit
them to stay—thus rendering indistinct the boundaries of both nations and citizens.
These non-citizens are not simply immune to disease, but to the prevalent republican
ideologies of the period. Brown’s narratives of emergent immunological citizenship
move beyond traditional medical discourse to explore the exigency and danger of
bodies in contact in the early Atlantic world.
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Constantia’s first physical encounter with a feverish body comes as she
attempts to nurse a sick neighbor against her father’s wishes. As her friend perishes,
Constantia notices that this “house and her own were opposite each other and not
connected with any on the same side. A narrow space divided them, and her own
chamber was within the sphere of contagion.” Suddenly aware of the vulnerability of
this space (here disease makes even physical and spatial boundaries ineffective) she
struggles to “stifle the conviction that some mortal sickness had seized upon her own
frame” and grapples with the “anxieties of head and stomach”; she recognizes the need
to remove herself—both physically and mentally—from the perils of contagion.25 Later,
a character named Baxter experiences similar “anxieties of the head” with less
fortunate consequences. Although “Baxter had a notion that Frenchmen were exempt
from this disease,” upon hearing rumors that a French neighbor has died, he perches
himself outside his house to witness the burial. Like Constantia, his fears heightened
as “he reflected how near he might now be to the source of infection,” yet “some
fascination had forbidden him to recede.” The corpse falls from its wrappings and
Baxter flees the scene in fright only to perish of the fever himself shortly thereafter.
Brown attributes Baxter’s death to a “force of imagination,” noting, “he had probably
already received, through the medium of the air, or by contact of which he was not
conscious, the seeds of this disease. They might perhaps have lain dormant, had not
this panic occurred to endow them with activity.”26 The physical transmission of
disease is of little consequence, yet Baxter’s panic-stricken mind proves fatal. In
placing unfounded fears alongside tangible dangers, Brown emphasizes the
interrelatedness of the imagination and one’s physical well-being.
The threat of these “imagined immunities” is most apparent in conversations
that take place between Constantia and Martinette. Wondering how Martinette
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survived alone in the streets during the epidemic, Constantia is shocked at the
Frenchwoman’s response: “Hast thou forgotten that there were . . . at least ten
thousand French in this city, fugitives from Marat and from St. Domingo? That they
lived in utter fearlessness of the reigning disease,—sung and loitered in the public
walks, and prattled at their doors with all their customary unconcern?”27 Exiled
French revolutionaries induce fear in Ormond for their perceived immunities, a claim
also leveled against blacks in Arthur Mervyn who cared for the sick and buried the
dead. That non-citizens could move freely through the nation’s temporary capital,
inoculated against pestilence and violence by their racial constitutions and
revolutionary ideals, threatened to undermine established hierarchies. These
immunities allowed for the circulation of ideas considered pervasive and contagious.
Foreign influences had “infiltrated” the city and formed communities with no regard
for the dangers of yellow fever, marking a significant intersection of conspiratorial and
contagionist fears in the novel. Robert Levine notes, “Constantia is surprised to learn
that [Martinette] had found immediate refuge with her compatriots, ‘fugitives from
Marat and from St. Domingo,’ who somewhat threateningly form a secretive
subcommunity within Philadelphia.”28 Martinette’s “customary unconcern” provides
increased mobility across racial, political, and moral boundaries during the epidemic.
Whereas Wald argues that the outbreak narrative “articulates community on a
national scale, as it identifies the health and well-being of those legally within the
borders of the state and its worthy representatives,” Brown’s novel acknowledges an
eighteenth-century fear—one that is perhaps most pronounced in Burke’s writings—
that these changing social and political formations, or “varieties of untried being,”
might irreversibly alter established forms of national belonging.29
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Blacks experienced a similar mobility during the epidemic. As contemporary
accounts of the yellow fever epidemic often read the efforts of Philadelphia blacks as a
community of free blacks serving some “national” interest, the simultaneous
perception of blacks as contagious agents and inoculated carriers of disease served to
further marginalize them as a community. Although for years slaveholders had
recognized the value of a “seasoned” slave—one inoculated against new world diseases
through previous exposure—prominent physicians like Rush continued to make
inaccurate claims that blacks were immune to yellow fever, demonstrating how blacks
could be perceived as susceptible to disease (they need to be “seasoned”) and immune
at the same time. Calling on the black community for assistance as a result of this
perceived immunity, Rush put the city in what Philip Gould has called “the awkward
position of asking non-citizens to act like ideal citizens” and placed an established
white society into a morally and economically dependent relationship with the black
community.30 Claims of black immunity also forced the young republic to acknowledge
the unspoken reality of miscegenation as prominent figures like Thomas Jefferson
began to question whether this immunity existed only in “pure blacks” but not those
of mixed race. Prevailing concerns that French merchants and free blacks were
advancing their own interests during the epidemic by charging exorbitant wages or
plundering deserted houses mapped too easily onto stories of “the Terror” in France
and stories of newly-liberated blacks violently asserting power in Saint Domingue. The
residents who remained in Philadelphia often watched in fear as fellow citizens were
carried off by black carters to likely perish at Bush Hill, the French-run hospital on
the outskirts of the city. The image of blacks publicly burying the dead brings together
the worlds of revolution and disease, with Martinette asking late in the novel: “What
are bleeding wounds and mangled corpses, when accustomed to the daily sight of
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them for years?”31 Hardened by the experiences of violence and disease, Martinette
blurs the distinction between casualties of war and victims of the fever, and between
quarantine and exile. “Seasoned” by war and pestilence, these non-citizens were able
to establish networks of communication and move about with relative freedom.
These shifts between mobility and immobility are similarly experienced by
Constantia, as she resists physical and economic confinement and crosses—albeit
uncomfortably—a number of social and political boundaries. Brown reads the
prospects of a fledgling nation through her experience, as Constantia is forced to
break with class and gender standards in order to support herself and her family,
while also protecting her republican and “womanly” virtue amidst growing national
fears of political and physical contagion. Yet the issue of inviolate space—or virtue—is
not limited to questions of physical intrusion; as Robert Levine has argued, the figure
of Constantia represents an American who is also constantly seeking safety from the
“revolutionary energies” (and well-known Gothic tropes) of the period: specifically
Ormond’s sexuality and Martinette’s savagery.32 Attempting to wait in safety prior to
departing for Europe, for example, Constantia quarantines herself within an old family
home only to find herself again threatened by the conspiratorial presence of Ormond
and nearly raped. Trapped in a state of perpetual vulnerability, her need to flee the
revolutionary energies of America reflects a trope that can also be seen in the title
character of Arthur Mervyn, and Clara, the protagonist of Brown’s Wieland. As he
explores the possibilities of an inviolate republic, Brown often removes his characters
from America altogether; those who stay do so at their own peril.
At no point is the fear of contaminated space as pronounced as in Constantia’s
early experience nursing her neighbor, Mary Whiston. In an attempt to diagnose the
scenes around her, Constantia assumes that the fever infiltrated the Whiston
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household as a “malignant vapour” from some neglected corpse left outside. Her
awareness of the vulnerability of space and her assertion that she lives within a
sphere of contagion are both ultimately prompted by fears that the spread of the
disease is airborne; Constantia attributes the death of a nearby family to “the tainted
atmosphere around them.”33 Believing contamination to spread through the
atmosphere—a belief common to the period—Constantia worries that contagions will
be transmitted across physical and spatial boundaries. Her fear of being physically
and politically violated at the hands of Ormond and Martinette near the end of the
novel takes on a similar form. The final scene between Constantia and Ormond, in fact,
takes place behind locked doors and in the presence of another corpse: a
contaminated and conspiratorial space from which Constantia cannot escape inviolate.
Frightened she might conspire with the “yellow and haggard visage” of her dead
neighbor as she nurses Whiston, Constantia perceives not only physical illness but
also her own diseased mind.34 She recognizes the need to resist her imagined fears
and remove herself—physically and mentally—from the perils of contagion.

SPECTERS OF SAINT DOMINGUE
Constantia recovers from this moment of crisis as she hears the passing sounds
of a hearse in the middle of the night and breaks from her troubled reverie long
enough to make arrangements for the removal of Mary Whiston’s body. The sources of
Constantia’s relief are “two men, negroes, who listened to her tale with respect,” one of
only a few direct references made to race in the entire novel.35 Read alongside his later
political writings, this scene is often seen as an attempt by Brown to defend the
humanity of black volunteers. In his essay, “On the Consequences of Abolishing the
Slave Trade to the West Indian Colonies,” he refers to slavery as “the grandest and
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most cruel experiment that ever was tried upon human nature,” and later argues that
“this spectacle ought to teach us the effects of circumstances upon the human
faculties, and prescribe bounds to that arrogance, which would confine to one race,
the characteristics of the species.”36 Convinced that the perceived inferiority of blacks
was the result of circumstance rather than natural or inherent deficiencies, Brown
argues that the violence in Saint Domingue was the necessary result of a corrupt
system of slavery. Sophia describes one man—a “wood-carter” known previously to
Constantia and her father—as being “gentle and obliging,” and remarks that “his old
occupation being laid aside for a time, he had betaken himself, like many others of his
colour and rank, to the conveyance and burial of the dead.” This carter alleviates
Constantia’s despair by kindly agreeing to return later that evening to dispose of the
corpse, and Constantia learns the next morning that the man had “faithfully
performed his promise, the dead body having disappeared.”37 As the perceived threat
of West Indian immigrants loomed large during the epidemic years, Brown’s depiction
of faithful blacks certainly invites a reading of the text that is sympathetic to the plight
of free blacks and slaves in Philadelphia.
Brown’s explicit references to race in Ormond and Arthur Mervyn are few, and
he often avoids racial descriptions altogether. Still, the question of race is far from
irrelevant in his novels, and his reference to faithful black carters is especially
pertinent in light of the controversial remarks made by publisher Mathew Carey in
1793. Near the end of the first epidemic, Carey was responsible for writing several
editions of his short account, or “instant history,” of the yellow fever outbreak: a text
known best for its claim that “the great demand for nurses afforded an opportunity for
imposition, which was eagerly seized by some of the vilest of blacks. They extorted two,
three, four, even five dollars a night for attendance, which would have been well paid
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by a single dollar. Some of them were even detected in plundering the houses of the
sick.”38 This accusation from a man like Carey highlights the complexities of race
relationships in this period, and draws attention to the instability of racialized
hierarchies in the 1790s. A response to Carey’s assertion was published in 1794 by
Absalom Jones and Richard Allen, elders of the local church and leaders of the Free
African Society. While acknowledging that Carey had singled them out individually for
their service during the epidemic, Jones and Allen claimed that “by naming us he
leaves these others in the hazardous state of being classed with those who are called
the vilest.”39 Jones and Allen acknowledged that extortion was commonplace in the
city, but argued that it existed across racial boundaries and rebuked Carey for his
accusations of black opportunism. Carey was confused by this response, for he
considered himself “a dedicated republican, with seemingly impeccable antislavery
credentials,” and later editions included a footnote acknowledging white opportunism
as well.40 By publishing a series of small narratives about black service—narratives
that bear a strong resemblance to Brown’s depiction of negro carters published in
Ormond—Absalom Jones and Richard Allen offered a counter-perspective to the
perceived breakdown of social and racial hierarchies as described by Carey.
Although Carey’s initial indictment makes no specific reference to the recent
influx of black servants from Saint Domingue or to the growing fears of violence in the
West Indies, it would have been impossible for him—or Jones and Allen, for that
matter—to ignore their increased presence in the midst of an epidemic. In a recent
essay on Arthur Mervyn, Sean X. Goudie has argued that Jones and Allen also “invoke
the specter of West Indian rebellion” in their narrative, but that they “do so in order to
justify urgent appeals to their white audience for the emancipation and full integration
of black slaves.”41 Nor were whites the only people to believe that blacks were immune
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to the disease, as seen in Richard Allen’s claim that free blacks had a special
obligation as they had been granted exemption from the disease by God. Regardless, it
would have been impossible to ignore the increased mobility and public presence of
the black community, for “the whole city watched them every day as they made their
rounds, every night as they drove the dead carts. And, of course, the city shunned
them as infected, vilified them as predatory.”42 As arguments intensified in the United
States and throughout the Atlantic world regarding the violence in Saint Domingue—
abolitionists praising the black uprising and opponents criticizing the rebellion for its
violence and its impact on commerce—reports of looting and black opportunism fueled
racial tensions throughout Philadelphia. Black servants often experienced sudden and
unexpected freedom as their masters perished, and many found themselves in a
situation similar to that of the Dudleys: impoverished and unable to evacuate the city.
Brown, like Carey, had “impeccable antislavery credentials,” but we should be
similarly careful not to overlook the complex racial consciousness that informed his
work. As Goudie claims, the arrival of black servants and French refuges in
Philadelphia exposed “repressed unpleasant thoughts about slavery, rebellion, and the
nation’s foundational institutions” and Americans “found it necessary to reexamine
these things” as the yellow fever disrupted the established order.43 A most telling
example of repression and reexamination can be seen at the height of the yellow fever
epidemic in Brown’s other outbreak narrative, Arthur Mervyn. As Arthur—sick with
the yellow fever himself—enters the former habitation of a friend, he finds himself
hovering over an unknown dying man. He looks around and notices “traces of pillage”
and concludes that “some casual or mercenary attendant, had not only contributed to
hasten the death of the patient, but had rifled his property and fled.”44 At this moment,
Arthur is struck by “a ghostly, renegade West Indian ‘servant’ at the height of the
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yellow fever epidemic” and Brown literally raises the “specter” of violence in the West
Indies as Arthur is knocked senseless by an “apparition.”45
Unlike the humble and faithful black carter in Ormond, the West Indian servant
of Arthur Mervyn is described as having “one eye, a scar upon his cheek, a tawny skin,
[and] a form grotesquely misproportioned.” Arthur is frightened by this brief vision of
the mulatto, for, “to perceive, to fear, and to confront this apparition were blended into
one sentiment. I turned towards him with the swiftness of lightning, but my speed was
useless to my safety.” Like the West Indian servant, the yellow fever is also ghostly—an
invisible and unrecognizable presence in the atmosphere—and Arthur is overcome
with the fever only moments before his assault. Arthur is conscious of being infected
and claims that “a vapour, infectious and deadly, assailed my senses. . . . I seemed not
so much to smell as to taste the element that now encompassed me. I felt as if I had
inhaled a poisonous and subtle fluid, whose power instantly bereft my stomach of all
vigour.”46 Simultaneously assaulted by disease and violence, Arthur is discovered
unconscious in the street and narrowly escapes being buried alive by carters or
consigned to the contaminated space of Bush Hill. If the black carter of Ormond
acknowledges the humanity of blacks in Philadelphia in 1793, the mulatto in Arthur
Mervyn reveals Brown’s “repressed unpleasant thoughts” and his unfixed stance on
issues of race and rebellion in this period.
Concerns about the influx of West Indian immigrants, however, were not limited
to fears of servants and black uprisings.47 Although Brown makes the Philadelphia of
1793 an important site for his novels, both Arthur Mervyn and Ormond were written
years later as French sympathies lessened. Near the end of Arthur Mervyn, Arthur’s
travels put him in contact with a Frenchman and his performing monkey, in which the
Frenchman yells: “Tenez! Dominique! Prenez garde! Diable noir!” which translates into
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“Stop! Dominique! Mind you! Black devil!”48 By representing the Frenchman as the
master of this ill-behaved “beast” the novel doesn’t merely reinforce a racialized
hierarchy, but subtly assigns responsibility for this behavior to the French. Brown
takes this move a step further in Ormond by explicitly separating the French
immigrants from their black servants or the free blacks in Philadelphia; in Ormond it
is the French who are dangerous and savage, a move that perhaps undermines the
significance of racial contagion and instead emphasizes fears of pervasive political
discourse and revolutionary ideologies among the French. This reading helps situate
the narrative within the context of 1798, a period in which Michael Drexler argues “the
so-called Quasi-War with France had the effect of severing associations of the rebellion
in Saint Domingue and the French Revolution.”49 In Ormond, Brown not only severs
this association, but also transfers many of the prevalent fears and anxieties toward
blacks to the French. Indeed, the prevailing fear seems to be that blacks and the
French are rendered indistinct from others.
French exiles are particularly threatening figures not only for their immunity to
disease but also their exposure to revolutionary activities and ideals. This is seen
clearly in the woman Baxter believes to be a helpless Frenchman’s daughter, later
identified as Ormond’s sister Martinette. Like so many of Brown’s characters,
Martinette is not what she appears. Baxter initially believes that she is a
Frenchwoman unable to speak English, while Constantia assumes that she is simply a
well-traveled American. Her personal narrative as a cross-dressing revolutionary
militant from France, therefore, excites both curiosity and fear in Constantia when
they meet. Extolling the virtues of a “liberty inviolate” and claiming that “liberty
without peril can never exist” against the backdrop of the French Revolution and slave
revolts in Saint Domingue, Martinette epitomizes growing concerns in the United
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States over the potential consequences of a truly free republic.50 The narratives of her
travels and revolutionary philosophies gesture toward a contagion of liberty that might
infect the young republic and demand violence to uphold its ideals, and Martinette
invokes the specter of revolution by actively promoting the transmission of such
violent ideals to Constantia. Levine notes that “as Martinette continues to relate her
life story she seems increasingly monstrous, an itinerant revolutionary whose
character is determined and shaped almost entirely by the unloosed revolutionary
energies of the age.”51 Born of a Greek and a Ragusan, an orphan, and a traveler,
Martinette represents the revolutionary atmosphere of the period and the dangers of
increasingly mobile women who have been tainted—in her words—by “a mere passion
for war” and “the contagion of example.”52
Martinette’s mobility is contrasted sharply with the initial immobility of
Constantia as seen at the outset of the novel. Reduced to poverty through an act of
deceit, Constantia is driven out of the established community within which she was
raised and unable to remove herself from the material experience of the epidemic. With
all other societal bonds drawn from her, she is confronted not only by dire physical
and imaginary threats of pestilence, but also the need to interact with foreign
influences. In this state she meets up with black carters, the revolutionary Martinette,
and the conspiratorial political philosophies of Ormond. Her father is initially
described as one who “passed his time without much regard to futurity, being too well
satisfied with the present to anticipate a change,” but his resistance to change
eventually places Constantia in a position to feel threatened by an increasingly diverse
and shifting community.53 The yellow fever epidemic becomes a great social and
political leveler, and ultimately portends other threats of equality being circulated
through political movements occurring within and beyond the United States. Perhaps
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Brown sees in the collapsing hierarchies of a society built on principles of freedom
nothing more than a space susceptible to physical and ideational contagion. Despite
various attempts to relocate, Constantia eventually concludes that there is no place
where freedom is immune to contamination. The problem of freedom—as seen in a
figure like Martinette—lies in its vulnerability to conspiracy and contagion; it cannot
be obtained or sustained without physical and political casualties. The “imagined
immunity” of exiled French revolutionaries and free blacks lead Brown to imagine
alternative models of community while also exposing fears that violent revolution will
be perpetual—and inevitable—occurrences in a nation built upon principles of freedom.

CONSPIRACY AND CONTAGION
Although Martinette is perhaps the most explicitly dangerous figure in the text,
the threat of increased mobility reaches its height in her brother, Ormond. As Levine
argues, “during the 1790s the fever was regularly portrayed as a duplicitous form of
foreign infiltration and subversion,” and comparisons between Ormond and the
disease are telling.54 A member of the Bavarian Illuminati, a well-traveled soldier, and
a political revolutionary, we are told Ormond’s “projects” will “likely possess an
extensive influence on the future condition of this Western World.”55 Sophia—
Constantia’s friend and the narrator of Ormond, opens her letter to I. E. Rosenburg by
acknowledging, “Ormond will, perhaps, appear to you a contradictory or unintelligible,”
although she assures us that “he is not a creature of fancy.” Ormond’s fictionality is
tied to uniquely American circumstances as Sophia writes, “the modes of life, the
influence of public events upon the character and happiness of individuals, in America,
are new to you.”56 For Brown, Ormond emerges as a unique byproduct of the historical
and social landscape of the 1790s. In a period of deep political anxiety in the United
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States (and Philadelphia in particular), his presence points to a distinctly American
cultural imagination capable of entertaining wildly contradictory figures; his
contradictions spoke to their own conflicted social experiences. Indeed, like many of
Brown’s villains, Ormond fled Europe under questionable circumstances and
eventually took up residence in America, reinforcing concerns that foreign agents were
conspiring against the United States. In his conversations with Constantia,
He did not hide from her . . . that he had found service and promotion in
the armies of Potemkin and Romanzow; that he had executed secret and
diplomatic functions at Constantinople and Berlin; that in the latter city
he had met with schemers and reasoners who aimed at the newmodelling of the world, and the subversion of all that has hitherto been
conceived elementary and fundamental in the constitution of man and of
government; that some of those reformers had secretly united to break
down the military and monarchical fabric of German policy; that others,
more wisely, had devoted their secret efforts, not to overturn, but to
build; that, for this end, they embraced an exploring and colonizing
project; that he had allied himself to these, and for the promotion of their
projects had spent six years of his life in journeys by sea and land, in
tracts unfrequented till then by any European.57
Sophia also recounts the story of a Russian soldier who violently murders a fellow
soldier in order to rape and then kill this fellow soldier’s young lover. In an attempt to
expiate his guilt the next day, the soldier rushes alone into a group of Turkish foragers,
bringing away five heads and offering them on the grave of his friend as an act of
penance. “This youth was Ormond,” notes Sophia, “and such is a specimen of his
exploits during a military career of eight years, in a warfare the most savage and
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implacable.”58 In the course of the novel, he is also indirectly responsible for the early
death of a woman whose prospects of marriage he removed and threatens to rape
Constantia, demonstrating a complete disregard for established moral or legal codes.
This disregard is made possible by Ormond’s ability to assume multiple
identities, an act off political and social indistinction and a trait common to the
villains of Brown’s fiction. Levine has observed, “rationalistic, artful, and un-American,
Brown’s villains raise dark questions indeed about the futurity of a republic wherein
‘emigrants’ can theatrically fabricate identities as ‘Americans,’ all the while cloaking
their origins, politics, and agendas.”59 Martinette’s fluency in multiple languages and
her ability to cross-dress in order to fight for her revolutionary ideals is just one
example of such a fabrication. Yet Ormond does more than simply masquerade as an
“American” citizen, choosing instead to spy on Constantia by impersonating a black
servant (an act of making himself racially indistinct). His disguise makes him invisible,
immune, and mobile: a non-citizen, or non-being. This transformation jeopardizes the
organizing hierarchies of early American society. Ormond violates racial and moral
boundaries as he travels unseen into the uncontaminated space of a virtuous
republican woman, an obvious stand-in for the republic itself. Ormond’s visit in
blackface, like the West Indian assault in Arthur Mervyn, offers a spectral reminder of
the dangers of this historical moment: as Constantia finds herself plagued by
malignant vapors, an “apparition”—the black, unseen Ormond—enters.
Ormond opens with Constantia pondering questions of suicide and honor, and
of physical and social death. Her commentary serves to frame the novel, and similar
thoughts resurface in her final scenes with Ormond:
If thought degenerate into a vehicle of pain, what remains but to destroy
that vehicle? For this end death is the obvious, but not the only, or,
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morally speaking, the worst, means. There is one method of obtaining the
bliss of forgetfulness, in comparison with which suicide is innocent.60
Frustrated in his attempts to contaminate Constantia with his political ideals, Ormond
ignores her suicidal threats and conspires to rape her—dead or alive. Here we see that
even the distinction between life and death gets blurred. Ormond’s actions
demonstrate that questions of life and death are never merely physical: they are also
social and political. He warns Constantia not to give up her life over the imaginary
contagion of honor, yet demonstrates his own disregard for her life by instructing her
to “die with the guilt of suicide and the brand of cowardice upon thy memory, or live
with thy claims to felicity and approbation undiminished. Thy decision is of moment to
thyself, but of none to me. Living or dead, the prize that I have in view shall be
mine.”61 Unaffected by her pleas for life and liberty, his actions underscore Sophia’s
earlier claim that in times of revolution and epidemic “human life is momentous and
trivial in our eyes, according to the course which our habits and opinions have
taken.”62 Like Martinette, Ormond’s indifference to mortality and violence asks the
important biopolitical question of who has power to regulate or negate life.
Arthur Mervyn also struggles with these questions—initially confusing his
mulatto assailant for a corpse and then nearly being buried alive—yet Ormond is less
interested in the distinction between life and death: his prolonged exposure to violence
and disease makes life physically and politically inconsequential. Constantia is only
able to preserve her personal freedom through violence, opting to preserve her liberty
at all costs. In essence she must decide to perish or become Martinette; she ultimately
chooses to preserve her liberty even if the attempt proves fatal. Constantia’s struggle
against Ormond speaks to the struggle of a young republic attempting to maintain an
ideology of freedom, yet fearful that a republican philosophy will result in the same
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violence and hierarchical collapse being witnessed abroad. Here Ormond becomes a
narrative of political possibility that is both liberatory and fearful. Although Constantia
manages to survive the yellow fever epidemic without resorting to suicide, we are given
no indication that she ever recovers from the political machinations of Ormond.
For others, however the changing dynamics of this period still held political
promise; Brown’s novels also reflect the sentiments of those who claimed immunity
from the fever. Richard Allen and Absalom Jones believed immunity to be a gift from
God, one that might lead to abolition and equal black citizenship. Brown’s writings
also echo the sentiments of Stephen Girard, the French merchant who took over the
operations at Bush Hill, who noted that Americans died much easier than the French.
Girard speculated that Philadelphia would soon have nothing but Frenchmen left, and,
like Martinette, he demonstrated an “utter fearlessness” by moving freely about the
city. More importantly, Brown’s vision prefaced that of a former West African slave,
Jean-Jacques Dessalines, as he spoke to his troops in Saint Domingue three years
after Brown published his novels. Dessalines set forth a more explicit vision of
immunological citizenship, claiming that “the whites will fight well at first, but soon
they will fall sick and die like flies. Then I will make you independent. Then there will
be no more whites among us.”63 Dessalines’ prophecy was partially fulfilled. When he
declared Haitian independence in 1804, citizenship came with a price. Standing on the
ashes of a country torn by war and pestilence, he claimed independence only after
Saint Domingue had been deemed too hostile and infectious for white citizens.
Brown’s fictional experiment with unrestricted freedom and its consequences in
a period of democratic revolutions demonstrates a capacity to imagine outcomes like
those in Haiti. Brown had been displaced by the fever. He had witnessed the removal
of Washington and the federal government to Germantown—another politically
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charged site. He acknowledged that physical destruction and social vulnerability often
accompanied the pursuit of freedom; liberty was unsustainable without physical and
political casualties. Yet, despite these concerns, Brown refuses simply to pathologize
the foreign in his cultural diagnosis. Instead, his interest in the imagined immunities
of this period presupposes what the dominant rhetoric of contagion sought to negate:
that what was foreign was never really foreign at all. At its core, this reflects what
Stanhope Smith and Wollstonecraft argued in their own texts: humans are originally
the same, and difference is ultimately a matter of environment and circumstance. This
is what endows immunological citizenship with its political promise.
In Ormond and Arthur Mervyn, Brown imagines a biopolitical horizon in which
perceived immunities redefine what it means to be foreign or obtain membership in a
free society. Although Brown’s commitment to epistemological uncertainties makes it
difficult to pin down his politics, his betrayal of repressed anxieties toward republican
projects in the United States, France, and the West Indies hints at the complexity of
his historical consciousness. It is telling that his friend, Smith, wrote—but never
published—a utopian fiction that reimagined the structure and environment of the
republic rather than its inhabitants. The freedom he envisioned could exist as long as
the air and the established hierarchies were kept free from disease. Brown, however,
was less interested in how communities could shape disease; instead, his novels
explore the ways in which resistance to disease could reshape communities. Aware
that claims of French and black immunities were inaccurate, Brown still imbues these
imagined immunities with cultural capital; immigrant communities in his novels tend
to promote and hasten a democratic consensus. As Constantia is removed from a
pestilential American political environment, Brown envisions an immunological
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citizenship resistant to utopian revision, and a community “seasoned” by inevitable
contact with the bodies and politics of a larger Atlantic world.

HUMAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE PROMISE OF INDISTINCTION
Even as two of Brown’s Gothic novels explore the leveling power of disease and
its ability to think about the political promise of racial indistinction, a third novel,
Edgar Huntly, builds on questions about race to challenge species taxonomies as well.
In this section I argue that Edgar Huntly is a werewolf narrative. Considering the rise
of posthumanism and animal studies—fields suited to the study of such narratives—it
is surprising that few scholars have read Charles Brockden Brown’s Gothic novel
within this tradition, even as animals and animal transformations serve major
functions in the text. As early as 1994, Jared Gardner noted that “few bodies of
criticism surrounding a work by a major American author are so insistently uniform in
their concerns and conclusions”64 as those surrounding Edgar Huntly, and over the
last twenty years scholars have continued to focus on the novel for its “power to
express the cultural nationalism of post-revolutionary America.”65 Yet even as Edgar
Huntly continues to be read as a political novel, these readings often miss the
important role biology plays in shaping and articulating the messy politics of a socalled “age of democratic revolutions.” Scholars have often noted that werewolf
narratives have a long history serving particular political and cultural ends.66 In this
essay, I demonstrate a clear link between the political and the biological by arguing
that Edgar Huntly can be productively read through the lens of lycanthropy—that is,
as a story of a man turning into a wolf—and thus as a narrative of “indistinction”
between man and animal that also comments on the instability of democracy in this
period. As the limits of political subjectivity are questioned in an age of democratic
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revolutions, so too is the limit between human and animal rendered less than certain.
By situating Edgar Huntly squarely within a tradition of werewolf fiction, I demonstrate
how Brown’s well-known narrative of sleepwalking and frontier violence has deep and
surprising connections with both eighteenth-century accounts of lycanthropy and
current critical preoccupations with “becoming animal.”67
The critical stakes of demonstrating lycanthropy in Edgar Huntly are twofold.
First, species indistinction challenges Enlightenment beliefs in human exceptionalism
by presenting human-animal transformations as a natural consequence of radical
democratic equality. The instability of democracy also reflects an instability of the
species that manifests itself as lycanthropy in the novel. These human-animal
transformations fuel the Gothic horror of Edgar Huntly and establish human plasticity
as a dangerously unbounded marker of American identity. My reading of the novel
establishes human-animal indistinction as an arena where debates over democracy
and radical equality can take place. Written in the wake of the American Revolution
and against the backdrop of the French and Haitian revolutions, Edgar Huntly is a
narrative in which shapeshifting stands in for political and scientific inquiries about
the boundedness of the human amidst debates about political equality.68 Second, this
section comments on the relationship between human politics and literary form—
namely, the American Gothic. What makes the American Gothic exceptional is its
move towards indistinction, a move that is predicated on the radicalism of American
politics. Unlike a European Gothic, where class lines are crossed, Brown crafts an
American Gothic in which we see species lines crossed. Brown imagines the move from
a European Gothic to an American Gothic not merely as a geographical shift from
European castles to the American wilderness, but as an ontological shift: the
American Gothic enables both political and biological indistinction.
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Throughout the eighteenth century, Enlightenment beliefs in human
exceptionalism were manifest in an absolute and stark contrast between the natural
world and the human, a contrast Brown explicitly challenges in Edgar Huntly. Instead,
he uses lycanthropic transformations—specifically the transition from human to
nonhuman animal and back—to disrupt established categories of belonging in a
multispecies American wilderness. Brown thematizes this reconsideration most
emphatically by recoding sleepwalking as a process of lycanthropic transformation and
uses these transformations to interrogate the relationship between American
exceptionalism and the status of the human, simultaneously disavowing the
exceptional nature of human beings while clinging to an exceptional model of what it
means to be American. The possibility of unlimited human indistinction, or the
complete erosion of species boundaries, produces a Gothic sublimity in Brown’s fiction
as species transformations threaten to erase categorical difference. Yet that possibility
also fuels his desire to craft an exceptionalist American literature. The “new
performance” of an American Gothic extolled in his preface ultimately becomes a
performance of species indistinction.69 When contrasted with Clithero’s story about
leaving Europe, the lycanthropic transformations Edgar and Clithero undergo in the
American wilderness mark a shift from the conventions of European Gothic to the
distinctly American Gothic Brown has been credited with founding. The embedding of
Clithero’s narrative within Edgar’s own story demonstrates how a new Gothic
emphasis on species indistinction, here exemplified through lycanthropy, is part of a
larger transatlantic conversation.70
Brown sets apart his American Gothic from European predecessors by
representing lycanthropy in the novel through a distinctly American beast: his
humans do not become wolves, they become panthers. Unlike wolves, panthers are
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reclusive and solitary creatures, although like wolves they are primarily nocturnal. As
Brown breaks down distinctions between human and animal, however, he also does
not care to distinguish too carefully between kinds of animals that humans might
become; that is, using a variety of animals extends his logic of indistinction. Still, his
choice to use the panther does align with Brown’s goal stated in his preface: to develop
a distinctly American Gothic. In this case, he Americanizes the Gothic werewolf
narratives he was familiar with out of Ireland and Europe by substituting panthers for
wolves, while otherwise remaining faithful to other conventions of lycanthropic
literature. As werewolves were primarily solitary, even though wolves themselves are
pack animals, Brown locates in the American wilderness a more distinctly American
model for lycanthropy: the solitary panther. The solitary nature of the panther
becomes important by the end of the novel as Edgar finds himself unable to form a
pack with Clithero—a point I return to at the end of this essay.
The nonhuman subjects in Edgar Huntly help us reconsider debates about
contemporary biopolitics, particularly the work of Donna Haraway and Giorgio
Agamben. Throughout the novel, Brown interrogates what Haraway has called “the
Great Divides of animal/human, nature/culture, organic/technical, and
wild/domestic” by making the ontological claim that one is always-already “becoming
with” other species—not simply existing alongside them.71 As writings by Carolus
Linnaeus and the Comte de Buffon became emblematic of a growing interest in
classifying the world taxonomically, American thinkers such as Benjamin Rush
similarly looked to distinguish humans from beasts.72 Yet human-animal boundaries
remained porous in the 1790s and into the nineteenth century as taxonomers
attempted to reconcile folkloric traditions of species transformation with emergent
discourses of associationist and evolutionary philosophy.73 The influence of Gothic and
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folk traditions on Brown’s writings has been well-documented, but he was also
familiar with recent scientific writings on somnambulism by Erasmus Darwin and
seventeenth-century writings on the “melancholic metamorphosis” of lycanthropy by
figures such as Thomas Willis and Robert Burton.74 The possibility that humans could
transform into animals was an argument even sophisticated minds in this period took
seriously, although Enlightenment philosophers often sought to explain away such
aberrations. The flip side of an Enlightenment belief in human exceptionalism was the
fear that fixed human-animal distinctions were the real fantasy.75
In bringing together the biological and the political, Brown was drawing on a
conjectural history popularized earlier by Thomas Hobbes, who envisioned a state of
nature in which “men are like those beasts which are naturally wild, but capable of
being tamed.” In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes argues that “dejection subjects a man to
causeless fears; which is a madness commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in
divers manners; as in the haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behavior;
and in fearing some one, some another particular thing.”76 Hobbes’s reference to
haunting graves seems representative of a rare form melancholy called lycanthropia or
“wolf-madness.” Burton describes such madness in The Anatomy of Melancholy, where
he characterizes those afflicted as men “howling about graves and fields in the night”
who cannot be persuaded they are not becoming an animal.77 Solitude, causeless fears,
roaming the cemeteries, and turning into an animal—or simply acting like one—were
all symptoms of melancholia, a condition of which Brown was certainly aware.78
Brown was also familiar with Irish folk literature on werewolves, as Barnard and
Shapiro have demonstrated, and in Edgar and Clithero he captures this melancholic
prowling by allowing both figures to haunt a grave-like elm at night.79 Melancholy
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links sleepwalking and lycanthropy together as liminal states that enable Brown to
explore species boundlessness.
Agamben has similarly drawn on the question of lycanthropy in the twentieth
century to examine the political boundaries of the human. In Homo Sacer, he argues
that human-animal transformations create a state of exception, or “a continuous
transition between man and beast, nature and culture.”80 In his discussion of the ban
and the wolf, Agamben specifically invokes lycanthropy as he argues, “what had to
remain in the collective unconscious as a monstrous hybrid of human and animal,
divided between the forest and the city—the werewolf—is, therefore, in its origin the
figure of the man who has been banned from the city.”81 Although Edgar is not
explicitly banned, George Toles has noted that Edgar Huntly is Brown’s only novel to
avoid the city altogether.82 Instead, he argues that the novel’s wilderness landscape
serves as a backdrop to Edgar’s violent encounters with Indians and a distorted
reflection of the city. Edgar—no longer surrounded by the familiar—feels alienated by
a primitive world and its savage inhabitants. As a werewolf figure, or what Agamben
describes as one “who is precisely neither man nor beast, and who dwells paradoxically
within both while belonging to neither,” Edgar’s liminal status permanently alienates
him from the familiar.83 While this defamiliarization exposes the sublimity of Edgar’s
lycanthropic transformations, it also establishes the Gothic as something that does
more than threateningly erode boundaries, instead enabling boundary-crossings that
are both exhilarating and politically liberating.

CLITHERO’S MAGICAL TRANSITIONS
Edgar Huntly opens with Edgar searching for the murderer of his friend,
Waldegrave, only to discover Clithero: a self-exiled Irish criminal who fled Europe and
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took up residence in America. Edgar initially finds Clithero emerging from the elm
where Waldegrave had been killed and describes him as having a “melancholy
wildness.”84 Both Clithero and Edgar are melancholic figures, not only for their
brooding natures but also for their shared nervous disorder: sleepwalking, or
somnambulism. Somnambulism provides Brown with a means for exploring what
Agamben calls the “threshold of indistinction” between humanity and animality by
imagining Edgar and Clithero as liminal beings who exist in a state between
wakefulness and sleep.85 This disruption of consciousness makes them animalistic:
both men exist at a lower level of consciousness—one of animation without human
thought—and in a liminal state of mind that fits medical perceptions of lycanthropy.
Their liminality challenges the prevalent human-animal dichotomies of Enlightenment
science and the perceived stability of humans atop the great chain of being by
undermining such exceptionalist taxonomies.86 If we look beyond readings of
sleepwalking as a manifestation of postcolonial trauma, we can better recognize how
Brown draws on the already-present interrelationship between lycanthropy and sleep
to explore the liberating potential of interspecies transformation.87
Within the conventions of werewolf literature, those afflicted are often unable to
recall their nocturnal travels that take them from the city to the wilderness; they wake
in the morning, as if from a dream, with limited physical evidence of their recent
animalistic actions.88 Although early descriptions of human-animal transformation are
rooted in the supernatural, the somnambulist narratives of Edgar and Clithero also
share a number of similarities with eighteenth-century medical case histories. Brown
was aware, for example, of Erasmus Darwin’s description of sleepwalking as a
“melancholy madness” in which the somnambulist proceeds as if asleep yet suffers an
“inattention to the stimulus of external objects,” thus retaining knowledge reflected in
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his nocturnal wanderings and troubled mind.89 For Brown, sleepwalking produces in
Edgar and Clithero a liminal state that closely mirrors the clinical state of lycanthropy.
He recognizes lycanthropy as a psychopathological state—a “species of delirium” at
one point—but also recognizes that such distinctions are bound to collapse. Brown
does not conflate sleepwalking with human-animal transformation, yet he allows
somnambulism to facilitate such transformations in Edgar and Clithero. Their
transformations extend beyond the normal bounds of nervous disorders and offer a
more robust challenge to determinist taxonomies of the period.
Brown similarly interrogates the possibilities of transformation and mixture
across species by tying humans and nonhumans into relational knots. Particularly
through the doubling of Edgar and Clithero—yet also in their relationships with
Indians, panthers, and plants—Brown exposes the potential for what Haraway calls
“joint, cross-species invention” in Edgar Huntly.90 Although twinning is common within
a number of archetypal frameworks (including the doppelgänger motif in romantic
fiction), doubling also has a special relevance for lycanthropic literature.91 In his study
of wolves in American literature, S.K. Robisch writes that “shape-shifting, twin gods,
hybridization, and wolf brothers all run through wolf stories in a leitmotif of
doubling”92 and Haraway similarly frames metamorphosis as a “reworking [of] form to
make a kind of one out of two.”93 Robisch also notes that the term “lycanthrope has a
twin meaning, a double persona” in its dual categorization as psychological condition
and physical/biological transformation.94 While scholarship that examines doubling
has a long history in Brown studies, doubling in lycanthropy offers a unique angle into
the politics of human plasticity. By making the boundary between the human and the
animal malleable through shapeshifting, Brown questions not only the rigidity of
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Enlightenment taxonomies, but also the rigidity of social and political distinctions in
an American wilderness that allows for such transformations.
Edgar’s first encounter with Clithero takes place as he revisits the “fatal Elm” in
an attempt to find clues regarding Waldegrave’s murder. There he discerns a presence
that slowly emerges from—and distinguishes itself against—the tree; he insists that
“this apparition was human” and not a figment of the imagination. Edgar initially
describes “the shape of a man” with “something like flannel . . . wrapt round his waist.
The rest of his frame was naked.” He continues his description of Clithero as “a figure,
robust and strange, and half-naked.” Edgar keeps his distance for some time,
watching as the man digs at the ground with his hands and non-linguistically
communicates his grief with uncontrollable sobbing. The encounter ends with Clithero
wandering into the wilderness without paying attention to Edgar’s calls, at which point
Edgar identifies him as “a sleeper.”95 Yet the same markers that Edgar uses to identify
Clithero as a sleepwalker are those that might also easily describe him as a humananimal hybrid: a half-naked figure, shaped like a man, digging at the ground.
Edgar assumes the man must “have a name and a terrestrial habitation,” an
assumption that forms part of Brown’s continued resistance to the supernatural
assumptions conventional to Gothic fiction. Without much effort, he later assumes
that the man must be Clithero Edny, “a person of a very different cast” and “and
emigrant from Ireland.”96 Edgar concludes to return to the elm the following night to
see if this figure will appear once more. Clithero indeed returns to dwell upon the tree,
and as he departs Edgar determines to follow him. After a lengthy chase through
thickets and woods, Edgar arrives at “the verge of a considerable precipice” that leads
to a concealed cavern. Immediately upon noticing the cavern, Edgar claims that
“[Clithero] plunged into the darkness, and in a few moments, his steps were heard no
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more!” Deciding against entering this cave for himself, Edgar waits the entire night at
the entrance for Clithero to once again emerge, and at length is “excited by a sound
that seemed to issue from the cave.” With his eyes fixed upon the entrance, “the
rustling increased and presently an animal leapt forth, of what kind I was unable to
discover.”97 The possibility of human-animal transformation is symbolized as Clithero
descends into the cavern from which a panther then emerges, a visual exchange of a
human for an animal that also takes place elsewhere in the text.
Edgar takes up this search again later, when, having ventured into the
wilderness in search of Clithero, he passes through a cave and into some deep,
unexplored tract of wilderness. “It was probable that human feet had never before
gained this recess, that human eyes had never fixed upon these gushing waters,” he
notes, for “the aboriginal inhabitants had no motives to lead them into caves like this,
and ponder on the verge of such a precipice. Their successors were still less likely to
have wandered hither. Since the birth of this continent, I was probably the first who
had deviated thus remotely from the customary paths of men.” Edgar takes great
pains to establish his singularity in having penetrated the wilderness to the point
where no others had before, communing with the water, and plants, and rocks, and
pine branches on a path that separates him from others of his species. Indeed, he
continues speculating, “to meet a human creature . . . would have been wholly adverse
to my expectation.”98 His expectation, in inhabiting a presumably nonhuman space, is
that any creature he should meet would also be nonhuman.
Such is the preface to the second compelling moment of lycanthropy in Edgar
Huntly, as Edgar sees Clithero emerge on the other side of a chasm where a “magical
transition” once again gives Clithero a human countenance:
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While musing upon these ideas, my eye was fixed upon the foaming
current. At length I looked upon the rocks which confined and
embarrassed its course. I admired their fantastic shapes and endless
irregularities. Passing from one to the other of these, my attention lighted,
at length, as if by some magical transition, on—a human countenance!99
Brown uses the word “transition” often, not only in Edgar Huntly, but in his other
novels as well. In Wieland—a novel tellingly subtitled “the Transformation”—Clara
similarly describes the “magical transitions” of Carwin near the novel’s end,
questioning “whether he were infernal or miraculous, or human.”100 Transitions from
one condition to another are described in Wieland as “ambiguities, abruptnesses, and
dark transitions” and as “a transition of [Wieland’s] former madness into a new
shape.”101 Clithero’s “magical transitions” mark a similar shift from the “melancholy
madness” of his lycanthropic wanderings to something new.
Edgar describes Clithero by noting, “his scanty and coarse garb, had been
nearly rent away by brambles and thorns, his arms, bosom and cheek were overgrown
and half-concealed by hair. There was something in his attitude and looks denoting
more than anarchy of thoughts and passions. His rueful, ghastly, and immoveable
eyes, testified not only that his mind was ravaged by despair, but that he was pinched
with famine.”102 The change in Clithero is sudden, the transformation dramatic, and
his behavior trance-like. This description echoes seventeenth-century scientific
descriptions of lycanthropy, and—as Barnard and Shapiro argue—this passage also
echoes an Irish folk tradition similarly acknowledged by the Royal Irish Academy’s
John Dunne. Edgar is startled by this appearance, and for a time merely gazes upon
Clithero’s figure. Powerless to offer relief, Edgar decides that “all that I could do was to
speak,” and with a shrill and piercing voice, he calls out: “the chasm and the rocks
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loudened and reverberated my accents while I exclaimed . . . Man! Clithero!” Edgar
does not simply call out to Clithero by name, prefacing it instead with the species
identifier of “Man!” He notes immediately after that his call was “effectual” in that it
temporarily “shook off his trance.”103 Shaking off the trance is thus an act of species
recognition; Clithero is restored as a human subject in the wilderness after doubt is
cast due to his transformation. He has been reabsorbed and reclassified by Edgar
despite his threateningly indistinct taxonomic features.104
Clithero runs and does not return to Solebury. Concerned, Edgar returns to the
wilderness to leave food for Clithero, at which time he cuts down a tree in order to
bridge the chasm that separates them. Edgar attempts to engage the animalistic
Clithero in a relationship akin to Haraway’s companion species; by crossing the
symbolic gap between the human and the animal (or the animalistic Clithero), his act
of feeding makes them literally “messmates.”105 Edgar’s third trip puts him face-to-face
with the panther that has taken Clithero’s place—our second visual exchange of
Clithero for a panther—and he only survives the encounter through the destruction of
the wooden bridge. As the animal tries to cross the chasm, it falls to his death, a
commentary on the dangers of attempting to return to the human after becoming
animal. Edgar and Clithero should not survive the wilderness, yet their animal
transformations allow them to navigate, inhabit, and survive this multispecies world.
Haraway’s insistence on the word “entangle” seems apt in this context. Edgar and
Clithero are not only narratively entangled, but often entangled in the plant and
animal interactions of the American wilderness, demonstrating how the nonhuman
world corrects our assumptions and fantasies by creating zones of indistinction.
Brown imagines an American space where humans both recognize and resist
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themselves as always-already nonhuman, an American space where entanglement and
transformation produce companion species.

HOWLING, INDIGESTION, AND EDGAR’S “SAVAGE AWAKENING”
No single passage in Edgar Huntly has received the sustained critical attention
as that which Gardner refers to as Edgar’s “savage awakening.”106 Depicted either as a
primal scene of rebirth that breaks down the distinction between the savage and the
civilized, or as evidence of “Indian-hating” that works against idealized representations
of the “noble savage,” this moment has been read primarily in terms of white guilt,
dark doublings, and frontier psychopathology. Yet as Brown remystifies a world in
which science struggles to produce certainties, he opens up the possibility that
paranormal phenomena are neither psychologically nor supernaturally constructed.
Instead these phenomena are more akin to the “implosions of the discursive realms of
nature and culture” that Haraway refers to as “naturecultures.”107 Edgar’s narrative
produces an ontological framework that opens up more fluid human-animal
possibilities that aren’t strictly incorporated within a dominant cultural mode or a
monstrous otherness.
Unable to locate himself as he awakens, Edgar discovers that he is lost and out
of place. This dislocation leads him to participate in various acts of sensory
emplacement—challenges, perhaps, to Locke’s dark closet—in order to affirm his
physical existence. Although Edgar is no passive recipient of impressions in a Lockean
sense, his identity as a living being is embedded in the bodies and environments
around him. We learn that Edgar fell asleep in his bed and awoke underground in a
cave far removed from civilization. He is “conscious, for a time, of nothing but
existence” although the nature of this existence is questioned as if he only “existed in
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a wakeful dream.”108 As Edgar opens his eyes and finds himself surrounded by
darkness, his extended hands are met by empty space. Darkness makes it impossible
to compare distances and directions, and although at length his hands discover a
stone wall, his explorations convince him that he is completely entombed.
Edgar’s last accessible memory is going to sleep, and as he recalls Clithero’s
somnambulism he similarly diagnoses himself a sleepwalker. His previous definition of
sleepwalking as a state “[where] the notices of sense are partly excluded, and they are
shut out from a knowledge of their intire condition” returns full force as he recognizes
his own insensibility and confusion.109 The ability of his voice to operate without
impediment when asleep echoes Clithero’s concerns: “I was not aware, for some time,
of my perturbed sleep. Yet I was anew distressed at the discovery that my thoughts
found their way to my lips, without my being conscious of it.”110 The liminality of his
voice, defined by its ability to occupy both wakefulness and sleep, forces Edgar to
recognize that his narrative is little more than a poor echo of his experience. As
sleepwalkers, Edgar and Clithero speak only through a deferred voice, clinging to their
own echoes and appropriating their voices only as they wake. As a lycanthropic figure,
Edgar is forced to contend with an autonomous voice that exists on the edge of
(human) consciousness and whose echoes define the boundaries of his subjectivity.
As he regains consciousness, Edgar also regains dominion over his voice. “I now
exerted my voice,” he tells us, “and cried as loud as my wasted strength would admit.
Its echoes were sent back to me in broken and confused sounds and from above. This
effort was casual, but some part of that uncertainty in which I was involved, was
instantly dispelled by it.”111 Unable to see, Edgar can only locate himself by crying out
and then listening the distorted echo of his own voice. The return of his voice emplaces
him; as its echo surrounds him on all sides the aimlessness allows the sound to
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expand and even produce new spaces, opening up the walls that surround him and
mapping out the topography of the cave. Edgar’s voice appears to shape his
environment even as the echoes of the surrounding landscape similarly alter the
topography of his—presumably human—voicescape. Just as Edgar’s act of calling out
to Clithero became a taxonomic act of shaping and identifying him as a man, Edgar’s
voice here crafts the American wilderness into an exceptional space where human
plasticity—and thus human-animal indistinction—is made possible.
In an attempt to navigate this transformed setting, Edgar is forced to trust his
ears. Acquainting himself “as far as was possible with the dimensions of the place,
[Edgar] hallooed with all [his] force, knowing that sound is reflected according to the
distance and relative position of the substances from which it is repelled.”112 The
continued echoes of his voice place Edgar in a material realm, giving substance to the
world around him. Listening to his own echo creates a moment of self-recognition, one
made explicit in his claim that “the effect produced by my voice on this occasion
resembled, with remarkable exactness, the effect which was then produced.”113 His
voice resonates within the cave, evoking a recognizable—albeit altered—voice from the
past. Yet this recognition extends beyond a comparison with a self that existed at
another time; as such, these echoes should be considered more than products of a
distorted human scream. Edgar’s voice has been transformed.
These vocal transformations—along with the physical transformations
described later in the passage—are lycanthropic, and through them Brown explores a
potential for interspecies mixture that moves beyond human-human encounters.
Edgar’s “halloos” are cries out into an unknown wilderness, and the “broken and
confused” echoes return to him as the nonhuman responses of a diverse, multispecies
world. It is worth noting that “halloo” and “howl” have similar etymological roots in the
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Middle English houlen and the Germanic heulen, which both refer to an “echoic origin.”
The earliest uses of “halloo” also referred to the calling of hunting dogs, which is also
particularly resonant in Edgar’s narrative, in which the surname “Huntly” evokes the
image and persona of a “hunter.” Howling in Edgar Huntly serves both as a moment of
vocal recognition and an outward manifestation of lycanthropic transformation.
Similar signs of a violent transformation are apparent in the alterations to Edgar’s
body, which is half-naked, covered in blood and bruises, and barely conscious. His
awakening in this state represents his ongoing process of becoming animal.
Edgar continues to explore his dark surroundings with his voice, noting, “I once
more tasked my understanding and my sense, to discover the nature of my present
situation and the means of escape. I listened to catch some sound.”114 The sounds he
hears in the cave do not appear to grow nearer, but Edgar remains satisfied as long as
they can be heard. His howling gives way to bodily cries as he tells us:
My hunger speedily became ferocious. I tore the linen of my shirt
between my teeth and swallowed the fragments. I felt a strong propensity
to bite the flesh from my arm. My heart overflowed with cruelty, and I
pondered on the delight I should experience in rending some living
animal to pieces, and drinking its blood and grinding its quivering fibres
between my teeth.115
Often read as a violent, cannibalistic depiction of Edgar as Indian, this passage
invokes neither scalping nor other violent practices detailed in the captivity narratives
with which Brown was familiar. Instead, Brown evokes a more transformative
experience in which Edgar becomes a predatory nonhuman animal. His desire for
blood also looks forward to vampiric conventions of Gothic literature, and his yearning
for raw flesh mirrors classical medical writings on lycanthropy and mental disease.

— 112 —

These desires also preface a new encounter with a panther that complicates the
other doublings throughout the novel. As Edgar looks about the dark cave, he finds
himself face-to-face with a panther that mirrors his gaze. The eyes of the panther are
the first objects he sees, and he notes, “they resembled a fixed and obscure flame.
They were motionless. Though lustrous themselves they created no illumination
around them. . . . These were the eyes of a panther.”116 If Edgar’s experience with the
“echoic origin” of his own voice is one of self-recognition, his visual encounter with the
panther is a visual recognition of himself as animal—in this moment he is the hunted.
Convinced he is in mortal danger, and without deliberation, Edgar represses this
moment of self-recognition and strikes a fatal blow to the dark reflection of his own
beastly image. He writes that his tomahawk “penetrated the scull and the animal fell,
struggling and shrieking to the ground.”117 We should note that Edgar barely escaped
death when similarly confronted by a starved panther earlier in the novel, an
experience that calls into question the roles of predator and prey and blurs the
boundaries between species. Edgar describes the resemblance between this panther’s
cry and that of a human, although within the cave “the effect of [the panther’s] voice,
in these subterranean abodes, was unspeakably rueful.”118 These cries produce an
uncanny echo of Edgar’s voice, one that no longer dissipates uncertainty but instead
produces fear. Despondent and aware of his own transformation, Edgar sinks to the
ground, hearing his own voice echoed in the death throes of a beast.
As we’ve seen, Edgar’s transformation begins with, but does not directly result
from, his sleepwalking. Somnambulism dislocates Edgar, providing evidence of both
his nervous disorder and his anxieties toward being less than human. Shapeshifting
takes place only after Edgar confirms his existence in the cave and suffers the basic
needs common across species: hunger and thirst. Upon killing the panther, he is
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again assaulted by hunger. Increasingly aware of his own animality, Edgar attempts to
resist and repress his animalistic tendencies. His search for a distinction between his
humanity and his animality demonstrates yet another convention typical in werewolf
fiction. As his ears inform him the panther has died, Edgar explains:
The first suggestion that occurred was to feed upon the carcass of this
animal. My hunger had arrived at that pitch where all fastidiousness and
scruples are at an end. I crept to the spot. . . . I will not shock you by
relating the extremes to which dire necessity had driven me. I review this
scene with loathing and horror. Now that it is past I look back upon it as
on some hideous dream. The whole appears to be some freak of insanity.
No alternative was offered, and hunger was capable to be appeased, even
by a banquet so detestable.119
Unable to render his “banquet” cultural through cooking, Edgar is shocked by his own
willingness to eat raw flesh. Yet even as he professes reluctance to the idea of
consuming the animal raw, Edgar realizes that his continued existence relies upon
appeasing his hunger and literally “becoming with” (consuming) the dead panther.
Edgar continues with a less disinterested justification of his meal, claiming, “If
this appetite has sometimes subdued the sentiments of nature, and compelled the
mother to feed upon the flesh of her offspring, it will not excite amazement that I did
not turn from the yet warm blood and reeking fibres of a brute.”120 He returns to the
rhetoric of animalistic desire wherein he “pondered the delight” of “drinking blood” and
grinding “quivering fibres” in his teeth. Edgar conflates the human and the animal as
he argues that the American wilderness is a space where a mother may eat her child
without exciting amazement. America thus becomes exceptional in that it is a space
where the human, as a category, is not; it is a space where species distinctions fall
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away. Edgar’s delight is short-lived, however, for as “one evil was now removed, only to
give place to another” and his narrative quickly becomes one of indigestion:
The first sensations of fullness had scarcely been felt when my stomach was
seized by pangs whose acuteness exceeded all that I ever before experienced. I
bitterly lamented my inordinate avidity. The excruciations of famine were better
than the agonies which this abhorred meal had produced. . . . I stretched
myself on the ground. I threw myself into every posture that promised some
alleviation of this evil. I rolled along the pavement of the cavern, wholly
inattentive to the dangers that environed me.121
Rather than distancing him from this bestial consumption of raw flesh, Edgar
emphasizes his own status as a shape-shifting through the physical consequences of
his indigestion: contortions, rolling on the ground, and sensory inattention. In what
later become the conventions of werewolf literature, lycanthropes are often depicted as
rolling on the ground in a last-ditch attempt to halt the process of transformation.
Edgar’s indigestion here marks his own repressed animality.
Haraway writes that “eating one another and developing indigestion are [a] kind
of transformative merger practice,” and Edgar’s experience similarly demonstrates this
“co-opting of strangers” and “infolding of others.”122 By eating the panther Brown
moves beyond simply being present; rather, he becomes copresent through eating and
“becoming with” his messmate. He also backs away from his earlier desire for famine,
noting that “[what] I had eaten had produced temporary distress, but on the whole
had been of use” and thus sees indigestion as “a useful effort of nature to subdue and
convert to nourishment the matter I had swallowed.”123 Eating the panther is a
liberatory experience; it not only permits Edgar to escape the cave, but also allows him
to become worldly, to survive in the wilderness, to transform. As the “matter” of the
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panther becomes part of Edgar, it, too, participates in a symbiotic process of infolding
and becoming. We might also think about the political valence of indigestion, by
recognizing lycanthropic transformations as an attempt to contain expansion.
Werewolf literature often depicts the pain of the physical transformation as an attempt
to keep the beast in, yet Brown’s novel also seems to be playing with broader
questions about expansion on the American frontier. We shouldn’t forget that
Waldegrave’s murder at the hands of Deb and her tribe—the event that motivates the
entire narrative—is ultimately tied up in the politics of westward expansion and Indian
removal. Yet instead of speaking to a paradigm of cultural nationalism in which the
consuming of territories and inhabitants becomes a mere mark of colonialism, Edgar’s
indigestion represents a different form of “becoming with” in which the young nation is
itself transformed alongside its “messmates” in the wilderness.124
Still, Edgar ultimately resists this metamorphosis even as he offers a seemingly
Hobbesian justification for his “savage” actions. Following his (re)birth in the
wilderness, the narrative becomes a journey back to civilization: not the journey of a
man out of the state of nature, but the journey of a new species generated in nature.125
Edgar’s return to civilization is haunted by primitive echoes similar to those from the
cave; he is particularly frightened to hear echoes of his own voice in the savage cries of
the Indians he encounters, echoes which question his own relationship not only to
beasts but also to primitive man. He is preoccupied with stifling the echoes of his own
savage voice, at one point shooting an Indian before he could cry out, and in another
returning to silence the “doleful shrieks” of an Indian he had merely wounded. Edgar’s
own voice is both too savage and not savage enough. More frightening, perhaps, is the
possibility that every voice he hears is an indistinct and savage voice.
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Edgar’s encounter with the panther leaves him not only less civilized, but also
less than human. His act of eating the panther is the culmination of this beastly
transformation; it is only then he truly becomes with animal. We might compare his
eating of raw flesh with an earlier folkloric tradition claimed by the Parnassians, who
performed “a ritual where a boy was sacrificed and his guts made into a soup which
was eaten by shepherds, one of whom would then turn into a tormented werewolf who
was condemned to wander the countryside for eight years, regaining humanity by
refraining from eating human flesh.”126 Brown’s transformation into—and
identification with—the panther is similarly cannibalistic, and his consumption of raw
flesh hints at a larger failure to regain his humanity even as he journeys back to
“civilization.” His slaughter of the Indians—symbolically partaking of human flesh—
becomes just one more experience with nonhuman subjectivity from which he can
never recover.127

EDGAR’S “UNNATURAL PARTICIPATION”
Following his violent return to civilization, Edgar’s narrative begins to unravel
quickly. To justify his violence at the end of the text, Edgar claims that “most men are
haunted by some species of terror or antipathy, which they are, for the most part, able
to trace to some incident which befell them in their early years,” and he remarks that
after seeing his parents killed by savage Indians as a youth he “never looked upon, or
called up the image of a savage without shuddering.”128 Yet the most prominent
examples of Edgar shuddering in the novel occur when he comes in contact with
Clithero. Near the end of the text, for example, Edgar describes himself listening to
Clithero and notes that “these asseverations were listened to with shuddering.” Our
final glimpse of Clithero takes place in the remains of Old Deb’s hut, a borderland
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space between civilization and wilderness where Edgar seeks out Clithero only to
witness a final, unexpected transformation. Clithero’s living conditions are slender,
and Edgar notices that “there was nothing capable of human use” in the dwelling.129
Clithero, who consistently served as Edgar’s double, merely scowls at Edgar when he
arrives and offers no sign that he remembers his fellow somnambulist.
Edgar proceeds to tell Clithero that his beloved Euphemia is still alive and her
brother—Clithero’s sworn enemy—is dead, a narrative he expects will bring hope to
his fellow sleepwalker. Instead, Clithero responds with disbelief, proclaiming: “I will fly
to the spot which thou describest. I will ascertain thy falsehood with my own eyes. If
she be alive then am I reserved for the performance of a new crime.” Edgar then tells
us that Clithero has “darted through the door, and was gone in a moment, beyond my
sight and my reach. . . . [he] fled with the swiftness of a deer.”130 It would be
irresponsible, perhaps, to place too much emphasis on this reference, yet I do want to
recognize Edgar’s changing relationship to Clithero, who is no longer a beast of prey
but now a swiftly departing deer. Realizing that he has just placed Euphemia and his
own father-figure, Sarsefield, in mortal danger, Edgar immediately attempts to defend
himself by arguing that his misguided actions were merely the result of a “powerful
benevolence.” In this context, his reference to Clithero as a non-predatory animal
speaks as much to Edgar’s own shifting condition as to that of Clithero.
Deleuze and Guattari have argued that becomings and becomings-animal
require alliances, particularly alliances with no possible filiation (i.e. different species).
In this particular passage, we see that Edgar for the first time understands his
alliance with Clithero and recognizes their doubling. In becoming-animal, Edgar and
Clithero form both a self and more than a self—they form a pack. From the moment he
first followed Clithero into the woods, Edgar participated in becoming-animal with his
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fellow somnambulist. By seeking out Clithero and pleading for recognition in this final
scene, Edgar attempted once again to write himself into the pack and to hear his own
animality in Clithero’s voice. Yet in this moment Edgar cannot fully hear himself.
Following Clithero’s silence, Edgar begins to ramble incessantly, revisiting and revising
his narrative in an act of frantic auto-affection. He experiences what Deleuze and
Guattari refer to as an “unheard-of becoming,” an unnerving encounter with human
subjectivity not unlike that of his “savage awakening.” What they describe as the
“power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” now forces
Edgar to grasp at his own humanity in an attempt to secure a coherent human
subjectivity.131 His lycanthropic transformations have left him fragmented, and as
Edgar resists becoming-animal at the novel’s close, he finds himself instead unnerved
by his place in the pack: he represses his “unnatural participation” with Clithero and
instead clings to the illusion of a more unified subjectivity.
Edgar is left with this illusion, and we are left without Edgar’s voice. The final
letter of the novel is written not by Edgar, but by his mentor and father-figure,
Sarsefield. Edgar’s directive resembles that described be Deleuze and Guattari in their
analysis of Lord Chandos: “a strange imperative wells up in him: either stop writing, or
write like a rat . . . writing is a becoming, writing is traversed by strange becomings
that are not becomings-writer, but becomings-rat, becomings-insect, becomings-wolf,
etc.”132 Edgar’s attempt to write a narrative of remaining human has failed, and he
cannot bring himself to write (or even acknowledge) his narrative of becoming-animal,
so he stops writing altogether. The novel instead ends with Sarsefield’s response to
Edgar: a description of Edgar’s letter as the literal source of a miscarriage that
deprives him of an heir. Edgar’s interspecies crisis thus severs a familial relationship,
and, instead of being generative, occasions a fatal reproductive disorder.133
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Brown’s exploration of multispecies cohabitation collapses with the narrative
itself, leading to an unexpected breakdown of the American wilderness as a
posthuman utopia. Rather than representing the American wilderness as a potentially
generative space of mixture, Edgar’s transformation in the end produces a desire to
resist hybridity and reify a strictly human subjectivity. Much like the Deleuzian hybrid,
Edgar’s lycanthropic experience thwarts his adopted family’s reproductive act and his
return to civilization with no prospects of marriage leaves him sterile. Yet I don’t
believe that Edgar’s impotence and Clithero’s presumed death should be read strictly
as failures, nor do they undermine the seriousness of Brown’s inquiry into the
potential for interspecies transformation. The fluid ontologies of the American
wilderness still allow Brown to demonstrate a redemptive narrative of human
indistinction, even as Edgar Huntly falls short of the collaborative worlding envisioned
by posthumanist scholars such as Haraway. The novel’s depiction of violent
multispecies cohabitation where human and nonhuman “messmates” don’t get along
instead reflects Brown’s shifting views—and those of many others—toward the
increasingly violent acts of leveling of the French revolution.
As such, reading lycanthropy as a commentary on human exceptionalism in
Edgar Huntly demonstrates how questions about the stability of the human as a
biological category also become questions about the stability of the human as a
political category in this period. Brown recognizes that democracy requires the
eradication of distinctions—often celebrating indistinction as a central feature of the
American wilderness and an emergent American Gothic—even as his attempt to map
out the transformative potential of indistinction collapses under its own equalizing
tendencies. More importantly, Brown ends the novel by again violating the conventions
of the Gothic (and eighteenth-century novels more broadly) by refusing to offer us a
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tidy resolution. Unlike the social violations which get resolved in an earlier Gothic
tradition, where the main characters are reabsorbed into accepted communities, the
ontological boundary crossings in Edgar Huntly allow neither Edgar nor Clithero to
fully return to society. This ongoing potential for species indistinction ultimately fuels
the gothic horror of novel. Edgar’s transformation cannot be reversed, even as he
attempts to rewrite his narrative at the end. Instead, the novel’s scientific imperative
reasserts the need to question human exceptionalism in an American wilderness
where the liberatory appeal of indistinction must be taken seriously.
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CHAPTER 3
“HUMAN EXTINCTION”
The disappearance of Man at the end of History is not a cosmic
catastrophe . . . [a]nd it is not a biological catastrophe either: Man
remains alive as animal in harmony with Nature or given Being. What
disappears is Man properly so called. Practically, this means: the
disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions.
— ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel

In the decades following the so-called age of democratic revolutions, themes of
radical solitude and “last man” narratives became so commonplace that Mary Shelley’s
publication of The Last Man in 1826 met with considerable ridicule in the press.
Morton D. Paley, in his essay on the novel, mentions a particular review in The
Monthly Magazine that suggested “a term should be invented comprehensive enough to
include those superlatively late comers that usually follow the last.” He also notes,
however, that “behind that derision one senses a certain eschatological anxiety that
may account for the virulence of some of the reviews.”1 This anxiety is not surprising,


particularly in a postrevolutionary Atlantic world still grappling with the eschatological
question of whether or not democracy marked the next transcendent (and perhaps
concluding) stage of the human history. Indeed, the rise of “last man” narratives
appears symptomatic of postrevolutionary culture, with a number of authors
imagining what it would be like to witness the extinction of the human species.
Yet unlike other narratives that imagine the end of man as a “cosmic
catastrophe,” Shelley’s novel seems to ask a more complicated question: If human
political systems and histories cannot bring about utopia, is there another mode of
being—one not fully actualized—in which the failures of history can be overcome? By
setting her novel in the future, Shelley uses The Last Man to reflect backward on the
desire for radical equality manifested at the turn of the century. Throughout the novel,
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she appears torn between the revolutionary optimism of her mother, Mary
Wollstonecraft, and her own increasing sympathies toward Edmund Burke. This raises
the question: Is it possible to outline a politics that is nostalgic for the moralization of
her own revolutionary politics and at the same time accounts for it? This chapter
addresses that question by pushing back against readings of The Last Man as a
conservative turn in Shelley’s politics; it argues instead for a more nuanced politics of
indistinction in which Shelley both accepts and revises Burke—revealing her own
repressed desires for radical equality.
The politics of indistinction on display in The Last Man place Shelley in a larger
Atlantic conversation about radical equality and human extinction. Most scholars who
have written on Shelley’s novel cite poems by Lord Byron, Thomas Campbell, and
Thomas Hood as the most influential “last man” narratives of the period, but, as
Jonathan Elmer has noted, in America “there were last men too, most famously,
perhaps, Uncas, Cooper’s hero in The Last of the Mohicans, published that same
year.”2 Shelley was an admirer of Charles Brockden Brown and Washington Irving,
and her writings share much in common with an emergent American Gothic.3 Yet
while conversations about the transatlantic Gothic tend to focus on the extent to
which Brown might be considered a “Godwinian” author, I believe it may be equally
appropriate to think of Shelley as a participant in a transatlantic conversation that
is—to some extent—rather American. The Last Man borrows from Brown in its
engagement with plagues and postrevolutionary politics, and in Frankenstein and
Shelley’s short stories we often hear echoes of Edgar Huntly.
Though earlier authors, such as Brown, destabilize the category of the human
through tropes of somnambulism, lycanthropy, and narratives of immunity, Shelley
offers a more explicitly political engagement with questions of indistinction. In The
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Last Man, it seems that all political systems are ultimately rendered indistinct against
the leveling power of nonhuman agencies, such as the plague. Shelley traces a radical
democratic leveling to its logical conclusion, thus entertaining the possibility of
political and biological boundlessness—even if that possibility comes at the price of
human extinction.4 Scholarship on Shelley’s politics has often mirrored readings of
Brown’s politics in that her name, associates, upbringing, and early life suggest a
radical politics while her later work hints at more conservative political views.5 Indeed,


contemporary arguments about Shelley’s political views have ranged from subsuming
her politics within the revolutionary and Romantic politics of her husband, Percy, or
her parents, William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft, to arguing that Mary Shelley
was “no revolutionary herself,” in the words of Anne K. Mellor.6 Set against the
backdrop of political reforms in England, however, The Last Man reveals a radical
political skepticism not easily categorized.7
As I noted earlier, The Last Man differs from similar narratives of this period in
its treatment of lastness, reanimation, and the distinctions—both political and
biological—between life and death. A novel in which political concerns are quickly
subsumed into larger concerns about the plague, The Last Man demonstrates how all
political forms eventually begin to resemble each other, something that occurs
alongside the breakdown of social distinctions. For Shelley, this disintegration of
political categories and social distinctions can only be imagined by abandoning the
category of the human altogether. Whereas scholars have often read The Last Man as
Shelley’s claim for racial unity and domestic intimacy, I argue that such readings miss
the underlying political claims about human indistinction. Shelley challenges not only
the boundaries of human communities, but the boundaries of the human self. I see
the end of her novel as an attempt to imagine the self as existing in a boundless,
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posthuman world not limited by political or biological distinctions.8 By placing The
Last Man in conversation with Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, I explore
the thresholds of indistinction between life and death that appear as Shelley accepts
the end of human history as the only means by which radical equality can be realized.
By opening up a historical boundlessness, Shelley challenges the sustainability of
political distinctions over time and demonstrates a speculative historical imagination—
an imagination that reveals her own stunted desire for radical equality as she explores
the potentially utopian ends of human history.
The Last Man echoes both the political writings of Wollstonecraft and the
conservative writings of Burke, and I argue that, of all her fiction, it also offers the
most compelling glimpse into Shelley’s own political views. Anne McWhir has
accurately noted, “the novel’s tone wavers between triumph and regret, optimism and
despair, perhaps reflecting the political and philosophical mood of post-revolutionary
France.”9 Yet most critics relegate this triumph and optimism to the first half of the
novel or ignore it completely, a move that depicts Shelley at best as a disillusioned
radical, and at worst a figure who never truly embraced the revolutionary ideals of her
family and her youth. McWhir is sometimes guilty of this as well:
Lionel Verney quotes several times—approvingly—from the writings of Edmund
Burke, eloquent opponent of the French revolutionaries in the 1790s against
whom Mary Shelley’s mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, had written A Vindication of
the Rights of Men. Yet […] Burke’s ideas are no more solid than Godwin’s, and
Wollstonecraft’s disillusionment with revolutionary excess seems more
reasonable than her visionary faith in reason.10
That being said, McWhir does recognize that when Lionel quotes Burke in the novel,
he often does so out of context. As such, Shelley’s invocation of Burke is less a
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conservative or counterrevolutionary turn in her politics, than an attempt to grapple
with—and even revise—Burke’s political views from a historical distance.
Rather than simply accept Burke’s claims that radical equality leads to human
degeneration, Shelley rewrites the ends of human history to include moments of
transformation and boundlessness. I argue that there are a number of ruptures in the
novel in which Shelley demonstrates a desire—albeit a repressed desire—to embrace
revolutionary ideals and the potential of radical democracy to level political and
biological distinctions. We should not, however, mistake Shelley’s desire for the
optimism of her mother—optimism is too active a term for what Shelley depicts in The
Last Man. Yet there is a muted, complicated, and indirect desire for radical equality
not present in the writings of Burke. We might even ask if the extent to which she
represses this desire indicates that Shelley is frightened by how deeply she is
convinced by Burke’s arguments. By accepting his claims about history and human
nature, her radical imagination is restrained. Her willingness to entertain the
possibility of radical equality amidst human extinction represents a push back against
such restraints. To be sure, this is a stunted realization of a desire that lingers despite
the fact that she mostly agrees with Burke; she, too, believes radical equality would
lead to the end of human civilization. Still, she does not allow herself to approve of
Burke’s views directly. Her approval is filtered and deflected through two levels of
narration, and often slips into moments of uncertainty.
In this chapter, I explore Shelley’s politics of indistinction from two primary
angles. First, I examine how Shelley complicates human/animal distinctions in her
novel, with particular emphasis on the ways she uses human indistinction to revise
Burke’s vision of human nature and its relationship to radical equality. In this section,
I demonstrate how, throughout the novel, Shelley negotiates Burke’s concept of
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“second nature” and Wollstonecraft’s views on sympathy to define the boundaries of
what is human. Secondly, I examine how political indistinction is made possible
through the plague. I argue that the plague and the threat of human extinction make
it possible to see how Shelley resigns herself to a Burkean understanding of history
yet retains a tempered desire to entertain the possibility of a more egalitarian—even
posthuman—world. I conclude by returning to the question of why Shelley frames her
novel around Burke. Prompted by the perceived inadequacy of nineteenth-century
political systems, Shelley’s politics of indistinction derive from a desire to create a
much-needed space for political, ethical, and ontological innovation in an Atlantic
world still grappling with the aftermath of the French Revolution.

BECOMING HUMAN: DISTINCTION AND SYMPATHY
To examine how Shelley constructs the human in The Last Man, we must first
situate Lionel’s animality at the novel’s outset, in which Lionel (a fitting name for an
animalized human and potential monarch) explores the boundaries of the human.
Shelley frames the novel with Lionel becoming-human and becoming-animal, going so
far as to have Lionel quote his own words on this matter in the novel’s final pages: “I
had been ‘as uncouth a savage, as the wolf-bred founder of old Rome.’”11 Lionel’s
animality at the beginning of the novel prefaces not only his engagement with the
human, but also with humanism. He has been banned from the civilized world and
lives an unenlightened existence as a bandit. Once he is taken in by Adrian, however,
we see him embrace the process of becoming-human: he is educated, admitted to
society, and imagines himself belonging to a new world. Lionel returns to a savage and
wild existence at the end of the novel, however, where his human boundaries and the
“refinements” of civilization die away with the rest of humanity.12 In this way, Lionel
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has always been a posthuman figure; the boundaries of the human in The Last Man
are defined against his not-quite-humanness, which frames the novel.
When we first meet Lionel, for example, he writes, “I was rough as the elements,
and unlearned as the animals I tended. I often compared myself to them, and finding
that my chief superiority consisted in power, I soon persuaded myself that it was in
power only that I was inferior to the chiefest potentates of the earth.”13 Yet his
narrative about difference—whether across species or within species—as a difference
in power quickly shifts. In describing his ban from society, Lionel distinguishes the
human from the animal by stressing refinement, education, and feeling. He goes on to
say, “Thus untaught in refined philosophy, and pursued by a reckless feeling of
degradation from my true station in society, I wandered among the hills of civilized
England as uncouth a savage as the wolf-bred founder of old Rome.”14 Lionel
.

describes himself as wolf-like, and, fittingly, his sole companion is a trusty dog that
watches over his sheep. Early on, he equates wildness with freedom, writing, “years
only added fresh love of freedom, and contempt for all that was not as wild and rude
as myself.”15 He tells us, “my life was like that of an animal, and my mind was in
danger of degenerating into that which informs brute nature.”16 Lionel retains a sense
of his humanity even as he sees the potential to lose that distinction, and he
recognizes that his life is at a moment of crisis: “I stood on the brink of manhood;
passions, strong as the trees of a forest, had already taken root within me, and were
about to shadow with their noxious overgrowth, my path of life.”17 As he encounters
Adrian for the first time, Lionel stands not only between the animal and the human,
but also between the child and the man.
All this changes after he meets Adrian, when Lionel notes, “I seemed about to
begin life anew.”18 Here we see his exile lifted, as Adrian not only permits him entrance
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into the society he was previously denied, but Lionel also finds his life-blood stirred—
he is literally quickened and born again. The removal of this ban from civilized life
allows him access to human subjectivity and society, and it reanimates him by
allowing him to refine and repress the animal qualities he previously admired. His
admission to society becomes an interesting inversion of the Hobbesian state of nature,
for as Lionel notes, “the trim and paled demesne of civilization, which I had before
regarded from my wild jungle as inaccessible, had its wicket opened by [Adrian]; I
stepped within, and felt, as I entered, that I trod my native soil.”19 Whereas Hobbes
would imagine the state of nature as one’s “native soil,” Lionel imagines civilization as
his native soil.20 This civilizing process demonstrates Shelley’s awareness of the
constructed boundaries of the human, as it is only after Lionel returns to civilization
from exile that he discovers how “brutish, savage, and worthless” he had been
previously.21 In perhaps his most telling confession, Lionel writes, “I now began to be
human. I was admitted within the sacred boundary which divides the intellectual and
moral nature of man from that which characterizes animals.”22 With the ban from
civilization fully lifted, Lionel begins to define himself against his previous state, and
finally imagines himself as human.
For Lionel, becoming human is becoming an historical being, or developing
what Burke calls man’s “second nature.” For Burke, “life itself” is political life, and
Lionel’s admission to society and introduction to English history, manners, and
customs (even at the hands of a republican idealist like Adrian) is what truly separates
him from his savage, animalistic self. Shelley offers hints throughout the text that
Burke’s notion of a “second nature”—a nature shaped by history, customs, and
conventions—is an essential distinction between the human and the animal. This
would seem to be in line with Burke’s own thoughts on human nature, according to
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which man’s so-called “first nature” (or human nature) necessarily entails his “second
nature” as he becomes a citizen, or member of society. The loss of the second nature—
what Burke feared of the French Revolution—leads to savagery. For Burke, this in
turn entails the loss of the first nature; man is no longer human following a radical
democratic revolution, but instead becomes “unnatural” and “monstrous.” It is in this
context that Shelley’s engagement with Burke becomes telling. As her narrative opens,
we see a man who has been banished from society—he retains his first nature and the
form of humanity, but is cut off from heritage, custom, history, and convention.
Yet these human/animal distinctions break down near the end of the novel as
Lionel revisits his animal nature. Wandering through Italy as the last man, he writes,
“I fed like a wild beast, which seizes its food only when stung by intolerable hunger. I
did not change my garb, or seek the shelter of a roof, during all those days.”23 He
acknowledges later that he had to conquer his “repugnance” at sleeping in human
habitations. After wandering for some time, Lionel is startled as he enters a saloon: “I
started—I looked again with renewed wonder. What wild-looking, unkempt, half-naked
savage was that before me?”24 He quickly realizes that he is staring at himself in a
mirror, although his human form has become nearly indistinct from that of an animal.
For a moment he considers remaining thus, but ultimately decides to keep up human
appearances—a nod, perhaps, to the fact that the human form itself is constructed. In
this state, Lionel writes that he “now found the hardships and lawlessness of my
youth turn to account.”25 Yet, even as his former life becomes useful to his survival,
Lionel also finds himself less and less familiar. He writes, “my hair has become nearly
grey—my voice, unused now to utter sound, comes strangely to my ears. My person,
with its human powers and features, seem to me a monstrous excrescence of
nature.”26 Ultimately, Lionel bids farewell to civilized life, and acknowledges that
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human cities—such as Constantinople—“belonged to another state of existence from
my present one.”27 Although he does not necessarily become animal at this point, it is
clear that he has left humanity behind.
The apocalyptic rhetoric at the end of the novel eventually produces in Lionel an
altered echo of the savage self he describes at the novel’s outset.28 The threat of
human extinction leads us, in Lionel’s case, to return to the not-quite-human. His
narrative ends with him losing his voice, becoming nearly unrecognizable (visually) as
a human, and roaming about with an animal companion. In the end, we might ask not
only if Lionel is human, but—as Lynn Festa writes of Robinson Crusoe—if “he does not
quite know his own edges.”29 Indeed, Lionel compares his failure to recognize his own
form to a troubled dream as he writes, “[I] felt myself as much changed as if I had
transmigrated into another form, whose fresh sensorium and mechanism of nerves
had altered the reflection of the apparent universe in the mirror of mind.”30 Here we
might draw a comparison between Lionel and the protagonist in Brown’s Edgar
Huntly—at least with regard to their transformative potential. Both Shelley and Brown
take seriously the transformative possibilities of moving between the human and the
animal, and, in this case, the move from the animal to the human is what allows
Lionel to recognize himself as human. And, as we saw in Brown, we see the space
between life and death associated with sleep, a zone of indistinction between
consciousness and mere animal mechanism. Lionel becomes human as he forgets his
animality as little more than a “troubled dream.” Forgetting forms part of his
becoming-animal by novel’s end—he forgets the passage of time, the sound of his voice,
and the contours of his own reflection. We might also tie forgetting to the erasure of
human history at the novel’s end; in bidding farewell to customs and history, Lionel
throws off his second nature and—as far as Burke is concerned—his humanity.
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Forgetting not only enables transformation and indistinction; it also serves as a
survival mechanism for Lionel later in the novel. Lionel survives and becomes a
witness and an author. In his study of apocalyptic literature, James Berger writes,
“the survivor has seen, and knows, what no one else could see and know. This
authority of knowledge, or ‘epistemic privilege,’ confers a kind of ethical authority[;]
the survivor’s knowledge is often knowledge of a radical transgression of moral
boundaries.”31 Writing is also a sympathetic act that allows him to exist as a human;
through writing, Lionel might be said to tap into what Adrian describes later as having
“felt his life mingle with the universe of existence.”32 As Lionel begins writing, he notes,
“as my authorship increased, I acquired new sympathies and pleasures. I found
another and a valuable link to enchain me to my fellow-creatures; my point of sight
was extended, and the inclinations and capacities of all human beings became deeply
interesting to me.”33 Documenting his own history unites him with other humans, just
as his reading gives him access to the customs and conventions of his society. When
he ceases to write at the end of the novel—when he ceases to engage with the customs
and histories of his species—he brings about the true end of human history.
As Lionel becomes human, he writes, “I was at once startled and enchanted by
my sudden extension of vision, when the curtain, which had been drawn before the
intellectual world, was withdrawn.”34 His perceptions increase, and he claims to see
the universe “not only as it presented itself to my outward senses,” but filled with
poetry, philosophy, and new classifications (or distinctions). These new perceptions
“awoke the sleeping ideas in my mind, and gave me new ones.”35 Lionel becomes
human, in part, as he gains the ability to construct and recognize distinctions in the
world around him. By the end of the novel, however, we learn that these perceptions
are limited. It is only by embracing indistinction and the possibility of something after
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the human that Lionel can imagine radically new sympathies and perceptions. Like
Edgar Huntly, Lionel finds sympathy in writing, and a near-compulsion to do so. He
not only reiterates the importance of perception to his humanity, but also begins to
think about the role of sympathy in becoming-human. The politics of indistinction,
then, might involve removing human limits to perception and opening up a space in
which new access to sympathies might be gained. By deconstructing the human and
extending Lionel’s “point of sight,” Shelley entertains new possibilities for fellow-feeling
that extend beyond what her mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, called the “artificial
sympathies” of Burkean customs and hierarchies.
Lionel’s transformation is only the first act in what I argue is Shelley’s desire for
a universal, authentic sympathy. Lionel’s becoming-human early in the novel depicts
sympathy as a movement toward the human, not beyond it. What is interesting,
however, is that while sympathy is an important aspect of being human, it is also
socially constructed. Shelley works against Adam Smith and the eighteenth-century
argument that sympathy is inborn. Lionel can be human—in form, at least—without
being responsive to the feelings that most people think make us human. In her
depiction of Lionel, Shelley doesn’t appear to believe that humans are born with an
innate ability to imagine the misfortunes or happiness of others. Lionel partakes of the
“artificial sympathies” despised by Wollstonecraft, even though these sympathies get
dismantled when he becomes animal (or not-quite-human) again at the novel’s end.
Shelley admits the artificiality of these sympathies, but still—as Burke does—imagines
an altered return to the savage as history is cast off at the novel’s end.
Shelley’s interest in constructions of human sympathy is also made clear in the
depictions of Lionel and Perdita early in the novel, who have both been cut off from
human intercourse. Whereas Lionel seems to desire a sympathy he has been denied,
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Perdita actively rejects human sympathy—her name (which means “lost”) in some
ways points to this, signaling that she is lost from humanity. Lionel, on the other hand,
writes about himself as a shepherd, “there was freedom in it, a companionship with
nature, and a reckless loneliness; but these, romantic as they were, did not accord
with the love of action and desire of human sympathy, characteristic of youth.”36 So,
at least for Lionel, the desire for sympathy is inborn, and essential to youth. While
describing himself before encountering Adrian, Lionel notes that he has taken the
form of a man, as he “had shot up in appearance to man’s estate.”37 Yet he also notes,
“my skin was embrowned by the sun: my step was firm with conscious power. I feared
no man and loved none. In after life I looked back with wonder to what I then was.”38
Here, although he has taken upon himself the form and appearance of man and
desires human sympathy, he is enchained to human society by neither fear or love.
His passionate desire for sympathy is perhaps most clearly expressed when, in his
attempt to poach Adrian’s lands, Lionel remarks, “he feels me now.”39
Lionel and Adrian are eventually united by a past sympathy between their
fathers, one which Lionel feels was violated and Adrian hopes to restore by
establishing friendship. Adrian’s efforts are in line with his depiction as the most
sympathetic character in the novel. Even at the outset, Adrian displays sympathies
not only with his fellow humans, but with the entire world:
Adrian felt that he made a part of the great whole. He owned affinity not only
with mankind, but all nature was akin to him; the mountains and sky were his
friends; the winds of heaven and the offspring of the earth his play-mates; while
he the focus only of this mighty mirror, felt his life mingle with the universe of
existence. His soul was sympathy.40
Indeed, even as national and religious distinctions break down later in the novel as a
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result of the plague, Adrian—in an attempt to quell an uprising—calls for a universal
sympathy—a fellow-feeling only made possible by eliminating the distinctions of
human society. We see, for instance, Adrian commenting on the shared humanity of
Turks and Greeks: “The Turks are men; each fibre, each limb is as feeling as our own,
and every spasm, be it mental or bodily, is as truly felt in a Turk’s heart and brain, as
in a Greek’s.”41 By focusing on the shared forms and feelings of these men, Adrian
deemphasizes apparent distinctions between men based on national or ethnic
identities. Adrian continues, “Think you, […] I did not feel in every nerve the cry of a
fellow being? They were men and women, the sufferers, before they were Mahometans,
and when they rise turbanless from the grave, in what except their good or evil actions
will they be the better or worse then we?”42 By invoking Mahometans, Adrian invokes
human sympathy for “fellow beings” even though these men are widely considered
savage because of their religion, thus erasing the distinctions between self and other.
Here, indistinction appears to make fellow-feeling possible.
By extending sympathies beyond what is customary—and at times beyond
species boundaries—Shelley aligns herself with her mother, who argued that the
customs and systems of “chivalry” which Burke lauded were basically systems of
artificial feelings. Shelley demonstrates through Lionel a willingness to entertain the
necessity of both sympathies and customs in becoming-human, yet also recognizes
that sympathies and customs are artificial and merely constructed. In this way,
Shelley shares her mother’s pessimism toward Burkean chivalry and social order, as
she acknowledges that human society creates only artificial feelings—or false
sympathies.43 Lionel—who apparently embraces new sympathies as he becomes
human—recognizes these limits to human sympathy, even in death. He writes, “other
nations have a fellowship in death; but we, shut out from all neighborhood, must bury
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our own dead.”44 Although the development of political systems and nation-states
might create a sense of neighborhood, it also leads to isolation for the English. As
England perishes, it becomes even more apparent that they are geographically and
politically isolated from the fellow-feeling of other humans. And even as the plague
produces a leveling effect that breaks down many of the barriers of wealth and class,
Lionel notes, “the intimate sympathy generated by similar hopes and fears, similar
experience and pursuits, was wanting.”45 Here Lionel seems to believe that there is no
fellowship in death, even as rendering humans equal through the plague appears to
generate authentic sympathies elsewhere in the novel.
What happens at the end of the novel, then, might be read as a failed turn to
the utopian—and here I invoke Frederic Jameson’s claim that “the best Utopias are
those that fail the most comprehensively”—in the form of Lionel’s return to a “savage”
and “wild” nature.46 The end of the novel, where Lionel’s surprise at his own image in
the mirror is coupled with surprise at the sound of his own human voice, has often
been read as a moment of regression, but I would like to argue that it has more radical
potential as a failed utopia.47 Rather than representing what Burke saw as the
degenerative nature of human indistinction, Lionel’s status as not-quite-human at the
novel’s end allows him to witness human extinction and the realization (however
tragic) of radical equality. In his final pages, Lionel refers to the relics of human
civilization as belonging to “another state of existence from my present one” and thus
abandons them to set out with his dog.48 It is in this ability to imagine a change of
state (or a destabilization of the category of the human) that I find a repressed desire
for equality in Shelley’s novel, despite its clearly pessimistic themes.
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RADICAL LEVELING: POLITICS AND THE PLAGUE
Lionel’s becoming human at the novel’s outset represents not simply a move
from the animal to the human, but also his entrance into political life. Even while a
shepherd, he clearly harbored dreams of distinction, although such dreams lacked
specific goals.49 Bound by the limited perceptual capacities of his animality, Lionel
claims to have led a somewhat apolitical life: “I lived far from the busy haunts of men,
and the rumour of wars or political changes came worn to a mere sound, to our
mountain abodes.”50 This, too, changes when he meets Adrian and gains admission to
civilized life. Of the political landscape at the time of their first encounter, we learn
that Adrian’s father, the last of England’s kings, had abdicated his throne and that “a
republic was instituted” in the year 2073. Despite the monarchical desires of his
mother, Adrian “was addicted to study, and imbued beyond his years with learning
and talent . . . he had already begun to thwart his mother’s views, and to entertain
republican principles.”51 At least in his early years, Adrian had a utopian view of
republican government.52 But Adrian refers to these theories as “an almost-forgotten
dream.”53 Adrian blames his health for no longer pursuing these theories, yet later in
the text he alters his political views with the arrival of the plague. When Adrian
defends his nomination for deputy to the Lord Protector, Lionel writes: “No one had
ever before heard Adrian allude to the rights of his ancestors.” Adrian himself says,
“This is my post: I was born for this—to rule England in anarchy . . . my mother, the
proud queen, instilled early into me a love of distinction.”54 To some extent, Adrian
appears to abandon his utopian republican plans due to a love of distinction.
Of the various political efforts/visions that fail in Shelley’s novel, none fails
more spectacularly than Raymond’s. After being installed as Lord Protector with the
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support of Adrian and Lionel, “Raymond was occupied in a thousand beneficial
schemes” on behalf of his countrymen. Lionel describes his utopian efforts in detail:
Canals, aqueducts, bridges, stately buildings, and various edifices for public
utility, were entered upon; he was continually surrounded by projectors and
projects, which were to render England one scene of fertility and magnificence;
the state of poverty was to be abolished; men were to be transported from place
to place almost with the same facility as the Princes Houssain, Ali, and Ahmed,
in the Arabian Nights. The physical state of man would soon not yield to the
beatitude of angels; disease was to be banished; labour lightened of its heaviest
burden. . . . The arts of life, and the discoveries of science had augmented in a
ratio which left all calculation behind; food sprung up […] spontaneously—
machines existed to supply with facility every want of the population.55
Shelley clearly sets up Raymond with utopian ambitions, as his vision seems prepared
to usher in a new era of human society. Indeed, even as Lionel acknowledges that
there were still evils in this society, he also claims that “Raymond was to inspire them
with his beneficial will, and the mechanism of society, once systematised according to
faultless rules, would never again swerve into disorder.”56 Raymond’s utopian political
vision here is clearly influenced by Enlightenment ideals, and his brand of
republicanism at times aligns with the radical political agendas of Enlightenment
thinkers of this period, such as Godwin. The references to science, calculation, and
technological advancements reflect the effects of Enlightenment thought as they fused
with utopian enthusiasm in the nineteenth century. The prospects raised by the
democratic revolutions in the Atlantic world stirred intellectuals to consider what
types of new societies might be constructed, and afforded thinkers a chance to inject
utopian ideals into social institutions. Raymond’s projects reflect this utopian impulse.
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Yet despite claims that disease would soon be banished, Raymond’s utopian
projects fail, initially due to his own moral failings, and later due to the arrival of the
plague. With the plague comes a leveling power that brings about an even more radical
politics, freed from the humanist constraints of Enlightenment thought. To better
understand the plague as a necessary catalyst for Shelley’s narrative, I want to
propose that the plague ultimately serves Shelley in ways similar to how the yellow
fever epidemic served Brown in Arthur Mervyn and Ormond: it becomes a vehicle for
Shelley’s commentary on humanity, political institutions, and democracy.57 We might
ask why Shelley chooses to replace political rivals with the plague in The Last Man,
particularly when a political figure like Ryland seemingly embraces the radical leveling
of social and class distinctions brought about by the plague. Ryland’s political plans
are perhaps the most affected by the plague, although the plague ultimately leads to a
type of radical equality similar to that which he professes. When confronted by the
plague, Ryland is forced to abandon his equalizing plans.58
Shelley’s novel embraces a Burkean argument that radical equality can’t (or
shouldn’t) be achieved by human means, such as a violent political revolution that
dismantles established social hierarchies. Yet, even as Shelley embraces Burke’s
argument that revolutionaries—the French in this case—can’t simply dismiss or ignore
history, she engages only hesitantly with a Burkean politics of distinction and more
often than not reveals a desire for democratization and a more radical politics of
indistinction. Like Burke, she recognizes that radical equality may signal the end of
human history, but she does not back away from this prospect—she actually pursues
radical equality to the point of human extinction in the novel. Even as her characters
share Burke’s pessimistic view of human plasticity (as seen in their frequent rejection
of materialism), she also uses the plague to propel man beyond his usual boundaries
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through natural means. In this way, the plague opens up new possibilities for human
indistinction and even plays (albeit briefly) with the possibility of a posthuman world.
As I’ve mentioned, the plague radically upsets the political views of several
characters. The democratic Ryland is compelled to reinforce aristocracy and privilege
in order to govern during the plague. Adrian, the early republican champion, steps in
to “rule England in anarchy” by invoking his ancestral right through the former
monarchical system. And Raymond, who originally envisioned himself as the restorer
of the monarchy, uses his inability to rule as an excuse to abandon his position and
head off to war on behalf of another sovereign nation. It is in this role that Raymond
sacks Constantinople, literally opening the gates of the city to release the plague on
the western world. As the most flawed (and perhaps most brilliant) character, we find
that Raymond’s political life is tied to his moral life and its failure. The idealism of his
relationship with Perdita and his utopian projects fails, and his death represents the
death of idealism. By opening the gates for the plague, the purity of idealism not only
gets contaminated, but the contamination spreads—the political idealism of Ryland
and Adrian also dies as the plague ravages England.
The leveling progress of the plague is not, however, merely a commentary on the
inadequacy of political institutions; the plague also opens up the possibility to think
beyond the human. Encountering the plague, for example, makes an otherwise sickly
Adrian into a temporarily reanimated being.59 Lionel’s recovery from the plague also
makes him feel more than human.60 The plague thus enables forms of transformation
beyond a simple human-animal dichotomy, one that includes alternative temporalities
and even regeneration. As Lionel notes, in the winter, freed from the plague, “we
became ephemera, to whom the interval between the rising and setting sun was as a
long drawn year of common time,” while in the spring “man seemed to regenerate.”61
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The plague also makes Raymond and Evadne formless—indistinct from other beings
and the environment around them—and leads Lionel and his friends to speculate on
what might come after human extinction.
In addition, the plague opens up new perceptions—at least to Lionel, who is
able to look back on human history as the last man. He writes:
The vast annihilation that has swallowed all things—the voiceless solitude of
the once busy earth—the lonely state of singleness which hems me in, has
deprived even such details [accounts by Boccaccio, Brown, and Defoe] of their
stinging reality, and mellowing the lurid tints of past anguish with poetic hues,
I am able to escape from the mosaic of circumstance, by perceiving and
reflecting back the grouping and combined colouring of the past.62
Here, new perceptions of the past—perceptions Lionel can only obtain as the last
man—render the annihilation and voiceless solitude of these scenes poetic. He
continues, “time and experience have placed me on an height from which I can
comprehend the past as a whole . . . a picture in whose very darkness there will be
harmony.”63 We should question, however, whether this expanded view of the past is
human perception. As last man, devoid of fellow beings and fellow-feeling, Lionel has
already become something other than human.
Lionel laments, “I alone bore human features; I alone could give articulation to
thought. . . . The wild and cruel Caribbee, the merciless Cannibal—or worse than
these, the uncouth, brute, and remorseless veteran in the vices of civilization, would
have been to me a beloved companion.”64 Not only does he imagine the most inhuman
of his species as a desired companion, he also notes, “his nature would be kin to mine;
his form cast in the same mould; human blood would flow in his veins; a human
sympathy must link us for ever.”65 Here, Lionel seems to rethink sympathy as
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something that is innate, biological, entrapped in human form, in contrast to Shelley’s
apparent rejection of Adam Smith. The beings he describes are nothing like him,
except in form. Lionel then curses the various forms of life left, only to repent quickly
of those thoughts. He writes:
Ah, no! I will discipline my sorrowing heart to sympathy in your joys; I will be
happy, because ye are so. Live on, ye innocents, nature’s selected darlings; I am
not much unlike to you. Nerves, pulse, brain, joint, and flesh, of such I am
composed, and ye are organized by the same laws. I have something beyond
this, but I will call it a defect, not an endowment, if it leads me to misery, while
ye are happy.66
Lionel explicitly seeks cross-species sympathy here, while also acknowledging that
sympathy is something constructed; he can discipline himself to be sympathetic. We
also get an interesting materialist explanation of why this sympathy is possible:
humans and animals are formed of the same materials and by the same laws.
While the leveling power of the plague ultimately destroys human life, it is not
rejected outright by Shelley (via Lionel). Indeed, there are a number of moments in
which Lionel appears to praise this newfound equality: “We were all equal now; but
near at hand was an equality still more levelling [sic ], a state where beauty and
strength, and wisdom, would be as vain as riches and birth.”67 Moreover, the plague
reveals that they were always equal. Lionel recognizes human death as the ultimate
leveling power. Thus the plague becomes, to some extent, a utopian force that levels
what comes before to create a tabula rasa upon which to write a new type of
posthumanist utopia. Although the loss of human life makes the plague unsustainable,
it manages to accomplish what political institutions could not: a radical equality. In
this way, Shelley differs significantly from Brown in her treatment of disease and its
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democratic ends. Although we see echoes of Brown throughout The Last Man, whereas
Brown uses the yellow fever epidemic as a way to reform the boundaries of
communities and set up new codes of belonging (not restricted by species, race, or
other distinctions), Shelley uses the plague to produce a space free of human customs
and communities. For Brown, immunity plays an important role in creating the type of
mobility necessary for boundary crossing; for Shelley, mobility only comes to Lionel
through radical isolation as the last man.68
Echoes of Brown in The Last Man are also important in that they point to the
transatlantic debts of Shelley’s novel and her engagement with the revolutionary
politics of a broader Atlantic world. The plague becomes a global interference, creating
“a new state of things,” and, as Lionel notes, “trade was stopped by the failure of the
interchange of cargoes usual between us, and America, India, Egypt, and Greece.” The
result is “that whole countries are laid waste, whole nations annihilated, by these
disorders in nature.”69 As Shelley constructs the narrative, England becomes a point
of refuge much like Philadelphia did in Brown’s texts; both sites serve as a home and
gathering point for refugees, and both sites are threatened by foreign violence and
revolution. The plague situates Shelley’s narrative as a transatlantic—even global—
story of social and political leveling.70 In the novel, Lionel writes, “there were no means
of employing the idle, or of sending any overplus of population out of the country.
Even the sources of colonies was dried up.”71 Thus Shelley’s text offers a critique of the
colonial enterprise, a critique that—while not exclusive to a particular political
system—aligns nicely with the rhetoric of democracy in this period. The unsustainable
practices of colonialism point to the failure of utopian visions of the Americas as a new
world space where experimental democracies might thrive. As Lionel thinks about
Ryland as potential Protector, he writes: “Yet could England indeed doff her lordly
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trappings, and be content with the democratic style of America? Were the pride of
ancestry, the patrician spirit, the gentle courtesies and refined pursuits, splendid
attributes of rank, to be erased among us?”72 Shelley interrogates the questions Burke
poses in his Reflections. While Burke was able to support the American revolution, he
struggled to reconcile that support with increasing revolutionary activity in Europe. He
argues, instead, that England cling to and retain its customs and heraldry.
One character who clearly represents the dangerous revolutionary potential of a
global plague is Evadne. Much like Martinette in Brown’s Ormond, Evadne becomes an
emblematic figure of radical indistinction. As McWhir has argued, “Evadne’s very
name simultaneously encodes destructiveness, deception, and devotion. Like Lionel
Verney’s, her identity—princess, plague, adulteress, artist—remains uncertain and
unstable.”73 Her formlessness challenges rules about what counts as a political
subject, as human, and even as body. Evadne also raises important questions in the
text about the operations of the plague and its transmission, about race, gender, and
the limits of the foreign. Her ability to cross class and gender boundaries is striking,
particularly in her final scene as a dying, cross-dressed soldier.74 It is also worth
recognizing the ways in which Evadne begins to blur the lines not only between male
and female, but also between life and death. When Lionel discovers her dying on the
battlefield, it is as if she rises from the dead, only to die again:
I heard a piercing shriek; a form seemed to rise from the earth; it flew swiftly
towards me, sinking to the ground again as it drew near. . . . I with difficulty
reined in my horse, so that it should not trample the prostrate being. The dress
of this person was that of a soldier, but the bared neck and arms, and
continued shrieks discovered a female thus disguised.75
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The formlessness of Evadne up to this moment, along with her ability to disguise her
gender and language, makes her a mobile figure (a spreading contagion that
represents Raymond’s moral failings) and opens up new possibilities for her: she
enlists in two predominantly male professions, learns to survive outside of class
hierarchies, and ultimately becomes visually indistinct from the world around her.
This formlessness is both monstrous and liberating, highlighting the tensions at play
as Shelley explores the possibilities of indistinction. Evadne thus represents Shelley’s
own repressed desires: she exemplifies a radical equality, one that is only realized by
rendering herself inhuman and indistinct.
We see a similar formlessness in Raymond, in Lionel’s account during his
search for the body of his friend: “my friend’s shape, altered by a thousand distortions,
expanded into a gigantic phantom, bearing on its brow the sign of pestilence. The
growing shadow rose and rose, filling, and then seeming to endeavour to burst beyond,
the adamantine vault that bent over, sustaining and enclosing the world.”76 Here,
Raymond bursts beyond the boundaries of containment outlined in this space. This
excess is initially frightening for Lionel, much in line with political fears of
formlessness. McWhir describes the work of the plague as “a redefinition of categories,
as life is replaced by death, and nightmares, phantoms, and shadows of the past take
on greater reality than the illusion of continuing life.”77 I would argue, however, that
the plague is not simply a frightening redefinition of categories, but a promising
attempt to abolish them altogether. In Evadne, for example, we don’t simply see her
within new definitions of class, gender, or nationality: she becomes an indistinct force
rising from the earth (drawing a comparison between the plague and arguments for
natural equality, perhaps) that prophesies the fall of Raymond and a new order.78 Both
Raymond and Evadne, in their boundlessness, become the contagion that spreads
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across the world—literalizing Burke’s fears of spreading democracy. Shelley also links
this contagion to Raymond’s own moral failings, which produces a narrative of
democracy as both degenerate and immoral.
As the boundaries between life and death also become blurred during the
plague years, we can see in the mourning of Lionel an early engagement with
questions about the boundaries of the human and of mortality:
Half insanely I spoke to the dead. So the plague killed you, I muttered.
How came this? Was the coming painful? You look as if the enemy had
tortured before he murdered you. And now I leapt up precipitately, and
escaped from the hut, before nature could revoke her laws, and inorganic
words be breathed in answer from the lips of the departed.79
The relationship between the natural world and mortality seems strained to Lionel, as
he imagines (with an odd sense of terror) the reanimation of his wife. Lionel will offer a
similar sentiment as he and Idris leave Windsor: “Nature was the same, as when she
was the kind mother of the human race; now, childless and forlorn, her fertility was a
mockery; her loveliness a mask for deformity.”80 Rather than simply adopting a politics
of distinction, as Burke does, Shelley envisions a formless world of unlimited
indistinction. We could read the novel (and the plague) as speaking directly to a
Burkean fear of indistinction. Yet, for Shelley, this doesn’t necessarily lead to chaos or
a wild multitude; instead, it brings much-needed perspective to human life. With the
introduction of the plague—which represents both death and democracy—we see a
more radical leveling than previous political visions could produce.
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LIFE, DEATH, AND THE ENDS OF HUMAN HISTORY
As Shelley grapples with the function of history in a postrevolutionary Atlantic
world, she continues to explore the role of customs and hierarchies in the face of
human extinction. As Lionel departs from Windsor, he notes, “all these objects were as
well known to me as the cold hearth of my deserted home, and every moss-grown wall
and plot of orchard ground, alike as twin lambs are to each other in a stranger’s eye,
yet to my accustomed gaze bore differences, distinction, and a name. England
remained, though England was dead.”81 Lionel refers to these as familiar places, and
refers earlier to an “accustomed site” of a tree.82 He then says he beheld them “as if all
my sensations were a duplex mirror of a former revelation.”83 These passages
represent the novel’s habit of transferring terms—of moving vocabulary from the social
and political world to the natural world—in an attempt to make us think about how
these two worlds are related. The “accustomed gaze” is what allows Lionel to recognize
differences and distinctions; it reinforces a Burkean sensibility in Lionel, in which
customs form a “second nature.” These customs and distinctions are then naturalized
through Lionel’s intimate familiarity with the landscape. The environment does not
change, but the historical distance at which Lionel experiences that environment does.
Yet as England dies, so do its customs. The threat of human extinction thus brings
about a politics of indistinction: Shelley recognizes that indistinction is not customary,
and that it prevents the formation of Burkean customs and social hierarchies.
Shelley’s engagement with indistinction represents a notable departure from Burke’s
claims about the importance of distinctions to history.
On the question of history, it was Shelley’s mother, Wollstonecraft, who most
forcefully claimed that Burke’s Reflections is an argument “that we are to reverence
the rust of antiquity” and in The Last Man, Shelley similarly grapples with Burke’s
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reverence toward history84 While Shelley seems to embrace the impossibility of
realizing radical equality through human means, which echoes Burke’s argument, she
does not show the same reverence for history—and, despite claims by other scholars,

1

she does not long nostalgically for an old-world aristocracy. Lionel looks back upon an
empty England near the end of the novel and says: “Farewell to the glory and heraldry
of England!—I turned from such vanity with a slight feeling of wonder, at how
mankind could have ever been interested in such things.”85 Here we see echoes of
Wollstonecraft, who argued against Burke’s deference to “unnatural customs.”86
Shelley critiques English heraldry as mere vanity, an anti-Burkean move that again
highlights the insubstantial character of Burke’s second nature. The distinctions of
family and rank so cherished by Burke seem vain as Lionel lays his wife to rest. From
the perspective of a man facing human extinction, Lionel sees social orders and
customs as both uninteresting and insignificant.
As he dismisses the chivalric banners, Lionel describes his wife as a lifeless
corpse—almost statuesque. “While looking on her uncovered face, the features already
contracted by the rigidity of death, I felt as if all the visible universe had grown as
soulless, inane, and comfortless as the clay-cold image beneath me.”87 Here we also
get Lionel referencing Burke and the “sad immunities of the grave”—a comment Burke
makes to criticize the French revolutionaries. Burke conceptualizes history (and the
sacredness of the past) as part and parcel of the present social order. Shelley would
also have been familiar with Wollstonecraft’s continued attack on Burke’s attachment
to chivalry and history, in which Wollstonecraft argues that Burke’s depiction of
revolutionary struggles as “unnatural” ensured that human beings would “remain for
ever in frozen inactivity.”88 Shelley plays with this notion as she depicts Lionel musing
about statues at several points in the text. As he comes to grip with being the last man,
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for example, he observes the statues in Rome and remarks:
If those illustrious artists had in truth chiselled [sic ] these forms, how many
passing generations had their giant proportions outlived! and now they were
viewed by the last of the species they were sculptured to represent and deify. I
had shrunk into insignificance in my own eyes, as I considered the
multitudinous beings these stone demigods had outlived.89
Shelley divorces the human form—which is “for ever in frozen inactivity”—from the
human, leading us to ask whether a world filled with statues is worth inhabiting.
Lionel’s interest in statues in The Last Man offers a significant engagement with
(and critique of) Burke’s reverence of history during the revolutionary period. In 1792,
the Revolutionary Assembly decreed the destruction of statues and monuments
glorifying the royal house, and in 1814 there were multiple reports of a mob tearing
down a statue of Napoleon in Marseille. For Shelley, a Burkean world of inequality is
one enslaved to history. She seems ambivalent about this question as she both longs
for the world these statues inhabited, yet feels no sympathy with them—their world is
not a civilized world, nor a human one.90 For Burke, the experience of monuments and
statues is not one of ossified specimens of history, but rather an engagement with
fellow citizens and companions in a community of both the living and the dead.
By making Lionel contemplate these figures, Shelley sets up statues as a way to
allow her readers to reflect on the distinctions that separate the living and the dead.
Clearly Lionel recognizes the distinction between inanimate statues and animate
humans: being alive is to see, move, and speak, while the objects before him are
essentially immobile, blind, deaf, and dumb. Shelley seems interested in marking out
how walking, talking, and seeing establish boundaries between things sentient and
alive and things inanimate and dead. These distinctions between the living and the
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dead allow the statues to signal a departure from the society of the living. Kinship with
statues is a kinship with the dead. Yet Lionel finds it impossible to feel sympathy with
them, and can only reflect on their permanence. In their frozen state, they out-live the
last living humans. The indifference of these statues echoes the indifference of the
Countess earlier in the novel, when she is said to have a “total apparent want of
sympathy.”91 Yet immediately after Lionel describes how the Countess emerges from
the grave of Idris—“her tall form slowly rose upwards from the vault, a living statue,
instinct with hate, and human, passionate strife”—we see the first signs of life and
fellow-feeling in her.92 The twin capacities of the statue both to define and to
transcend the divide between the categories of the living and the lifeless leads us to
ask: to what extent is the statue-viewer relegated to the category of the inanimate?
Deprived of motion, the dead are reimagined or re-presented in forms indicative
of their new condition: statues. Mourners also become statuesque in their
motionlessness, planting themselves by loved ones and waiting for death. This
represents a withdrawal from the community of the living, and is depicted multiple
times in The Last Man. While the distinction between men and statues may seem
insignificant, it is important to recognize in monuments and statues a political
resonance. Statues stand in for the dead. They become exemplars of lifelessness and
the lack of sense and sensation. They are unresponsive. Shelley would also have been
familiar with the many myths—Greek and otherwise—of petrifaction, where we see the
transformation of men, beasts, and animate objects into monuments. They also have
historical and political significance. In Shelley’s novel, we might ask if the “living dead”
have a role to play in defining her politics.93 By blurring the lines between the living
and the dead, does Shelley evoke the ghosts of the revolution—a moment of historical
trauma? If so, perhaps Shelley’s setting of The Last Man in the future allows her to
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immediately reanimate those ghosts, thus populating her novel with the living dead of
postrevolutionary Atlantic world. Thus she again literalizes Burke, this time in
realizing his contract between the living and the dead. Although, as we’ve seen, Shelley
also seems interested in extending that contract beyond the human as well.

REVISING BURKE: REPRESSED DESIRE AND THE POSTHUMAN
Instead of simply accepting Burke’s views on distinction, Shelley toys with a
politics of indistinction that blurs the boundaries between the human and the
nonhuman. Even as she appears to embrace his claim that man’s second nature limits
his ability to cast off long-standing customs and traditions, Shelley ends The Last Man
with several moments of rupture in which she allows her characters to play—albeit
briefly—with the possibility of a posthuman world. As such, we see her break from the
Burkean notion of “life itself” as political life. Instead, she hints at the promise of
radical equality, even if that equality comes at the price of human extinction. Whereas
Burke sees the spread of democracy as unnatural and monstrous, Shelley is able to
imagine the natural world continuing after humans have died out, and even allows her
characters to speculate on other rational beings that might take humanity’s place.
Severely tempered by the reality of revolutionary aftermath in England and France,
Shelley still demonstrates a stunted desire for radical equality—regardless of cost.
These moments of repressed desire are most evident, perhaps, in the
conversations that take place between Lionel and Idris following Lionel’s encounter
with the plague. As Lionel ponders love after death, Idris asks herself, “now that all
mankind is dead to this life, to what other life they may have been borne.”94 Her
thoughts on an afterlife mix with concerns about humanity’s future on the earth, or
what she refers to as “the mystery of a future state.”95 Yet these visions of an afterlife
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are neither millenialist nor religious in nature. Idris is not interested in religious
ascension or the great chain of being, but instead in the possibility of a world sanshuman. She goes on to say, “what a scare-crow, indeed, would death be, if we were
merely to cast aside the shadow in which we now walk. . . . Alas! the same strong
feeling which makes me sure that I shall not wholly die, makes me refuse to believe
that I shall live as wholly as I do now.”96 Death does not represent an imaginary
boundary, but a moment of transformation. As Idris defines the boundaries of her own
life and mortality, she begins to imagine herself as both less than and more than
human, yet always not quite human. The promise of indistinction is that she, or her
humanity, shall not wholly die, but the peril is that she will not wholly live as she does
now: a posthuman world loses the distinctions that make her human.
As Idris continues to speak with Lionel, they begin to extrapolate beyond their
own lives, and imagine human extinction as a collective transformation of (or move
beyond) the human. Lionel writes, “we talked of what was beyond the tomb; and, man
in his human shape being nearly extinct, we felt with certainty of faith, that other
spirits, other minds, other perceptive beings, sightless to us, must people with thought
and love this beauteous and imperishable universe.”97 This posthuman speculation is
a far cry from a world of rigid hierarchies in which Shelley abandons the radically
democratic pitch of her early years with Percy. Instead, it allows Shelley to
momentarily project a utopian view of radical equality: an unbounded world free from
human distinctions. If humans are limited in their ability to perceive the world by
customs and conventions, as Burke argues, the only option for moving beyond those
limits would be for Shelley’s characters to look beyond the human and beyond human
history, even if that means writing themselves out of that utopia. That Lionel and Idris
would turn to perceptive, posthuman beings seems like a rupture of utopian optimism
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following the failure of human political systems to enact meaningful change.
What we don’t see by the end of The Last Man is what we have come to expect in
modern utopias—the effort by man to remake mankind for ideological ends. Instead,
Shelley seems to be embracing a belief that man has natural ends, while also
sustaining some measure of desire for a future filled with new perceptions and
consciousnesses. Yet Shelley is only able to toy with the possibility of a posthuman
world as the political alternatives to monarchy, democracy, and other human systems
have been exhausted. Indeed, for all the looking back that Lionel and others do
throughout the novel, there is never a sense that man would—or should—return to old
political forms. Indeed, Lionel writes as he leaves England, “we saw depart all hope of
retrieving our ancient state—all expectation, except the feeble one of saving individual
lives from the wreck of the past.”98 While literally referring to England as the
geographic and political space being abandoned, Lionel also seems to be thinking
about the biological state of being human as well. His reference to England and its
civilizations as the “wreck of the past” seems telling as a commentary on the inability
of human systems to produce a true utopia. Here we see Shelley’s clearest break from
Burke. While she tentatively accepts that humans can’t be severed from customs
without losing their humanity, her repressed desire for radical equality prevents her
from calling for a return to old political systems.
That being said, Lionel is not free from nostalgia. In fact, he momentarily
adopts a tone of desperation near the end of the novel, as he bemoans the impending
extinction of the species: “We must all die; nor leave survivor nor heir to the wide
inheritance of earth. We must all die! The species of man must perish; his frame of
exquisite workmanship; the wondrous mechanism of his senses; the noble proportion
of his godlike limbs; his mind, the throned king of these; must perish.”99 From here,
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however, Lionel begins to ask larger questions, demonstrating an historical awareness
that extends beyond the limits of his own species:
Will the earth still keep her place among the planets; will she still journey with
unmarked regularity round the sun; will the seasons change, the trees adorn
themselves with leaves, and flowers shed their fragrance, in solitude? Will the
mountains remain unmoved, and streams still keep a downward course
towards the vast abyss; will the tides rise and fall, and the winds fan universal
nature; will beasts pasture, birds fly, and fishes swim, when man, the lord,
possessor, perceiver, and recorder of all these things, has passed away as
though he had never been?100


Here we see again the emphasis on human perception, its past and its limits. Yet
Shelley is also thinking about just how much universe there is outside the human,
and beyond human history. Everything that continues to exist beyond the human in
this passage is beautiful.101 What remains is not the description of ruins, or
extinguished civilizations, but of a utopian—perhaps Edenic—posthuman space (one
that fits with Shelley’s radical skepticism of political systems). If we continue to think
of posthumanism as both before and after humanism, as defined by Wolfe, it seems
right that Shelley would imagine the end of humans as if they never were.
That Shelley is capable of imagining a posthuman world is perhaps most
evident in description of animal life as the plague wipes out humanity across the globe.
Indeed, one of the best examples might be the numerous accounts of nonhuman
animals inhabiting human spaces as mankind perishes. As Lionel travels the streets of
London prior to departing England, he writes:
No human step was heard, nor human form discerned. Troops of dogs, deserted
of their masters, passed us; and now and then a horse, unbridled and
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unsaddled, trotted towards us, and tried to attract the attention of those which
we rode, as if to allure them to seek like liberty. An unwieldy ox, who had fed in
an abandoned granary, suddenly lowed, and shewed his shapeless form in a
narrow door-way; every thing was desert; but nothing was in ruin.102
Here we get a glimpse of a radical equality, one that demonstrates even domestic
nonhuman animals seeking liberty, and animals like the ox inhabiting human spaces.
Lionel refers to the streets as “unpeopled” but not ruined; the cities are still filled with
“undamaged buildings” and “luxurious accommodation.”103 He goes on to imagine that
the “tenantless and abandoned” streets “became mere kennels for dogs, and stables
for cattle,” for “human being there was none to reply; and the inclemency of the night
had driven the wandering animals to the habitations they had usurped.”104 Shelley is
clearly toying with a radical equality as animals occupy human habitations by opening
up the possibility for cross-species sympathies. As the novel ends, Lionel seeks new
sympathies with animals, nature, and inanimate objects, even entertaining the
possibility of a sympathetic relationship to things.105 He recognizes that human
sympathy has limits, and that humans are perhaps not the only vehicle for sympathy.
Still, Shelley remains unsure of the nature of this posthuman world. Will
humanity be replaced? Transformed? Will it exist in another state? Lionel writes,
“surely death is not death, and humanity is not extinct; but merely passed into other
shapes, unsubjected to our perceptions. Death is a vast portal, an high road to life: let
us hasten to pass; let us exist no more in this living death, but die that we may
live!”106 The only constant in Lionel’s speculations is that human extinction will bring
about a change in perception and new forms. In this passage, Lionel is uninterested in
a religious understanding of the afterlife, pondering instead the question of how
humanity might pass from one shape or form into another. This ultimately leads to his
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lamentation about the historical place (or significance) of humanity:
Did God create man, merely in the end to become dead earth in the midst of
healthful vegetating nature? Was he of no more account to his Maker, than a
field of corn blighted in the ear? Were our proud dreams thus to fade? Our
name was written ‘a little lower than the angels;’ and, behold, we were no better
than ephemera. We had called ourselves the ‘paragon of animals,’ and, lo! we
were a ‘quint-essence of dust.’107
Shelley prefaces this with a similar comment by Perdita as she struggles with
Raymond’s death earlier in the novel: “Look on me as dead; and truly if death be a
mere change of state, I am dead. This is another world, from that which late I
inhabited, from that which is now your home. Here I hold communion only with the
has been, and to come.”108 Perdita imagines death as a change not only in her material
state, but also as a changing of the material world and its history.
We should be careful, however, not to overstate Shelley’s investment in a
posthuman world. These conversations represent moments of rupture in the text that
exist alongside a reluctant acceptance of the inability to realize radical equality
through revolutionary change. Ultimately, in these highly-qualified glimpses of
posthumanity, I argue we might read The Last Man as a rewriting of Burke’s
Reflections. Whereas Burke metaphorizes actual revolution by describing its
democratizing impulse as a contagion that will lead to the end of civilization, Shelley
turns around and literalizes this metaphor by describing human extinction via an
actual plague. The extended demise and lastness of humanity becomes, for Shelley,
not a counterrevolutionary argument a la Burke, but rather an attempt to grapple with
her acceptance of his notions of history and human nature, while also resisting her
own repressed desire for radical equality. Shelley thus inhabits Burke even as she
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disinhabits him, and Burke becomes a way of framing her novel even as she employs
him to her own ends. Shelley, like Burke, champions formlessness, but does so in a
way that leaves open the utopian possibility of radical equality.
Both Burke and Shelley see the collapse of distinctions coinciding with the
collapse of old social orders and political systems, and with the end of human history
itself. Where Shelley ultimately deviates is in her repressed desire to push for this
change despite the necessity of envisioning human extinction to get there. Shelley
recognizes that both Wollstonecraft and Burke were engaged in a theoretical
imagination in the early years of the revolution, and at a slight historical distance, her
vision in The Last Man demonstrates the tension she feels between her mother’s
optimism and certain Burkean views experience has taught her to embrace in a
postrevolutionary society. As I’ve demonstrated, Shelley also literalizes Burke’s
rhetoric in the end of human civilization as she imagines Lionel becoming-animal as
human history and customs fall apart around him. Yet her return to the savage is also
deeply romanticized, whereas, for Burke, the revolutionary activity in France only
brings about a violent and scary end to human civilization. From a postrevolutionary
perspective, Shelley embraces Burke’s notions of second nature and history in
acknowledging that one can’t just erase or ignore history in attempts to enact radical
equality. Indeed, she doubts the capacity of humans and/or human institutions to do
so altogether, which is why the plague does the leveling work in the novel.
When we consider his later writings, we see that Burke takes on an even
stronger eschatological tone as he fends off accusations of insanity. We might, then,
with a little imagination, see Shelley’s The Last Man as a rewriting of Burke’s
Reflections in which Burke himself becomes another “last man” figure—the last
defender of social order from the disease of democracy. Certainly the similarities are
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there. Burke’s fear that civilization will descend into (or return to) savagery is rewritten
in Shelley’s novel at the end, although she is much more ambivalent about the value
of human/animal distinction. Whereas Burke sees Europe exemplifying a state of
barbarity masquerading as improvement, Shelley sees this human/animal
indistinction as the only viable step towards truly erasing human history and realizing
radical equality—even though such a step leads to human extinction. We might also
remember that Burke directly referred to the French Revolution as “a plague” and
urged “the most severe quarantine ought to be established against it.”109 We hear
these words echoed not only in the descriptions of the plague in The Last Man, but
even as Lionel directly links the impostor-prophet to a “contagion of rebellion.”110
Through Shelley’s novel, political danger develops alongside the threat of contagion
from the plague. Shelley embraces Burke’s vision of democratization as a contagion
that crosses national and social boundaries, but unlike Burke still manifests a
repressed desire to see such a radical equality play out in her novel.
So rather than simply embracing Burke’s counterrevolutionary arguments for
the preservation of distinctions, customs, and history, Shelley literalizes his rhetoric
and develops a politics of indistinction that revises Burke’s commitment to distinction.
One symptom of this repression is also seen in the long, drawn-out end of humanity
throughout the novel; the feeling of lastness happening over and over again is
symptomatic of this repression. Shelley repeatedly invokes Burke and literalizes the
end of human civilization, but her purpose is not to depict a degenerate humankind,
but rather to enact a radical equality. This rewriting and reframing of Burke shows her
attempt to retain the power of her own imagination—what the narrator calls a world
“glowing with imagination and power” in the opening pages of the novel—even if that
imagination has been muted by a general acceptance of Burke that she doesn’t want
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to fully embrace. Burke serves the purpose of demonstrating, for Shelley, the
impossibility of a perfect and just human society. Yet the psychological pain Shelley
experiences in accepting Burke’s views of history and humanity produce her stunted
desire for radical equality. As such, her vision in The Last Man is neither utopian nor
dystopian (perhaps de-topian?); instead, it offers us but a brief glimpse at Shelley’s
alternative visions of a society free from human distinctions.
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CHAPTER 4
“THE INDISTINCT SELF”
My turn to Robert Montgomery Bird in this chapter is motivated, in part, by the
fact that he might appear to be a political outlier when placed alongside Wollstonecraft,
Shelley, and Brown.1 Bird was an outspoken Whig, a fierce critic of both Brown’s
novels and the Gothic mode, and a friend to Samuel Morton, whose theories of race
appear to be at odds with the narratives of indistinction I discussed earlier. Yet Bird is
perhaps less of an outlier than he appears. This chapter suggests the pervasiveness of
indistinction as a defining feature of political and scientific definitions of the self in the
early nineteenth century. Bird’s inclusion in my dissertation also indicates that
indistinction can be a politically ambidextrous and intellectually tempting
phenomenon: it allows for narratives that can be radical or conservative, utopian or
dystopian (as we saw in Shelley’s The Last Man). In what follows, I argue that
indistinction provides an irresistible vocabulary for Bird as he confronts questions of
geographical expansion and slavery, even though he was arguably less enchanted by
the American experiment with democracy than the other authors featured in this
project, particularly Wollstonecraft and Brown. Whereas many Whigs decried the
excesses of democracy in the antebellum United States, Bird stands out for the way in
which he recognizes indistinction—which, in many ways, defines this excess—as a
central, and often appealing, feature of democracy.
Bird’s Sheppard Lee also marks a shift in how we might think about
indistinction in the 1830s—particularly in the United States—by placing us in a
different political landscape than in earlier chapters. Though borrowed from an
ancient premise, the transmigration of a soul from body to body in Sheppard Lee
complicates social, political, and biological distinctions in ways that are peculiar to an
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emergent Jacksonian politics of individualism. This transmigration leads to a politics
in which the bounded self becomes permeable and leads (potentially) to madness.2 The
mobility granted by indistinction and democracy in this period is initially liberatory for
Lee, allowing him to engage in cross-racial and cross-species sympathies by imagining
an indistinct self.3 Yet the instability of this self also raises important questions about
accountability and volition in a nation grappling with its paradoxical investment in
democracy and slavery. The Gothic horror of Bird’s novel emerges as Sheppard Lee
crosses the threshold between man and slave only to provoke a brutal slave uprising,
forcing readers to ask who—if anybody—must take responsibility for the violent
ruptures of democratic life. By allowing Lee-as-Tom to participate in, witness, and
eventually be lynched for his role in a violent slave rebellion, Bird situates his
questions about selfhood and volition at the center of antebellum American politics.
The permeable boundaries between persons, and even, by the novel’s end, between
persons and things, raise important questions about the mutability of political
categories (including slave-master distinctions) and the stability of the human self. In
this way, Bird articulates a politics of indistinction that confronts the young nation’s
newly democratized sense of accountability for political and historical violence.
Bird’s novel thus offers an alternative narrative to Jacksonian politics by
making indistinction (and specifically this notion of an indistinct self) central to
concerns over human origins and human diversity—concerns that would become
increasingly important in debates over the institution of slavery.4 Whereas Jacksonian
democracy was popular and in many ways egalitarian, Bird’s novel both exposes and
participates in the masculine privilege and racial prejudice so prevalent in this period.
By cycling his protagonist through multiple selves, Bird attempts to get at the lowest
common denominator of human life, but ultimately crosses the boundary between
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what is human and nonhuman, with Lee moving from landed white men to slaves,
then to animals, and ultimately to inanimate objects. The novel then ends by
dismissing the entire experience as a mere nervous disorder. On one hand, Bird seems
to argue that democracy induces a diseased state of mind that collapses distinctions
critical to government and the category of the human. As Lee inhabits each corpse, he
struggles to remember former existences. This blurred memory allows the lost bodies
and wandering spirits of Sheppard Lee to inhabit America in a way that echoes
Shelley’s wandering “last man”—a figure left negotiating his guilt without a clear sense
of the extent to which he is accountable to his country, his family, and himself.
Although I have positioned Bird as a political outlier, he does share with others
a political worldview that resists simple classification. His fiction, in particular, makes
it difficult to reconcile his hostile depictions of Native Americans, his sometimes
contradictory views on slavery, and his political allegiances as a Whig.5 Published
alongside dominant historical narratives of expansion and the “rise” of American
democracy, Bird’s written work demonstrates the complicated ways in which early
nineteenth-century American politics engaged with English Old Whig ideas,
eighteenth-century medical practices, and an admiration for Burke.6 For Bird, like
many American Whigs of his time, Burke had lost some of his reactionary legacy and
was instead being lauded for his Whig reform writings and his rhetorical skills. Bird
thus saw Burke primarily as part of a long tradition that engaged with classical forms
of rhetoric and eloquence.7 Yet unlike other Whig writers in this period, whose ideas
often seem fossilized to later critics, Bird also engages in a more complex formal
experiment with Sheppard Lee that embraces indistinction as a rhetoric inseparable
from democracy—thus placing him squarely within a transatlantic Gothic tradition.
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If, as I argue in earlier chapters, the Gothic is an imaginative mode primarily
interested (at least in terms of content) in the crossing of boundaries and the
penetration of unknown spaces, then Sheppard Lee (1836), which is not traditionally
read as Gothic fiction, represents a generic mixture of satire and Gothic that similarly
crosses formal boundaries. While his best-known novel, Nick of the Woods (1837), is
more easily placed within a tradition of American Gothic novels, Bird explicitly rejected
the Gothic as Brown imagined it. Indeed, few critics would describe the satirical
Sheppard Lee as a Gothic novel at all. Instead, as Bird turned from drama to novels,
he often sought to produce historical romances along the lines of his hero, Walter
Scott, or his fellow American novelist, James Fenimore Cooper. Yet, as Cynthia Wall
has argued, the Gothic need not remain separate from satire or romance. Wall shows
that in Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto (1764), for example, the clumsiness of
the Gothic trappings actually function as a “subterranean satire on patriarchal
politics.”8 Too often read as a humorous allegory or psychological picaresque, the
clarity of Bird’s political satire similarly falls apart (or simply becomes clumsy) in the
face of real terror and the immediate political fears of indistinction. As Michael Seidel
has argued, satire is also a destructive mode, always caught between “the urge to re
form” and “the urge to annihilate.”9 While Bird’s novels are certainly indebted to the
Gothic as it has been defined throughout my argument, they also demonstrate how
the Gothic, satire, and sentimentalism—a mode dedicated to expanding sympathies
through the imagination and breaking down traditional boundaries—are often engaged
in similar projects through different generic techniques.
Critics, however, have yet to look beyond political satire in Sheppard Lee.
Whereas Bird’s satiric mode at times asks us not to take the transmigration of Lee’s
soul literally, he still asks us to think seriously about the political and moral
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consequences of a destabilized self. Unlike Locke, however, who was asking similar
questions in the seventeenth century, Bird does not tie the stakes of selfhood and
accountability to religion or God’s final judgment. Instead, he seeks to understand
accountability in more secular terms. Bird’s relationships to slavery and indistinction
are particularly notable for the antebellum United States, in which racial sciences
were undergoing a dramatic shift. Bird’s status as a physician thus marks another
overlap between biological and political discourse in this period, and helps us think
about how the politics of indistinction remain essential to debates over democracy,
even as the so-called age of democratic revolutions grows increasingly distant. Trained
in medicine, he participated in a larger conversation about human plasticity that
moves past the theological rhetoric of Smith and ultimately begins to codify what we
now think of as scientific racism. As a result, his move to metempsychosis shifts the
conversation away from the physically oriented debates about race I discussed in
earlier chapters to a more psychological reading of human indistinction. Yet despite
this turn, property and rank also remain central problems in this text—even as they
too become psychologically inflected. Bird’s interrogation of the self thus raises a
crucial question: Are distinctions essential, or merely circumstantial?
This chapter addresses that question by offering four contributions to my larger
argument. First, it identifies Bird as a natural inheritor of a literary history established
in my earlier chapters (and an important link between these authors and the later
work of Poe). Sheppard Lee demonstrates the continued evolution of a Gothic
sensibility that emerges out of Wollstonecraft—a Gothic that is deeply tied to a politics
of indistinction and questions about radical equality. Second, this chapter situates
Bird’s engagement with metempsychosis within a longer tradition of interrogating
consciousness and argues that this tradition is crucial to understanding political
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accountability as it relates to Bird’s construction of an indistinct self. Third, this
chapter will examine how metempsychosis—which, for Bird, represents psychological
illness—raises questions about social mobility. Like Brown, Bird sees that illness
offers mobility even as he repeatedly calls the benefits of mobility into question. The
chapter then ends with a reading of the conclusion to Sheppard Lee which places
questions of selfhood, mobility, and accountability squarely alongside conversations
about slavery. Decades after the so-called “age of democratic revolutions,” Bird asks
us who, if anyone, remains conscious of—and accountable for—its legacy.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND SELFHOOD
Although Sheppard Lee is notoriously difficult to summarize, it primarily has
been read as a tale of metempsychosis in which Sheppard Lee’s spirit inhabits a series
of corpses. The novel opens by introducing us to the original Sheppard Lee, a lazy
farmer’s son from New Jersey who squanders his inheritance. Early on, Lee makes
several unsuccessful attempts to regain financial solvency through marriage,
speculation, and local politics. As a last resort, he attempts to dig up a buried treasure
(as suggested by his slave, Jim, and confirmed to him in a dream), suffering a rather
comic death in the process. Awaking as a disembodied ghost, Lee then inhabits the
corpses of a number of characters across the antebellum American social spectrum:
John Hazelwood Higginson, a wealthy, henpecked Philadelphia brewer; Isaac Dulmer
(I. D.) Dawkins, a penniless Philadelphia dandy; Abram Skinner (Old Goldfist), a
miserly money-lender; Zachariah Longstraw, a naïve and excessively philanthropic
Quaker; Tom, a contented Virginia slave who ultimately helps plan a rebellion on his
plantation; and Arthur Megrim, a wealthy Virginia heir and hypochondriac. The novel
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then closes with Lee re-inhabiting his original body after he (as Megrim) finds it
mummified and on display as part of a traveling medical show in Virginia.
This corpse-hopping helps to establish a premise by which Sheppard Lee can
engage with ideas of accountability, allowing Lee to inhabit spaces of transformation
and indistinction. As discussed in Chapter 2, Brown similarly tackled the question of
accountability via sleepwalking in Edgar Huntly. For Bird, however, this question
hinges on an indistinct self that emerges not from lycanthropic transformations but
instead through metempsychosis. Metempsychosis allows Bird to engage with the
types of questions of selfhood and association articulated a century earlier by Locke.
This link is most evident shortly after Lee enters the body of I. D. Dawkins:
I found myself invested with new feelings, passions, and propensities—as
it were, with a new mind—and retaining so little of my original character,
that I was perhaps only a little better able to judge and reason on the
actions performed in my new body, without being able to avoid them,
even when sensible of their absurdity.10
Writing in the voice of his original self, Lee claims that he can’t be held responsible for
his actions while occupying other bodies. The body, it seems, invests him with new
feelings, a new mind, and an entirely new character. While able to remember what he
has done as various characters (thus differing from Brown’s lycanthropes), he thus
does not hold himself accountable for those actions.
The extent to which selfhood is embodied is a question explored explicitly by
Lee during his time inhabiting Dawkins’ body. Although he reminds us that he isn’t
“writing a dissertation on metaphysics, nor on morals either,” he also makes it clear
that he believes the causes of good and evil are rooted in “causes and influences
“purely physical.”11 He illustrates his thoughts with the following claim:
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Socrates, in Bonapartes’ body, could scarcely have been Socrates,
although the combination might have produced a Timoleon or
Washington. . . . [T]hose sages who labour to improve the moral nature of
their species, will effect their purpose only when they have physically
improved the stock. Strong minds may be indeed operated upon without
regard to bodily bias, and rendered independent of it; but ordinary spirits
lie in their bodies like water in sponges, diffused through every part,
affected by the part's affections, changed with its changes, and so
intimately united with the fleshly matrix, that the mere cutting off of a
leg, as I believe, will, in some cases, leave the spirit limping for life.12
The language of this passage strongly echoes Locke’s investigation of the self in his An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. As Locke discusses the roles of both the soul
and the body in shaping a self, for example, he offers the example of a finger being
separated from the rest of the body: “[S]hould this consciousness go along with the
little Finger . . . ‘tis evident the little Finger would be the Person, the same Person.”13
While Locke uses this example to dismiss the idea that consciousness might travel
with a severed finger, Lee’s metaphysical aside makes it clear that Bird was thinking
about the self in a similar vein—as something shaped by both body and consciousness.
Lee’s description of the sponge-like nature of the spirit also seems to echo Locke’s
epistemological notion of the tabula rasa, in which knowledge—and even selfhood—is
shaped through associations and sensory experience.
Bird’s engagement with Locke here is apparent, although Bird is less explicit
about what’s at stake in making this observation. Locke, in his chapter on identity,
frames another question about consciousness that emphasizes the importance of
being able to hold an individual accountable for his actions:
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But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either of
Nestor or Thersites, does, or can he, conceive himself the same Person
with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their Actions?
Attribute them to himself or think them his own more than the Actions of
any other Man, that ever existed?14
Locke asks us to consider the role of consciousness when it comes to accountability.
Can one be held accountable for an action one does not remember? An action he or
she remembers but never committed? Bird demonstrates a similar desire to
understand personhood in this context. Does Lee’s ability to engage with Dawkins’
memories, passions, and tendencies, for example, truly make him Dawkins? To what
extent does this ability make him accountable for Dawkins’ actions if he is not, indeed,
the same man? Lee makes the case that his agency is removed when he transforms,
although Bird is clearly inviting his readers to recognize this claim as absurd. Lee
echoes these sentiments again upon occupying the body of Abram Skinner, this time
addressing the reader directly: “But I entreat the reader to remember that I had got
into Abram Skinner’s body, and that the burden of my acts should be therefore laid
upon his shoulders.”15 He disburdens his “spirit” of guilt by arguing that
accountability is an embodied attribute that should go to the grave with the body. As I
will argue momentarily, however, materialist readings of Bird fail to recognize the
conflicted self Lee becomes with each transformation. Despite Lee’s best efforts to
privilege the body over the soul, Bird ultimately depicts an indistinct self that is
instead the product of an interdependence among body, soul, and environment.16
This interdependence, and Bird’s inability to establish a stable distinction
between the spirit and the body, leads to complicated questions about accountability
and volition as Lee makes his next shift into the body of Zachariah Longstraw. Having
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jumped into Longstraw’s body after the Quaker was violently murdered, he wakes to
find himself being buried as Longstraw by the killer, along with the recently evacuated
body of Skinner. This confuses him when asked to testify (as Longstraw) against his
attacker, for “I knew very well that Mr. John Smith, rogue and assassin as he was,
had not killed Abram Skinner, but that I had finished that unhappy gentleman myself.”
Regarding the assault of Longstraw, he is similarly perplexed:
Whereas John Smith was there only accused of assault with attempt to
kill, he had in reality committed a murder; which if I had affirmed, as I
must have done had I affirmed any thing at all, I should have been a
living contradiction of my own testimony.17
Here we see the indistinct self as a barrier to Lee’s ability to establish guilt or
innocence. His ability to cross the barriers between self and other—and between life
and death—make it impossible for him to draw fixed distinctions between charges of
murder and assault, and between the guilt of his assailant and his own role in the
death (or second death) of Skinner. This reflection is humorous, poking fun at both
Lee and the legal system, but it also carries with it a very real concern about identity
and the ways in which human indistinction complicates the notion of guilt.
The moment in which Lee jumps into Longstraw’s body also resembles a scene
from another Brown novel, Arthur Mervyn (1799), in ways that highlight Bird’s interest
in the relationship between consciousness and violence.18 Lee writes:
I lost all consciousness. . . . I came to my senses a few moments after,
just in time to find myself tumbling into a hole in the earth beneath the
floor of the hovel, with Mr. John Smith hard by, dragging to the same
depository the mortal frame I had just deserted. I perceived at once the
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horrible dilemma in which I was placed; I was on the point of being
buried, and, what was worse, of being buried alive!19
Like Mervyn, Lee finds himself awakening from a blow to the head, only to be nearly
buried alive. Sleep, a liminal state between a conscious and an unconscious state, is
mirrored in the ways in which Lee navigates the liminal space between life and death
by inhabiting dead bodies. This resonance with Brown’s text is important, as Mervyn’s
violent awakening results from an attack by a West Indian mulatto and invokes the
specter of the Haitian revolution—a concern that later occupies Lee’s thoughts as he
inhabits the bodies of Longstraw and Tom. The violence committed by a racial hybrid
in Brown becomes a violence suffered by a hybrid self in Bird.
It is this racial violence, I believe, that leads Bird to ask what is at stake if we
are not accountable in other bodies. The question is obviously literalized in Sheppard
Lee, although it is present in other texts featured in this dissertation as well; each
author engages with human plasticity and transformation within a specific historical
and political context. For Bird, questions of identity and accountability are tied to the
construction of a distinct self, which is why the possibility of indistinction and violence
haunts Sheppard Lee, infusing Bird’s otherwise satirical novel with a Gothic sensibility.
Although the novel is framed by questions about Lee’s mental stability—which too
often leads critics to ignore the philosophical questions that are at its core—Sheppard
Lee is a text invested in the impossibility of constructing a stable identity. Because
there is no permanent record of deeds inscribed on our consciousness, Locke
mobilizes the final judgment of God as the only ultimate guarantee of identity and
accountability. Bird appears more interested in the secular consequences of an
indistinct self on our ability to govern, and to be governed, in a democratic society. The
stakes in linking consciousness to actions are more politically present for Bird.
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Still, for Locke, identity remains a forensic category that negotiates the
relationship between actions and consciousness.20 In his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Locke questions what happens to the soul when humans sleep—
ultimately arguing that the soul becomes insensitive, insensible, and inactive. A
person wakes up each morning forced to ask, “Who am I?” and every morning that
person must reassemble the world around him via associations. Similarly, as we will
see with each transformation, Lee awakes from a sleep-like state and has to
reassemble his world and his notion of himself as a self through associations. This is
why Bird, like Brown, turns to sleep and sleepwalking to think about these
transformations. Sheppard Lee recodes sleep as a liminal state with transformative
potential in order to understand Lee’s relationship to the self. Although the
transformations in the novel are almost universally described in the language of sleep
or lower consciousness, their role in the novel has yet to be addressed by scholars. Let
me turn to those moments of sleep-like transformations now.
When Lee (as Lee) initially dies, he declares “[w]hen I awoke from this trance, it
was almost daybreak,” setting a precedent for the novel’s remaining transformations,
all of which describe waking in terms of waking from a sleep-like state.21 It should be
noted, however, that this first transformation is the only one in which Lee awakens as
a disembodied spirit—the only example of Bird disentangling the body and the spirit in
his novel. Of his transformation into Dawkins, he exclaims, “a sudden fire flashed
before my eyes, a loud noise like the roar of falling water passed through my head, and
I lost all sensation and consciousness.”22 He then describes himself coming to, but
awakening to a “great stupor over most of my senses.”23 Here we see his
transformation facilitated by a loss of consciousness. This is then compared to the
liminal state of sleep more explicitly when he muses that “these circumstances had
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the effect to increase my confusion to that degree, that I felt like one who is asleep and
knows it—provided one ever did or can feel so.”24 There is something similar to the
sleepwalking and lycanthropy of Edgar Huntly at play here: a vague sense or
recollection (albeit a confused recollection) of the time that has passed while asleep or
transformed. It is passing in and out of this state that produces a confusion of self and
creates a space of indistinction in the novel.
The sleep imagery is even more prevalent as Lee later transforms into Skinner.25
After wishing himself into Skinner’s body, he tells us: “I found myself starting up from
the bed, as if I had just been roused from sleep.”26 He goes on to write, “My swoon was,
I believe, of no great duration, and I awoke from it a new man, as well as an old one.”27
The comparisons between his metempsychosis and sleeping/swooning produce, for
Bird, a new man—not just the reanimation of an old one. As an aged character, but
also as a result of the dream-like transformation, Lee-as-Skinner testifies that “[m]y
eyesight was bad, my hearing indistinct, and indeed, all my senses were more or less
confused.”28 This confusion, while rooted in the old body of Skinner, also resembles
the confusion he has previously felt as he inhabits the bodies of others. As a confusion
of the senses, it points to the role of the body in producing a distinct self. This
confusion of selves appears, however, to be short-lived:
[T]he transformation that had now occurred to my spirit was more
thorough than it had been in either previous instance; I could scarce
convince myself that I had not been born the being I represented; my
past existence began to appear to my reflections only as some idle dream,
that the fever of sickness had brought upon my mind; and I forgot that I
was, or had been, Sheppard Lee.29
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Lee’s former life now appears to him as a dream or a delirium, something disembodied
and indistinct. The language of diminished consciousness is also invoked when Lee
enters into Longstraw’s body, where he finds himself in a “delirium, and therefore in a
measure unconscious of my sufferings” and “lying all that time in a state of
insensibility, more dead than alive.”30 Like Brown, who refers to Edgar’s lycanthropic
transformations as a “species of delirium,” Bird resorts here to the language of mental
illness and lowered consciousness to describe a state of indistinction capable of
producing actual physical transformations.
As Skinner, Lee refers to these moments as “privileges of transformation,”31
which begs the following questions: What makes these transformations a privileged
act? Is this privilege tied to mobility? Does transformation lead to distinction, or is this
a politics in which indistinction itself is the privilege—ultimately granting social
mobility? Perhaps mobility itself is questioned in Sheppard Lee, as Lee never seems to
move up the social scale (despite appearances) and seems to doubt that there are
actual distinctions to be found as he inhabits other bodies. Yet even as he pitches
transformation as a privilege, he immediately undercuts that claim by also imagining
sleep, and thus transformation, as a potential waste of time. This is mentioned
explicitly by the character of Jonathan Longstraw as he debates the merits of
philanthropy with Lee-as-Longstraw late in the novel. He pronounces, “I don’t believe
the wasting of time to be any such heinous matter as thee supposes; had it been so,
man would not have been made to waste a third of his existence in slumber.”32 If
slumber is a waste, and Bird has constructed sleep as a state of transformation and
mobility, embedded in this moment is a subtle critique by Bird of the mythology of
distinction and social mobility in antebellum America. He undermines the common
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national narrative that mobility and distinction are desirable by depicting the
transformations needed to make that mobility possible as wasteful.
This rhetoric of sleep, which enables Bird to think through questions of
accountability and mobility, also demonstrates how Bird’s novel is closely allied to an
eighteenth-century tradition of interrogating consciousness—as Christopher Looby
hints when he discusses the similarities between Sheppard Lee and the subgenre of “it
narratives,” for example. Bird examines the role of consciousness in self-formation by
using metempsychosis to question more fully the relationship between the soul and
the body. The connection between this relationship and sleep is usefully articulated by
Peter Schwenger in At The Borders of Sleep, who uses Hegel to examine the
relationship between sleep, the self, and consciousness:
We initially find the soul, then, within sleep, from which it cannot be
distinguished: “Sleep,” Hegel says, “is the state in which the soul is
immersed in its differenceless unity.” If differenceless, then the soul
cannot be differentiated from sleep; its awakening is precisely a matter of
differentiation, during which a soul becomes a self, conscious of its
selfhood as distinguished from what is other than itself: “The waking
state includes generally all self-conscious and rational activity in which
the mind realizes its own distinct self.”33
Although Bird is no Hegelian, he assumes a similar view of the relationship between
sleep and selfhood. Lee regularly “wakens” from his transformation from a sleep-like
state unsure of who (or sometimes what) he is. Where Bird appears to break with
Hegel is when he depicts Lee’s inability to construct a stable, distinct self upon
waking; the soul/self that awakens fails to distinguish “what is other than itself.”
Constructing sleep as indistinction and wakefulness as distinction thus explains why
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Bird (and Brown before him) relies so heavily on sleep—or at least a lower state of
consciousness that imitates sleep—to effect transformation. It is in this liminal state
that selfhood and the privileged role of the “soul” get called into question.34 Yet
whereas Brown’s interest is in using sleepwalking as a code for species transformation,
Bird uses the sleep-like moments literally to transform the self.
I use “transformation” here because that is the word Bird himself uses most
often to describe the movement of Lee’s spirit from body to body. Although he is
specifically describing metempsychosis, or the transmigration of souls, I think it is
telling that he turns to the word “transformation” instead, even declaring loudly at one
point that “I am transformed again.”35 I find it striking that he uses word “transform”
so frequently, particularly as we think about “form” as the root of “transform” (which
literally means across forms). For Bird, the body and the spirit shape each other,
mixing and blending as Lee’s spirit hops from body to body. Thus each transmigration
is actually a transformation that alters the form of the self. By thinking of these as
transformations, rather than transmigrations, Bird removes the shell-like quality of
the body from the equation and locates the self in the body, rather than the soul alone.
Yet more than that, Bird’s use of this language also gestures to political debates about
matter vs. form, discussions that had begun in the seventeenth century. Human
plasticity, for Bird, includes the plasticity of the spirit as it is worked upon by the
human body. Yet political plasticity is a more complicated matter, to which I will
return later in this chapter.
These literal (or biological) transformations of Lee are messy, in ways that Poe
found troubling in his 1836 critique of the novel’s portrayal of metempsychosis. While
mostly impressed with Sheppard Lee (he called it a “jeux d’esprit”), Poe objected to the
messy status of the self when bodies and souls came together:
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Some fault may be found with the conception of the metempsychosis
which is the basis of the narrative. There are two general methods of
telling stories such as this. One of these methods is that adopted by the
author of Sheppard Lee. He conceives his hero endowed with some
idiosyncracy [sic ] beyond the common lot of human nature, and thus
introduces him to a series of adventures which, under ordinary
circumstances, could occur only to a plurality of persons. The chief
source of interest in such narrative is, or should be, the contrasting of
these varied events, in their influence upon a character unchanging—
except as changed by the events themselves. This fruitful field of interest,
however, is neglected in the novel before us, where the hero, very
awkwardly, partially loses, and partially does not lose, his identity, at
each transmigration.36
In this review, Poe reveals his own interest in metempsychosis (which appears in at
least three of his short works) while also revealing his interest in the rigidity of the self.
Bird, on the other hand, is interested in plasticity: a character who changes, who
“partially loses, and partially does not lose” himself. In this way, Lee is ultimately able
to ask “[w]hat had become of me? That is, what had become of my body?”37 He thus
articulates two of the central questions at the heart of the novel, both of which again
recall Locke: What is the self, and, what is the self’s relationship to the body?
Looby, in his introduction to the text, recognizes that, unlike Poe, “Bird
absolutely did not want a stable consciousness at the center of his tale, for he thought
that consciousness really was fundamentally weak and unstable, and was controlled
to a large degree by its material embodiment.”38 Instead, Looby argues that Bird
harbors a “materialist conviction that identity is largely determined by embodiment,”
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which likely results from his training as a physician.39 Yet I would caution against
overprivileging the role of the body in Sheppard Lee. Although Lee certainly makes a
materialist argument about the self in his moments of reflection, we must remember
that these reflections are some of the most satirical of the novel, and that his
narrative often undermines his explicit meditations. Looby contends that “[t]he weak
essence of Sheppard Lee . . . only faintly persists through the succession of bodies he
inhabits: re-embodiment itself is an event that profoundly—and quite rapidly—alters
his consciousness as it migrates from one body to the next.”40 Yet Lee is always
present, if indistinct, in each of the bodies he occupies. Whereas Looby falls back on a
materialist reading of the self, I argue that Bird sees the self existing in more of a
Lockean “mixed mode” that allows for both biological and political mutability.41 There
is no distinct, essential self for Bird (although there is perhaps no tabula rasa either).
Rather, the self is formed in a zone of indistinction mediating between consciousness,
embodiment, and the environment.

EMBODIMENT AND POLITICAL COMPLEXION
Although Bird was not an essentialist, he draws attention to Lee’s essentialist
leanings in the novel—particularly the ways in which Lee sees biological markers as
indications of political affiliations. Essentialist comments by Lee often offer some of the
novel’s more humorous satirical moments, yet the comments are also striking because
they so closely reflect a growing interest in phrenology and other markers of racial and
social inferiority in the 1830s. However, before turning to emergent racial science, I
would first like to emphasize that political selves are always embodied selves in
Sheppard Lee—selves that remain subject to the type of environmental model of
plasticity demonstrated in this dissertation from Smith onward.
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The novel opens with changing political and social contexts which cause Lee to
switch dramatically party affiliation. While this fictional depiction of switching
allegiances is humorous, Bird’s personal writings hint at a fear that different contexts
can lead to switching kinds—particularly political kinds. This can bee seen clearly in a
letter he wrote from England, addressed to “Dearest Children,” in which he articulates
a context-based fear of becoming a Jacksonian. It is worth quoting at length:
I see new evidences every day that America is a detestable place, and its
institutions odious; though I know our country is a wilderness, and
yourselves barbarians, yet, oh murder! oh murder! how homesick I am!—
Oh how tired I am! I was never more tired of any doghole in all Tennessee,
except one, than I am of the million and a half Monster, London. . . . I
was meant for a wild man, though not of the gregarious order. . . . I am
afraid if I stay here longer, I shall become a Jackson man! I begin to feel
like a democrat, and for the first time in my life to think that God will
lead the foot of the poor man to the neck of the rich, and that, in this,
there will be justice. I can’t look about me here . . . without seeing an
evidence of the corruption and misery that follow in the steps of privilege.
If you could but look into some of the wretched hovels which make up
the mass of London . . . you would become reformers, radicals,
agitators—that is to say Jackson men, undoubtedly.
This letter provides an interesting example of Bird making an environmental argument
about politics; witnessing the corruption and poverty of England leads him to worry
that he would indeed be a Jackson man in a different context. In this way, the
physical characteristics of living in a democracy are tied to and/or altered by climate
and society in ways similar to what Smith expounded in his Essay. This, when
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extended to slavery, seems like an important question to address. Bird not only
demonstrates a fear of biological transformation, seen throughout his novel, but also a
genuine concern about whether he is essentially or circumstantially a Whig. In this
letter it again seems clear that Bird is not an essentialist, although it also appears as
if a fixed political essence is something he desires.
This tension between essence and circumstance plays out repeatedly in the
novel as Bird (through Lee) explores the political relationship between body and spirit.
In one of the most telling passages in the novel, when Lee finds himself musing about
the possibility of inhabiting Higginson’s body, he compares the uniting of the body and
the spirit to the uniting of two political factions:
Why might I not, that is to say, my spirit—deprived by an unhappy
accident of its natural dwelling,—take possession of a tenement which
there remained no spirit to claim, and thus, uniting interests together, as
two feeble factions unite together in the political world, become a body
possessing life, strength, and usefulness?42
This union of two distinct entities (the body with the spirit or one political faction with
another) into a new body highlights the extent to which Bird imagines the biological as
a way of understanding the political. It also emphasizes the ways in which Bird sees
selfhood as a politically charged issue. If the uniting of soul and body (or form and
matter) is here compared to the uniting of political factions (or bodies politic), Bird
implicitly asks us to examine more carefully how questions of biological selfhood map
onto larger political concerns in the United States. I will trace this move from bodies to
bodies politic in more detail in the next section.
First, however, I want to emphasize the ways in which Bird continues to explore
the intersections of the biological and the political throughout the novel. Early on, as
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the town hears of Lee’s death, we learn how death itself (or the death of the body)
becomes a political act. Both parties claim him, leaving Lee with a rather indistinct
political legacy.43 Similarly, the death of Lee-as-Higginson leads to public political
commentary in the local newspaper. As Lee-as-Dawkins describes it, the newspaper
that included a story and editorial about Higginson’s rescue of Dawkins
was of a highly democratic character, and the notice was closed by a
ferocious warning to the young bug of aristocracy . . . “to remember,
when wasting his trivial existence in that heartless society, whose
pleasures were obtained at the expense of their worthier, though poorer
fellow-creatures, that the preservation of it had cost the nation one of its
most excellent citizens, and the world a virtuous man and pure
patriot:”—by which I understood that John H. Higginson was of the
democratic party.44
This passage highlights not only the political tensions associated with class
distinctions in this period, but also the loss of political accountability one suffers at
death. In the cases of both Lee and Higginson, their deaths led to an articulation of
their political views that Lee is unable to recall: “that was a circumstance of which the
gout and my wife had kept me ignorant.”45 Despite lacking political consciousness,
certain values are attributed to these characters upon their deaths.
In addition, democracy—or democratic principles—are often engraved on the
countenances of those Lee encounters throughout his narrative. When Dawkins
becomes concerned about the fact that his uncle is living on Market Street, for
example, he declares, “I thought his nose looked more democratic than ever.”46 Bird is
committed to a relationship between biology, politics, and rank—here allowing Lee-asDawkins to claim a biological trait as a marker of social status and party affiliation.
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Such traits are also explored as Lee inhabits Longstraw’s body. At one point he
mentions a drunken man who “spoke with the indignation of a freeborn republican,
who felt his rights invaded,”47 and later says the following about himself:
[U]niversal benevolence was the maxim I engraved upon my heart; I had
no thought but to relieve the distresses, meliorate the condition, and
advance the happiness of my species. My generosity extended equally to
individuals and communities; I toiled alike in the service of the beggar
and the million.48
As Longstraw, democratic principles are engraved on Lee’s heart, leading him to extoll
the virtues of equality and an indistinction of rank. Lee-as-Longstraw goes so far as to
explain that all professions are equally corrupt, that the alms-house is “a more
democratic establishment,” and that corporations—as institutions—should be treated
on a par with charitable organizations (he advocates a leveling principle) according to
the democratic principles that apply to human beings. In a satirical flourish, Lee
espouses an equality that extends beyond humans to institutions as well. This flourish,
however, masks a very real concern about the boundaries of the human that rise to
the surface near the end of Sheppard Lee.
Lee goes on to argue more explicitly for a relationship between the political and
the biological—what he calls a “political complexion.” Disgusted by the ingratitude
shown him despite his philanthropic efforts, Lee-as-Longstraw observes that:
[Ingratitude] springs, like a thousand other evils of a worse, because of a
political complexion, from that constitution of society which,
notwithstanding its being in opposition to all the interests of the land
and the character of our institutions, is founded in, and perpetuated by,
the folly of the richer classes.49
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This passage merits additional attention because it refers to a political complexion
that owes its existence to the constitution of society—an argument similar to that
made by Smith at the turn of the century about the power of societies to affect the
human countenance. More interesting is that the variety of political complexions this
constitution produces is, according to Lee-as-Longstraw, owing to the folly of the
richer classes in society. Here we seem to see a pointed critique not only of those with
privilege, but also of the inherited “character of our institutions” they occasion. Bird’s
training as a doctor and his familiarity with emergent racial sciences make it difficult
to dismiss his use of terms such as “complexion” and “constitution” as mere
metaphors. Instead, his invocation of a “political complexion” offers an explicitly
political statement that both highlights the power of society to change the biology (or
complexion) of men and offers a possible critique of Burke’s politics.
Lee follows this up with another brief political digression from his narrative to
meditate on how equality plays out in practice in the antebellum United States:
The poor man in America feels himself, in a political view, as he really is,
the equal of the millionaire; but this very consciousness of equality adds
double bitterness to the sense of actual inferiority, which the richer and
more fortunate usually do their best, as far as manners and deportment
are concerned, to keep alive. Why should the folly of a feudal aristocracy
prevail under the shadow of a purely democratic government? It is to the
stupid pride, the insensate effort at pomp and ostentation, the
unconcealed contempt of labour, the determination, manifested in a
thousand ways, and always as unfeelingly as absurdly, to keep the “base
mechanical” aware of the gulf between him and his betters.50

— 195 —

Here we see Bird (via Lee) offering a rather scathing critique of the state of democracy
in America, calling it a feudal aristocracy that prevails under a supposedly pure
democratic government. Yet he also puts this “consciousness of equality” alongside an
“actual inferiority” in a way that makes it difficult to tease out his stance. The critique
is leveled at those who would sustain a gulf (or distinction) in place based on rank,
manners, and behavior, yet the poor only “feel” themselves equal politically. Is the
political self in America, then, a fantasy that must collapse under the weight of “actual”
(material or social) distinctions that are “kept alive” by the rich?
For Lee, the root of these distinctions is pride, and particularly the pride of the
wealthy. It is in pride that he traces “all those political evils which demagoguism,
agrarianism, mobocracism, and all the other isms of a vulgar stamp, have brought
upon the land.” He then points out that “there is pride in the poor, as well as the rich:
the wise man and the patriot will take care not to offend it.”51 The tension between the
poor and the rich is founded on the question of indistinction—or one group believing
themselves the same as another (thus the two parties are indistinct) while the other
holds fast to the distinctions they’ve constructed (embracing instead a politics of
distinction). Capturing this social paradox, Lee goes on to submit that “If thou art a
gentleman, remember that thy cobbler is another, or thinks himself so—which is all
the same thing in America.”52 Here the ability to identify oneself as a gentleman (or
person of rank) is inserted into a novel that otherwise struggles to identify a stable self,
a move that maps questions about individual selfhood onto questions about rank and
status. Such a digression about the distinctions between the poor and the rich makes
sense in a novel in which social mobility mostly operates in reverse, with Lee
consistently attempting to move up the social chain of being (at least until Skinner
makes a different type of attempt). Yet the kidnapping of Longstraw, whose non-
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economical motivations toward happiness are similarly thwarted, ultimately takes the
narrative in another direction.

RACE, SLAVERY, AND POLITICAL METEMPSYCHOSIS
Bird uses the kidnapping of Lee-as-Longstraw as a turning point after which he
explicitly maps his questioning of selfhood onto antebellum political questions. The
journey south itself mimics the metempsychotic transformations earlier in the novel,
only this time Lee is physically transported not just from one individual body
(Longstraw) to another (Tom), but from one body politic (North) to another (South).
Much like his earlier transformations, Lee is reduced to a lower state of consciousness
and deprived of sensory experiences as he travels; he is transported in “a little covered,
or rather boxed wagon,” his arms and legs secured, and his mouth gagged.53 For
several days and nights he is “borne . . . like a corpse” across the Mason-Dixon line
with only a vague sense of where he has been taken.54 This journey thus represents a
different type of corpse-hopping: a political metempsychosis in which he literally
crosses the border between northern and southern bodies politic.55 The change in
environment alters his political self as well; although he retains the same
consciousness, the move across the Mason-Dixon line transforms him from a
philanthropic Quaker to an abolitionist. He finds himself in a strange environment and
can only piece together his location (and political identity) through associations.
Perhaps the most interesting moment in Lee-as-Longstraw’s reassembly of the
world around him occurs when he hears “a shuffling of feet, as of people engaged in a
dance, while a voice, which I knew, but its undoubted Congo tang, could be none by a
negro’s, sang, in concert with the fiddles,—
‘Ole Vaginnee! nebber ti—ah!
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Kick’m up, Juba, a leetle high—ah,—’”56
It is at this moment that he realizes that he is no longer in Jersey, but has been
transported to Virginia. That this realization is constructed around a reference to Juba
is important to my argument in several ways. What was termed the “Pattin’ Juba”
dance was frequently seen on plantations in the antebellum United States, imported
originally from West Africa and more recently from Haiti. That the first mention we get
of southern U.S. slaves in the text is through a dance tied to Haiti seems noteworthy,
particularly in light of the slave rebellion that soon follows in the text.57 This reference
is also telling as Juba was a North African prince who figured prominently in
Addison’s Cato, a figure whose national (and perhaps racial) outsiderness leads to a
conflicted sense of self and helps fuel the tragedy. Addison’s Juba rejects his own
African past by imitating Cato, occupying another person’s identity, an example Bird
was familiar with. Cato became an important reference point for the American and
French revolutions; for Burke, Cato’s “varieties of untried being” were used to
articulate what Burke saw as experimental political forms.58 In addition to helping Lee
situate himself in the south through the association with negro dance, Bird’s reference
also signals a shift in his novel from individual to political concerns.
The figure of Juba also serves as an important transatlantic literary marker of
race and animality at the turn of the nineteenth century—a marker that Bird taps into.
Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda serves as an interesting precursor to Bird in this regard.59
Edgeworth’s Juba is a black African (and West Indian) servant who ultimately marries
a white farm girl (until that gets removed from the third edition). Conversations about
interracial marriage and miscegenation circulated throughout antebellum America,
and the possibility of hybridity was central to debates about racial indistinction in this
period. The most common arguments against miscegenation tended to depict blacks
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as little more than animals, which makes the depiction of blacks in Belinda and
Sheppard Lee so interesting. In Belinda, for example, Juba is also the name of a dog,
which leads to this exchange with Mr. Vincent:
“Juba is, without exception, the best creature in the universe.”
“Juba, the dog, or Juba, the man?” said Belinda: “you know, they
cannot be both the best creatures in the universe.”
“Well! Juba, the man, is the best man—and Juba, the dog, is the
best dog, in the universe,” said Mr. Vincent, laughing, with his usual
candour, at his own foible, when it was pointed out to him.60
The confusion about Juba as human or animal here is also present in Bird’s novel.
Just as negro slaves are first identified by Lee-as-Longstraw for their “Juba” song and
dance, when Lee finds himself inhabiting the body of Tom, a black slave, we are asked
again to interrogate human-animal distinctions the way Mr. Vincent does for his
Juba(s) in Belinda. When Lee-as-Tom first sees his little master, Tommy, he tells us, “I
had an unaccountable longing come over me to take him on my back and go galloping
on all-fours over the grass at the door.”61 Tom’s joy at playing animal blurs the lines
between a human, a slave, and a pet. He continues later in the text as Tommy runs up
to him again: “down I dropped on my hands and knees, and taking him on my back,
began to trot, and gallop, and rear, and curvet over the lawn. . . . [I] enjoyed this
foolish sport just as much as Tommy the rider.”62 The language of Juba in Sheppard
Lee and Belinda places blacks in a space that perpetually calls selfhood (and
specieshood) into question and puts the politics of slavery front and center.
I call attention to the crossing of the Mason-Dixon line and Bird’s Juba
narrative because these passages highlight the extent to which Bird engages with
environmental and social constructions of racial inferiority that speak directly to his
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particular historical moment. As Lee crosses into the U.S. south and transforms into a
black slave, Bird tacitly acknowledges that in order to transform people into property,
you must minimize those qualities that make them human. He was well aware that
literature of the early nineteenth century began to portray “the negro” as a savage in
stronger terms than those that had been used for blacks (or even the Irish) earlier in
American history. This was a major transformation in thought about who, or what,
Africans were considered in antebellum America.
American intellectuals appropriated and rigidified human categories that had
been established by European scholars during the eighteenth century. They ignored,
however, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's observation that human groups blend
insensibly into one another, so that it is impossible to place precise boundaries
around them. When Samuel Morton, one of Bird’s colleagues, initiated the field of
craniometry in the 1830s, proponents of race ideology received the most powerful
scientific support yet. By measuring the insides of crania collected from many
populations, he offered “evidence” that the Negro had a smaller brain than whites,
with Indians in-between. Indeed, the 1830s saw the rise of an “American school” of
ethnologists such as Samuel Morton, Samuel Cartwright, Louis Aggasiz, Josiah Nott,
and George Glidden. These men became widely trusted voices on behalf of polygenism
and the natural inferiority of some races. Their rise represents a move away from the
monogenetic, environmentalist narratives of figures like Stanhope Smith, or a move
away from the idea that human variation was a function of climate or geography
rather than innate differences between races. As a trained doctor, Bird was certainly
aware of these ongoing debates, and the political consequences of racial science. It
was against their backdrop that he anonymously published Sheppard Lee, and against
this backdrop we must read his depictions of slavery and race at the end of his novel.
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Looby points out the complicated transformation that occurs when Lee inhabits
the body of Tom, as here Lee loses his previous identity more fully than before, a
development which may point toward a belief in something inherently inferior in the
biological makeup of Africans. Initially, his past selves seem to disappear, as only the
memories and mind of Tom are present within Lee-as-Tom. He reports:
I found myself, for the first time in my life, content, or very nearly so,
with my condition, free from cares, far removed from disquiet, and, if not
actually in love with my lot, so far from being dissatisfied, that I had not
the least desire to exchange it for another. . . . I forgot that I once had
been a freeman, or, to speak more strictly, I did not remember it . . . I
had ceased to remember all my previous states of existence.63
This comment seems to privilege the materiality of the self while also playing into the
racial stereotypes of the period. Lee’s memory as a slave raises questions about black
bodies, black memories, their contentedness with the present, their relationship to the
status of human, and their participation in history. Indeed, Tom exists as a distinct
self apart from Lee until a chance encounter with an abolitionist tract reminds him
that he knows how to read: “It was a question I could not well answer; for, as I said
before, the memory of my past existence had quite faded from my mind: nevertheless, I
had a feeling in me as if I could read.”64 Here literacy allows him access to associations
that call forth an otherwise dormant consciousness of himself as Lee. It also leads to a
“revolution” in feelings as the promise of freedom, equality, and natural rights also
brings forth a sense of fear among the slaves, who “for the first time in their lives . . .
beheld [the master’s] approach with terror.”65 We are suddenly asked to think of Leeas-Tom as a white man in a black body.
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The ability to read exposes the dissonance between the institution of slavery
and U.S. principles of democracy. Lee-as-Tom recounts his experience of reading the
abolitionist pamphlet by noting that “the very next paragraph was opened by the
quotation from the Declaration of Independence, that ‘all men were born free and
equal,’ which was asserted to be true of all men, negroes as well as others.”66 To that,
a fellow slave named Governor, offers his thoughts on personhood and slavery:
Decoration of Independence say dat? Gen’ral Jodge Washington, him
make dat; and Gen’ral Tommie Jefferson, him put hand to it! “All men
born free and equal.” A nigga is a man! Who says no to dat? How come
Massa Cunnel to be massa den?67
The paradox of slavery and democracy, expressed simply by Governor, becomes for the
slaves an assertion of their own humanity. This new knowledge breeds fear among the
slaves when they encounter their master, perhaps a tacit admission by Bird that the
promise of freedom—what Lee-as-Tom refers to as a “revolution in our feelings”—
breeds terror, particularly in the wake of the Haitian revolution.68 As Bird was aware,
the specter of Haiti haunted the many slave rebellions of antebellum America, and
rebellion is what follows in Sheppard Lee. The plotting of the slave rebellion, in fact,
becomes an explicit commentary on the slaves’ ambition for distinction. It shifts
conversations among the slaves to the possibility of becoming kings, presidents,
emperors, and constables. It leads many of them to speculate about the possibility of
claiming white women as property. It also exposes the deep-seeded fears of interracial
desire that marked antebellum American thought—fear of a sexual boundary crossing
that would remain taboo well into the twentieth century.
This move also matters because it marks a shift in the tone from earlier in the
novel. Simply put, when Lee becomes a slave, the narrative temporarily stops being
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funny. While there are moments of humor with Tom once he learns to read and
recognizes his status as slave and property (while simultaneously becoming an
indistinct self who must grapple with the remnants of his memory as Lee), the story
quickly becomes a more recognizable Gothic horror. At no point is this more clearly
felt than when Lee-as-Tom describes the slave rebellion against his masters that he
helped to initiate. The most troubling example of this Gothic horror occurs when his
master (and namesake) Little Tommy comes running to him for protection, vowing
never to hit him again: “As for the boy, he caught sight of me, and sprang into my
arms, entreating me ‘not to let them kill him.’”69 Lee-as-Tom goes on to explain that “I
would have defended him at that moment with my life, for my heart bled for what had
already been done; but he was snatched out of my hands, and I saw no more of
him.”70 Lee-as-Tom is paralyzed, unable to take responsibility for his own actions and
unable to lift a finger to assist either the rebels or his young master. Shortly after,
humorous satire becomes lost in a Gothic rendering of violence.
This Gothic terror is tied to the tension between a desire to sympathize with the
slaves and a fear for their master’s family. As Julie Ellison notes, “race serves high
culture as a way of signifying crises of identification and many degrees and kinds of
power.”71 It is fitting that Bird’s penultimate body is that of a slave—a black body that
calls identity and selfhood into question, and leads to the most violent crisis in the
text. Ellison notes that “racial discourse signifies traumas of personal identification
and political loyalty,” and it is interesting to see how Bird also ties together race and
political loyalties (or factions) to comment on two distinctions that separate whites and
blacks: hierarchical systems of power and of mobility.72 “In affairs of the affections,
slaves and political factions are equally unreasonable. The only difference in the effect
is, that the one cannot, while the other can, and does, change his masters when his
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whim changes.”73 It is here, then, that we receive the payoff of Bird’s earlier
interrogation of consciousness and exploration of accountability. As he shifts his
attention from the individual to the political, those questions offer a critique of the
paradoxical coexistence of democracy and slavery.
So how does the issue of slavery speak to questions of accountability discussed
earlier? Whereas Locke thinks accountability finds its ultimate guarantee in religion,
Bird asks us to think about a politics of accountability and the ways in which political
and biological indistinction disrupt accountability to a degree that threatens
democracy as a viable option. If Sheppard Lee is initially a story about the
powerlessness of form to hold a person together, by its end it becomes a story about
the powerlessness of form to hold a democracy together. The tension between the
Constitution and the institution of slavery is one example of this. By making a Gothic
turn into questions of slavery, Bird presents a paradox of selfhood as it applies to the
antebellum United States. For Locke, there are actions you’ve done and forgotten, or
which you choose not to think about. And he would argue that you are temporarily off
the hook there—until you are before God. Yet Bird seems to be asking the United
States to think about the earthly consequences of forgetting in terms of slavery. What
does the existence of this institution do for a public consciousness in the United
States? If Bird invokes a political tradition in which the multitude has the ability to
take new forms, yet those forms can still lead to the sort of violent encounters we see
with Tom, what are we left with? The instability of form ultimately produces an
instability of selves.
I want to take a moment to connect this back to the ways in which previous
authors formed their politics in response to Burkean politics of distinction. If we look
back on Burke’s writings about democracy, we find that his argument hinges on the
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belief that individuals are not capable of being accountable to themselves or others.
That, instead, becomes the role of customs and institutions, which is why he argues
so fiercely for their persistence (and the persistence of the distinctions that fix them in
place).74 Democracy, on the other hand, depends on individuals holding themselves
accountable. Without such accountability, democracy cannot work. In this context,
Bird’s depiction of a man who can’t even render himself distinct thus challenges the
viability of democracy. Bird draws on Lee turning into a slave at the end to challenge
the ability of individuals to be accountable in the ways democracy might require.
Bird’s novel, then, demonstrates how tempting the rhetoric of indistinction can be,
even as Bird situates indistinction as a problem inherent to democracy—or at least a
democracy that maintains the types of species and rank distinctions in place that
would allow slavery to coexist alongside the promise of equality.
Although this section of my chapter illustrates an important turn to the Gothic
in Sheppard Lee, we should recognize that the Gothic and the satirical do not remain
easy partners. Just as the shift from Philadelphia to Virginia—and from Longstraw to
Tom—becomes a structural moment around which the novel turns, Tom’s lynching
marks another structural shift back to the satirical mode used earlier. The concluding
chapters of the novel, however, do not back away from the larger political questions
raised by Lee’s experience as a slave. Sheppard Lee literalizes the idea of democracy as
one person being radically equal to another, producing unstable, indistinct selves. The
instability is present throughout the novel, but against the backdrop of slavery (and
the slave rebellion itself) that instability leads to an important question: if democracy
cannot be held accountable to its constitution—its form—because of its relationship to
slavery, what are we left with? In the next section, I will conclude by examining the
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brief and satirical end to Bird’s novel, which engages that question by taking
formlessness to an extreme that calls the category of the human into question.

THE POSTHUMANITY OF SHEPPARD LEE
Published only a decade after Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) and nearly
two decades after Frankenstein (1818), Sheppard Lee similarly grapples with issues of
reanimation and human plasticity at the end of his novel, only to transform those
questions into an examination of the psychological state of nineteenth-century
American politics. At the end of Sheppard Lee, we are left with an ambivalent turn to
boundlessness and a nod to the possibility of a posthuman future—a tacit admission
that perhaps the category of the human is not sufficient for radical equality. The
ability to blur the boundary between life and death is always tied to the question of
whether or not there is something valuable in humanity worth sustaining, or, perhaps,
whether mortality is itself a defining feature of the human—a premise that retains
currency in contemporary science fiction and modern scientific discourse. Yet unlike
The Last Man, in which Shelley’s turn to the posthuman demonstrated a repressed
desire for radical equality, Bird’s final chapters are more difficult to pin down. In what
follows, I examine the satirical return to the posthuman at the end of Sheppard Lee,
with some reflections on the political implications of this return.
The posthumanity of Lee is interesting in that—unlike the galvanic experiment
in Shelley’s Frankenstein—his reanimation does not motivate the Gothic horror of the
novel. On the heels of being lynched, Lee-as-Tom’s body becomes the subject of a
series of galvanic experiments.75 On being reanimated, he explains:
The first thing I did upon feeling the magical fluid penetrate my nerves,
was to open my eyes and snap them twice or thrice; the second to utter a
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horrible groan, which greatly disconcerted the spectators; and the third
to start bolt upright on my feet, and ask them, “what the devil they were
after?” In a word, I was suddenly resuscitated.76
While the attending gentlemen immediately flee in terror, the novel once again turns to
humor as it depicts a rather comic scene: all the participants flee but one man, Arthur
Megrim, who instead dies of fright on the floor. Lee-as-Tom quickly takes possession of
this man’s body, only to have Tom’s own dead body fall upon Lee-as-Megrim as soon
as the transmigration takes place—knocking the wind out of him. Leaving behind the
authentically terrifying scenes of a slave rebellion and lynching, Bird returns to a more
recognizably satirical mode. Yet the seriousness and political breadth of the questions
he raises as Tom now inevitably subtend these final moments of satire.
It is in this mode that Bird most emphatically begins to challenge the
boundaries of the human. Lee’s awakening as Megrim, for example, offers a convincing
echo of Edgar’s “savage awakening” in the cave—a moment of physically painful,
perhaps even lycanthropic (considering Megrim’s later belief that he is a dog),
transformation. Lee writes of his experience, “I awoke late on the following morning,
feeling very comfortable, notwithstanding the bruises on my ribs. . . . Indeed this was
my only feeling. I woke to a consciousness, though a vague one, of the change in my
condition.”77 He struggles similarly (almost immediately) with a bout of indigestion,
with sleep and appetite his only desires and concerns. This seems to be a similarly
animalistic change (albeit a much lazier one), as Lee-as-Megrim experiences a “savage
appetite” in his new body and can only focus on that need.78 His indigestion is
interesting, less because of its representation of a nonhuman transformation (as seen
in Brown) than for its commentary on freedom. Having just abandoned his life as a
slave, Lee-as-Megrim writes this of his digestion:
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And as for independence, the idea was a mockery; the servitude of a
galley-slave was freedom, unlimited license, compared with my
subjection to dyspepsy, and—for the truth much be confessed—the
doctor; to whom I was at last obliged to submit.79
This comment on indigestions raises the question about the relationship between
indigestion (here seen as a form of subjugation) and freedom. As discussed in my
chapter on Brown, we might think about indigestion as a form of expansion or a
representation of the tension between expansion and containment. If we map this onto
Bird’s novel, does the turn to the posthuman become a necessary condition for the
types of painful expansionist practices of Jacksonian America? Indigestion seems a
fitting representation of Bird’s expansionist politics. If the imperialist nature of
expansion is a consuming process (digestion), indigestion exposes a tension between
expansion and containment. Lee-as Megrim’s indigestion depicts a conflict between
voracious biological and political appetites of the antebellum United States and
attempts to draw boundaries around the human and the nation.
The challenges to Megrim’s own boundaries highlight not only his posthumanity
but also his attempts to contain those transgressions. His character offers the most
explicit posthuman experiences, if the least believable. Instead of getting better after
treating his indigestion, Lee-as-Megrim wakes one day “converted into a coffee-pot; a
transformation which I thought so much more extraordinary than any other I had ever
undergone.”80 After Tibbikens “cures” him by threatening to warm him, he wakes the
next day “seized with a rage of a most unaccountable nature, and falling on my hands
and feet, I responded to the animal’s cries, and barked in like manner, being quite
certain I was as much of a dog as he.”81 After being assaulted by Tibbikens with a
horse whip, he then imagines himself an icicle before “[experiencing] divers other
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transformations, being now a chicken, now a loaded cannon, now a clock, now a
hamper of crockery-ware, and a thousand things besides.”82 Lee-as-Megrim finally
imagines himself as human again, although fully convinced he is the emperor of
France. That his final transformation places him in a position of lofty rank and power
seems fitting. The reference to France also calls to mind the violent revolutionary
politics of France and Haiti at the turn of the century, and the equally violent attempts
to contain those politics in the revolutionary aftermath.
With all these transformations, Tibbikens tortures Megrim as a form of curing
him—and by cure, here, I mean the (re)imposition of boundaries to contain Megrim as
a human and a self. “In this way,” Lee writes, “if I was not cured of my disease, I was,
at least, brought into subjection.”83 With each transformation, Lee is violently trained
not to transform, not to change, not to be free. “I therefore took good care, when
bewailing my hard fate, not to charge it, as I at first did, to the democratic wrath and
jealousy of my tormentors.”84 Lee-as-Megrim is violently taught and conditioned not to
cross boundaries, and he describes each cure as a “return to rationality,” noting that
“I made no attempt to tear them to pieces.”85 Being cured, then, is an act of becoming
human and having the boundaries of acceptable human behavior strictly enforced. Lee
goes on to explain:
In this manner I was cured of hypochondriasis; for although I felt, ever
and anon, a strong propensity to confess myself a joint-stool, a Greek
demi-god, or some other fanciful creature, I retained so lively a
recollection of the penalties I had already paid for indulging in such
vagaries, that I put a curb to my imagination, and resolved for the future
to be nothing but plain Mr. Megrim, a gentleman with a disordered
digestive apparatus.86
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Again, we are left with a disordered digestive system, a system that has been muddled
by conflicting attempts to expand and be contained. Similarly, Megrim ends up
disordered as a result of his attempts at boundary crossing that are repeatedly and
violently contained by the doctor. By the end, he has lost any agency as a self,
becoming nearly inanimate. Even when he leaves the house, it is in a nearly
unconscious mode at the doctor’s direction: “I followed him mechanically.”87 He has
been convinced of his madness and is subjected to strict diets and routines.
While the transformations of Lee-as-Megrim are quickly dismissed as madness,
this violent curing of his hypochondria merely sets the stage for a more fully-realized
attempt to transform or alter the human body when Tibbikens takes him to visit Dr.
Feuerteufel’s medical show. Perhaps echoing the use of body parts in Frankenstein,
Lee-as-Megrim describes the display of seemingly infinite pieces of the human body:
“[The show] consisted of an infinite variety of fragments from the bodies of animals
and human beings . . . Tibbikens assured me they were real specimens, taken from
animal bodies, and converted by scientific process.”88 As they walk, Tibbikens proudly
proclaims the virtues of chemistry to Megrim. The conversation around chemistry is
striking; it is the science of transformation, one whose function is to break the
boundaries between categories. Chemistry emphasizes the chemical bonds formed
between species (a form of sympathy) and the formation of new substances/species.
Alchemy, a precursor to chemistry, was said to include drawing the spirits from bodies
and bonding the spirits within bodies—making chemistry central to conversations
about metempsychosis.89 Tibbikens’ praise of chemistry thus provides an interesting
commentary on Lee’s own transformations: “Davy, Lavoisier, Berzelius . . . how little
they knew of the true science of chymistry! They stopped short at the elements—our
doctor here converts one element into another!”90 If, as Tibbikens insinuates, scientific
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indistinction is possible at the elemental level, what does this say about the possibility
of biological indistinction in complex organisms such as humans?
Feuerteufel addresses this question as he explains his goals to his visitors. He
introduces himself as “a friend of de species human” as he discusses the posthuman
possibilities of human preservation.91 Lee-as-Megrim has already seen heads and
other body parts preserved as stone, indurated, embalmed, etc. Yet the doctor has
higher ambitions than turning humans into statues; as he unveils his final display, he
boasts that “you shall see how mosh petter it is tan de statues marple . . . py my
process, make him indestructeeble, and not to alter for ever.”92 Here Lee-as-Megrim
encounters the body of Sheppard Lee himself, “looking entirely like a living being,
except that the eyes were fixed in a set unnatural stare, and the attitude was a little
stiff and awkward.”93 Feuerteufel begins to explain the benefits of mummification as a
process of preservation and as a public health concern:
De poddie is made incorruptible, proof against de water, vat you call
water-proof. It is de process for de peoples in zheneral; and I do hopes to
see de day ven it shall pe in universal adopt by all, and no more poddies
put into de earth to rot, and to make de pad health for de peoples dat live.
It is de shtyle for de unwholesome countrees. Zhentlemens, you have
know dat de Egyptians did make all dare friends mummee. Why for dey
do dat? Very good reason. De land upon de Nile vas unwholesome, and
de purrying of de poddies made it vorse.94
Here Feuerteufel makes clear the interdependent relationship between human bodies
and the environment, as bodies have a biological effect on climate and vice versa. The
German doctor also echoes the writings of Buffon and C.F. Volney in making his
claims about unwholesome environments specific to America: “I have devise my plan
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for de benefit of America, vich is de most unwholesome land in de earth, full of de
exhalation and de miasm, de effluvium from de decay animal and vegetable.”95 The
human body, then, is put in conversation with the bodies of other animals and even
vegetables in its ability to decay, to be made ill, and to be disposed of properly. It is
perhaps worth noting that the doctor sees his process as a democratic one, as he
plans to make this type of preservation available to all people, not just the rich: “I have
de full and complete specimens of de process for make de sheep [cheap] mummee, de
mummee of flesh and plood.”96 Yet even on this point, the novel struggles with the
tension between democracy and slavery. When Lee reoccupies his own body and flees,
the doctor chases him through multiple states, repeating “Stop my mummy!”97 This
reenactment of a body considered property fleeing north while being chased by an
owner again places the danger of occupying other bodies alongside the very real
tensions over slavery and democracy in nineteenth-century America.
Feuerteufel’s democratic and utilitarian view of human preservation also recalls
Lee’s own earlier thoughts on democracy, which similarly reflect a posthuman
sensibility. These remarks provide the best representation of Bird’s own politics of
indistinction: whereas Shelley’s disenchantment led her to a vision of human
extinction and abstract dreams of a posthuman world, Bird embraces an organic and
embodied view of posthumanity that only sees the value of humanity extending
beyond this life in nonhuman forms—even as those forms remain dependent on the
prior construction of human selves. Perhaps the best example of this desire occurs
when Lee-as-Skinner makes the conscious decision to switch bodies. At that moment,
he pauses for the first time to reflect on his ability to inhabit other corpses:
[T]hat I possessed the power to transfer my spirit, whenever I willed it,
from one man’s body to another, and so get rid of any afflictions that
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might beset me, was highly agreeable. . . . But there was one drawback
to my satisfaction; and that was the discovery which I now made, that
men’s bodies were not to be had every day, at a moments warning.98
Bird imagines himself being able to rid his ailments by crossing the boundaries that
separate one human self from another. Unlike Shelley, however, whose characters
sought an end to illness and pain by imagining ethereal posthuman creatures that
would inhabit the world after them, Bird locates his ability to transcend the human in
the body itself. This leads him to the most important digression in his text:
I cannot help observing, that it is an extremely absurd practice thus to
dispose of—to squander and throw away, I may call it—the hosts of
human bodies that are annually falling dead upon our hands; whereas,
with the least management in the world, they might be converted into
objects of great usefulness and value.99
The first example he gives in this digression seems obvious: Lee suggests that bodies
should be used to enrich the soil naturally by making them into manure. Yet his
interest in repurposing the human body also leads back to questions about rank and
distinction; he satirically offers suggestions for preserving social and political
distinctions after death, thus resisting the leveling power of death to turn all humans
into mere bodies. He proposes, for example, that the president of the United States
could be boiled down to soap, “to be used by his successor in scouring the
constitution and the minds of the people” and notes, “the rich and tender would
esteem it a cruelty to be disposed of in the same way as the multitude.”100 Lee then
suggests that the multitude could perhaps be converted into spermaceti for candles or
lamp posts “whereby those who never shone in life might scintillate as the lights of the
public for a week or two after.”101
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Perhaps more interesting is that Lee begins to speculate about how these
repurposed bodies might still embody the democratic principles of the multitude. He
asserts this of the multitude: “Their bones might be made into rings and whistles, for
infant democrats to cut their teeth on.”102 Here, democracy seems to be embodied in
the bones themselves of the indistinct multitude. Lee also talks about another option,
one that more closely reflects the chemical experiments of Feuerteufel, “converting the
human body into different mineral substances. One man changes his neighbour’s
bones into fine glass; a second turns the blood into iron; while a third, more
successful still, transforms the whole body into stone.”103 These reflections lead Lee
back to questions about the indistinct self and its political complexion or constitution.
If the elements of the body can be rendered indistinct and the promise of humanity
might be reduced to material uses of the body after this life (a nonhuman
posthumanity), what are we left with? If we are accountable neither to the unstable
consciousness of the self, nor to the bodies we inhabit, who can be held responsible
for democracy? Bird’s inability to answer that question sufficiently, perhaps, accounts
for Lee’s retreat into madness at the novel’s close. Like Shelley, Bird ultimately backs
away from the posthuman as something tempting but unsustainable.
I want to conclude by placing the posthuman possibilities presented by Lee
alongside the question Lee-as-Skinner asks earlier in the novel: “What mode of
existence then was most likely to secure the content that I sought?”104 While, on a
basic level, this is a biological question about selfhood (who Lee wants to be), it is also
a deeply political question. This marks the first example of forethought by Lee as he
seeks out a new body; with it, he stops being reactionary. If, as I’ve argued, these
transformations serve as a type of political commentary, what does it mean for Bird to
attack the same reactionary (revolutionary) changes Lee seeks for the first half of the
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novel? To what extent does Bird embrace the “varieties of untried being” Burke feared,
yet worry about the lack of forethought given to these varieties? This tension perhaps
highlights why, ultimately, indistinction is as unsustainable in Bird as it is in Brown
and Shelley. Indistinction always destabilizes the political imagination, but it is also
endlessly tempting and subtly threatening; it can never stabilize into a utopian vision.
This explains why the posthuman visions of Shelley and Bird can never materialize
without leading to human extinction or madness. That these authors leave us with
reflections on petrification (statues) and/or mummification points to the ways political
and biological constructions of the human remain bound by history and mortality.
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NOTES
Bird’s political views do map quite nicely onto the views of Samuel Stanhope Smith. The Whigs were
natural descendants of the Federalists, and Bird’s complex relationship to race, politics, and indistinction
is reminiscent of the tensions that also haunted Smith’s political views. See Chapter 1.
1

2

This turn to madness, if we take it seriously, might make this novel a dystopian vision of indistinction.

It is worth noting, however, that Bird does not engage with gender indistinction. He is willing to explore
various men, a slave, animals, and inanimate objects—but he never imagines crossing gender boundaries.
3

I should note that this is not only about slavery. Immigration, women’s rights, temperance, and
industrialization were also part of the “radical” changes taking place in this period.
4

Like Brown and Shelley, Bird retains a certain ambivalence toward indistinction—he despairs at the
possibility that every station in American life is equally miserable. His relationship to expansion and
slavery is equally complicated. Nick of the Woods—although it interestingly troubles the pervasive
savage/civilized distinction in this period—is often criticized as an Indian-hating novel that champions
expansionist philosophies. His depiction of Sheppard Lee as a slave late in the novel is already a far cry
from his neoclassical depiction of slavery and republicanism seen in his play The Gladiator, which was
produced only five years earlier. And while he often invokes sympathies towards slaves, Bird also seems
ready in his fiction and his public statements to deny the very rights he invokes.
5

Although Bird was an admirer of Burke for his rhetoric and republicanism, his novel marks a shift away
from a politics of indistinction that is directly engaging with the Burkean politics of an age of democratic
revolutions. Instead, against the backdrop of increasingly polarizing debates about the institution of
slavery and the nature of humanity for Africans, the politics at play in this period are less about
democracy as a revolutionary break with the tyranny of monarchy, and more invested in the increasingly
complicated relationship between democracy, expansion, and the institution of slavery. As I argue later,
Bird ultimately looks more Lockean than Burkean in his engagement with accountability and form.
6

Like other Whigs, Bird saw the revolution and the founders as a classical drama played out on American
soil. This is particularly clear in his early dramatic works. I argue that this emphasis on the importance of
classical influences, republicanism, and rhetoric aligns Bird with a sense of the sublime that—like we saw
with Wollstonecraft—draws on the work of Longinus.
7

Cynthia Wall, “The Castle of Otranto: A Shakespearo-Politico Satire?” in Historical Boundaries, Narrative
Forms: Essays on British Literature in the Long Eighteenth Century in Honor of Everett Zimmerman, ed.
Lorna Clymer and Robert Mayer (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 2007), 185.
8

9

Michael Seidel, Satiric Inheritance: Rabelais to Sterne (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 4.

Robert Montgomery Bird, Sheppard Lee: Written by Himself, ed. Christopher Looby (New York: New York
Review of Books, 2008), 140.
10

11

Bird, Sheppard Lee, 140-141.
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Ibid., 141.

13

Locke, Human Understanding, 340-341.

14

Ibid., 339.

15

Bird, 202.

Here I find myself persuaded by Wolfram Schmidgen’s reading of Locke in Exquisite Mixture, and argue
that Bird is also participating in a construction of personhood in which “unity and identity rests on a
complicated set of relationships, not on a form or essence.” Schmidgen, Exquisite Mixture: The Virtues of
Impurity in Early Modern England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 133. That Bird is
not an essentialist is important to understanding the stakes of his later transformation into a black slave.
16
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Bird, 273.

We might note that the name Arthur Megrim is similar to Arthur Mervyn, and that Bird’s hero, Walter
Scott, also named a character Arthur Mervyn in Guy Mannering—presumably after Brown’s character.
18

19

Bird, 248.

Near the end of his chapter on identity, as he explores the relationship between actions, accountability,
and selfhood, Locke argues that the self is the same as person, and that person is “a Forensick Term,”
capable of “appropriating Actions and their Merit.” Locke, 346.
20

21

Bird, 47.

22

Ibid., 98.

23

Ibid., 101.

24

Ibid., 105.

Lee’s remaining transformations similarly bind sleep and transformation together. When he transfers
his spirit into Tom’s slave body, for example, he writes: “If thou art dead, my sable brother, yield my spirit
a refuge in thy useless body. . . . I had no sooner uttered the words than I fell into a trance.” Bird, 327.
This particular transformation is notable for its duration. Tom is out of commission for days afterward,
only to wake up in a strange, primitive (one might even say savage) place. There he finds himself black,
the setting crude, and all men equally miserable, 331-332. In his last transformation before returning to
his own body, Lee inhabits Megrim, which he this time refers to as a “translation,” and notes, “I fell
directly sound asleep,” 374. I will return to these transformations in more depth later in the chapter.
25
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Bird, 194.

27

Ibid., 199.
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Ibid.

29

Ibid., 212.

30

Ibid., 253.

31

Ibid., 235.

32

Ibid., 263.

Peter Schwenger, At the Borders of Sleep: On Liminal Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2012), vii.
33

Schwenger also writes: “If sleep is a plenum, it is also an absence; and this is not as contradictory as it
may sound. In sleep, true sleep stripped of consciousness, we become once more a thing. . . Sleep is an
absence, then—the absence of a self, and of the consciousness that is needed for any knowledge of what
is being experienced by whatever is experiencing it.” Schwenger, Borders of Sleep, x.
34

35

Bird, 106.

Edgar Allan Poe, “Robert M. Bird,” in Essays and Reviews ed. G. R. Thompson (New York: Library of
America, 1984), 389-403: 401.
36

37

Bird, 51.
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Looby, “Introduction,” in Sheppard Lee, xvii.

39

Ibid., xv.
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Ibid., xvii.

Note here about how I draw this reading, in part, from Schmidgen. Schmidgen argues that “Locke’s
insistence on interdependence teaches us that life and consciousness exist through discontinuities and
mutations,” which means “[t]he same man can be different persons.” Schmidgen, Exquisite Mixture, 143.
This reading serves nicely to highlight the ways in which we might consider Bird a Lockean thinker.
41
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Bird, 52.

43

Ibid., 73.

44

Ibid., 109.

45

Ibid.

46

Ibid., 137.

47

Ibid., 235.

48

Ibid., 272.

49

Ibid., 305.

50

Ibid., 306.

51

Ibid.

52

Ibid.

53

Ibid., 308.
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Ibid., 307.

Notice that being south of the Mason-Dixon line changes the classification of blacks. It is the line of
distinction between free and slave—literally transforms status of beings from human to property.
55

56

Bird, 311.

It is also somewhat prescient, since Master Juba, the famous dancer, was still a decade away from
prominence in the United States when Bird published his novel.
57

Cato was similarly present in American political discourse in this period. In 1758, for example, George
Washington wrote to Mrs. George William Fairfax: “I should think our time more agreeably spent believe
me, in playing a part in Cato, with the company you mention, and myself doubly happy in being the Juba
to such a Marcia, as you must make.” Ellison, Cato’s Tears, 69.
58

Although I do not know of a certainty that Bird read Belinda, I do find it unlikely that he was unfamiliar
with Edgeworth’s work. He made good use of the libraries at the New Castle Academy, the Germantown
Academy, and the University of Pennsylvania throughout the 1820s, catalogues which included
Edgeworth’s novels. As an important influence on Sir Walter Scott, Bird’s favorite author, and arguably
the most famous British novelist until Scott, it seems quite likely that Bird encountered Belinda.
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Maria Edgeworth, Belinda, ed. Kathryn J. Kirkpatrick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 346.
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Bird, 336.

62

Ibid., 339.

63

Ibid., 341.

— 218 —

	
  

64

Ibid., 350.

65

Ibid., 354.

66

Ibid., 353.

67

Ibid.

68

Ibid., 305.

69

Ibid., 366.

70

Ibid.

71

Ellison, 48.
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Bird, 357.

A Foucauldian reading of the nineteenth century might argue that accountability increases in this
period from institutions to individuals. As such, Bird’s conflation of individuals and institutions
highlighted earlier is rather striking.
74

Although it is perhaps obvious, we should note that this is not the first reanimation in the novel,
merely the only one to involve galvanism. Similar language can be found as Lee inhabits the body of
Dulmer: “I was brought to life again, greatly to the triumph of my tormentors, before the appearance of a
physician; who, however, subsequently assured me they had revived me with such effect as to give him
double trouble to keep me in the land of the living afterward; for it seems, after being more dead than
alive all that night, I had remained in a kind of stupor all the following day, from which I awoke on the
second morning, well enough, as the doctor prognosticated I would be, but only after I had remained more
than thirty-six hours in a state of insensibility.” Bird, 110.
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Bird, 373.
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Ibid., 397.
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Ibid., 399.

One etymology of chemistry indicates that the term originally comes from the word alchemy, which is
described as an earlier set of practices that included elements of chemistry, metallurgy, philosophy,
89
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astrology, astronomy, mysticism and medicine; it was commonly thought of in relation to the goal of
turning lead or other materials into gold. The word has a contested etymology, however, and may also
trace its history alongside meanings such as attraction, affinity, and mixture.
90

Bird, 400.
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Ibid., 401.

Ibid., 403. Statues or the statuesque are present throughout the novel, often representing a lack of
energy or vigor. Lee himself is initially described as lacking energy; indeed, it is the initial cause of his
problems: “My natural disposition was placid and easy,—I believe I may say sluggish. I was not wanting in
parts, but had as little energy or activity of mind as ever fell to the share of a Jerseyman . . . Ambition was
a passion that never afflicted my mind,” 10-11. One might argue that the entire novel is an attempt to
reanimate (or re-humanize) Lee. Later in the text, Lee writes: “I had not the power to stir; horror and
astonishment chained me to the corner, where I stood as it transformed to stone, unable even to vent my
feelings in a cry,” 245. Crying is human, but remains inaccessible. Lee, instead, becomes statuesque, with
no power to move. Additional examples include Lee claiming that “human nature was of the nature of
stone” and—when trying to rid himself of Skinner’s body—encountering a body he presumes dead, but it
is actually drunkenly asleep, 297. There he writes, “my hand chancing to touch his face, I found it cold as
marble,” 234. The statuesque in this novel, much like we saw in Shelley’s The Last Man—represents that
liminal space between wakefulness and sleep, and between life and death.
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Ibid., 229.
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Ibid. Lee also proposes that lovers might be converted into jewels, “or, in case of extreme grief on the
part of the survivors, into looking-glasses, where the mourners would find a solace in the contemplation
of their own features,” 229-230. He goes on to write, “But I would confine the process of petrification to
those in whom Nature had indicated its propriety by beginning the process herself. None could with
greater justice claim to have their bodies turned into stone, than those whose hearts were of the same
material; and I should propose, accordingly, that such a transformation of bodies should be made only in
the case of tyrants, heroes, duns, and critics,” 230.
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